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CONTENTS

Toward Controlling International Change: A Personal Plea — *Ernst B. Haas* — 1

Bomber Disarmament — *Jeremy J. Stone* — 13

Patterns of Language Planning in the New States — *Jacob Ornstein* — 40

Society, Economics, and Politics in Contemporary Turkey — *Kemal H. Karpat* — 50

ONUC's Civilian Operations: State-Preserving and State-Building — *Harold Karan Jacobson* — 75

RESEARCH NOTE

Approaches to the Study of Political Development — *Robert A. Packenham* — 108

REVIEW ARTICLES

Rationalizing NATO Strategy — *Malcolm W. Hoag* — 121

Inter-American Politics: Limited Thoughts on the Unthinkable — *Daniel Goldrich* — 143

Toward Further Modernization of the Study of New Nations — *Manfred Halpern* — 157

The Contributors — ii

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TOWARD CONTROLLING INTERNATIONAL CHANGE

A Personal Plea

By ERNST B. HAAS

IN the world of Isaac Asimov the computer programmer is God: he selects the facts and relationships between facts from which as yet unknown correlations flow; thus he rules the world by predicting and manipulating change, and thus he maintains stability.

In our world the programmer has not yet achieved divine status; statesmen and scholars still select facts and deduce relationships from them; their correlations are far from exhaustive and the changes produced by them are intractable to clear prediction or effective manipulation. Of stability there is no trace.

Each of these two worlds possesses certain attractions. That of science fiction—but how much longer will it be fictitious?—assures a minimum of security because it controls change; but it has sacrificed freedom to the conformity which flows from the computer. Our present world offers little security and sacrifices generously to the Mammon of cumulative innovation which approaches hyperbolic chaos; but freedom, of a sort, remains with us as long as the forces of innovation are able to compete fiercely.

Perfect prediction reaffirms the self-fulfilling prophecy: the certainty that a given choice will produce a desired result induces us to adopt that choice, and since no competing predictions are programmed, the desired result becomes history. The imperfect art of forecasting in which our generation of social scientists still indulges need not cause us to fear this outcome as yet, because the very grossness of its procedures assures that lack of certainty which enables us to envisage alternative outcomes.

If, as I shall argue, cumulative innovation is intolerable for a minimal stability in our environment, the means for making it bearable, at least, are still varied enough and the perspectives which define them sufficiently pluralistic to encourage the hope that we may attempt some control over our environment without falling victim to the benign totalitarianism of electronics. If I have cast Asimov's Hari Seldon in the shape of a god, I have deliberately substituted a deterministic future for a probabilistic one. The rule of electronics need not be totali-

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tarian, to be sure, but it sharpens our perceptions to keep the possibility in mind. In any event, my concern is with the probabilistic aspects of the future world environment. As the argument proceeds I shall make my peace with the computer as one promising means for making the future a bearable one.

I

The stability for which many of us yearn is only partly represented by the hope that the major ideological and political chasms of international relations can somehow be contained. Clearly, the forces competing in Vietnam and Berlin, Katanga and Cuba, in Geneva and on the East River, can hardly be considered as giving order and certainty to our lives. Political ideology with religious fervor when also organized into opposing military blocs with thermonuclear toys is hardly a stabilizing factor. Yet I suggest that this kind of tension and uncertainty may be tolerable and comprehensible as compared with the challenge to order which is associated with the cumulative innovation resulting from technology, science, and the economic and social pursuits linked to them. In time the cross-pressures flowing from the nexus of technological possibility, exaggerated human expectations, and frantic efforts at meeting them may capture the instability of the cold war and subsume it. The continuation of cumulative innovation when blindly exploited by the forces of the cold war may yet create a world scenario in which the electronic philosopher-king will be greeted as the savior. Hence I shall address myself to the major technological factors which may make the international environment unlivable in our generation and explore the possibilities for stabilizing them.

Let me present some of these factors. In a perspective of unlimited progress and a better life for the developed as well as the underdeveloped nations, they all appear desirable and praiseworthy. Bearing in mind, therefore, the remaining possibilities of envisaging alternative outcomes, I wish deliberately to explore the conceivably disastrous implications of these factors in our focus of stability and change.

Thus technology, in principle, seems capable of meeting the demands of the revolution of rising expectations. But what happens if in the underdeveloped countries the expectations outstrip the capacity of the political and social system to meet them? What happens in the developed nations when "objective" needs of sharing affluence with the needy in order to head off their revolt against the West—whether under Communist or some other aegis—meet a pervasive and democratically legitimate insistence on husbanding affluence at home and

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investing it in the domestic revolution of still higher expectations, the hopes for a third and fourth car, for the split-level ranch house and the mountain cabin? Is more leisure time a force making for contentment or frustration, for do-it-yourself ceremonies or stormtrooper rites? It is certainly possible that the diffusion of nuclear knowledge will enable energy-poor countries to achieve industrialization at a faster rate; but what is to prevent the same countries from investing this knowledge first in less wholesome pursuits?

It is sometimes suggested that scientific breakthroughs in the field of motivation research, conditioning, teaching, and the not always gentle arts of communication will give us the techniques for making premodern people capable of assimilating, utilizing, and understanding at an ever-faster rate the tools of industrialism and mass consumption. Teaching machines may take the place of human technical assistance. Chemical inducements to "reenforce motivation" (we might call it "positive brainwashing") may eliminate the habits of nepotism, corruption, and status security which presently militate against speedy economic development. Progress in psychology can thus act as a link between the surge of technology and the lagging of societies and attitudes. But what is to guarantee us that the resulting balance will yield international stability rather than chemically, genetically, or verbally induced race hatred, envy, or greed? I suggest that at the moment no group, agency, or government knows how to direct scientific possibilities into politically stabilizing channels.

We might add other disturbing technological forces. In the future it may be possible to control the climate and the rhythm of agricultural production. Would the resulting changes in rural life be stabilizing to the international environment? Successful programs of public health have given us the amply familiar pattern of gigantic population growth before the advent of the industrial revolution and ahead of the completion of the urbanization process. The result is a tendency toward famine, migration, and stagnation in terms of per capita improvements in welfare despite growth in total production. Areas in Asia, Latin America, and Africa in which industrialization has been most rapid have also displayed the greatest amount of political dissatisfaction and social frustration. Is indiscriminate economic development a stabilizing factor? Certainly not in the short run, and—as Keynes assured us—in the long run we will all be dead. To complete this catalog of woe, let us bear in mind that while the industrialization process covers the globe, the older industrial nations tend to "progress" at a still faster rate. Soon we may have synthetics for all the major raw materials.

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Controlled photosynthesis and chemically manipulated genetics may yield economic results that will make national autarky a very simple matter. What, under such conditions, happens to world trade? Do we retrain the entire manpower of the jute industry, the middle-class elements who exist on the processing and sale of coffee? We may have to resort to teaching machines in order to induce these groups to settle down and accept their fate without harassing world stability.

In a dispassionate survey of these trends, the Stanford Research Institute noted that "Scientific developments in the next decade will give rise to or intensify many problems that must engage the attention of foreign policy planners. Scientific developments will also help solve foreign policy problems. But the outlook is that the progress of science and technology will do more to create or intensify than to ameliorate such problems, *unless deliberate policy measures are taken.*"[1] It is not a conflict between C. P. Snow's two cultures, the humanistic and the scientific, which produces this instability. Rather, the destabilizing tendency of technological innovation is more accurately described by Ogburn's notion of cultural lag: as the rate of innovation increases because of the telescoping of research and development time, and as innovation becomes cumulative with the application of new approaches in one field to problems in another, human organization and thought patterns, hallowed values, and formal ideologies cannot keep up, even though they may be willing to undergo change as well. The result may be a wider gap between what world society is able to accomplish in terms of physical or biological knowledge and what it is capable of accommodating in terms of its values.

If the gap remains wide, then indeed cumulative innovation spells hyperbolic international chaos. The problem is compounded by the growth of planned innovation, unmatched by planned human adaptation. Some philosophers of science, like Michael Polanyi, argue that the unplanned forces of unfettered and unsubsidized scientific genius produce the greatest advances because the scientific equivalent of the free market guides their progress. If there were anonymous competition in scientific and technological innovation, we might derive a breathing spell from this condition; but the fact is that monopolistic competition, at best, characterizes the process, in that governments, foundations, and giant corporations guide and direct the areas in which breakthroughs

[1] *Possible Nonmilitary Scientific Developments and Their Potential Impact on Foreign Policy Problems of the United States*, A Study Prepared at the Request of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 86th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, GPO, 1959), 1 (emphasis supplied).

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will be scored. Therefore innovation becomes the more terrible because it has acquired a systematic as well as a cumulative character. Can nations singly, or in concert, "plan" to adapt themselves to this trend? Can they assimilate innovation that corresponds to certain values professed by their citizens while also controlling it so as to protect other and equally fervently held values? Can they reconcile the competing values so as to avoid civil strife, mass frustration, new imperialisms, and uncharted anxieties? To this question we now turn.

II

One currently fashionable attempt to close the gap can be described only as contemporary chiliasm. The not always complementary notions of immediate world federation with world law and of instantaneous and possibly unilateral disarmament provide cases in point. Sometimes these nostrums are held out as sufficient in themselves to get us beyond chaos. At best they seek to eliminate those aspects of technical innovation which relate to the waging of war, thus leaving untouched the disturbing aspects of change which might threaten us with instability even if only crossbows and poisoned darts were available.

More to the point is a psychiatric variety of chiliasm—as, for instance, that preached by Erich Fromm and Brock Chisholm. Fromm would cure us by introducing an intense personal creative life and the force of social love; Chisholm sees world federalism as a kind of mass psychotherapy designed to prod mankind toward adult maturity from its present infantile approach to international problem-solving. The more intractable the problem becomes—because childlike approaches toward its solution are adopted—the more regressive national anxieties and policies grow. If we were to grant—though I am very far from willing to do so—that all conflict is irrational and curable by proper therapy, then this approach would still not help us in our predicament because modern states plainly are not rest homes ruled over by omniscient psychiatrist-kings. For better or for worse, the political conflicts of nations which overlap with the technological threats are perceived as rational in the minds of the real kings. And the adaptation of international society with its diverse values to the challenge of technological and scientific chaos must therefore proceed within the vise of the values as perceived by these kings.

It has been suggested that our kings—the decision-makers—be subjected to intensive motivational research in order to weed out those plagued by personality factors which cannot adjust to pure problem-

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solving behavior. This would no doubt be feasible in terms of our growing knowledge of emotional manipulation. If we knew precisely what problem required solving and which underlying values were the most desirable, this kind of certainty would be as acceptable as that provided by the computer. Actually we should remind ourselves that the innate political values of men and groups in society *have*—in a sense, spontaneously—displayed some remarkable adaptive tendencies. It seems to me that the actual adaptation to industrialism is much more rapid today in totalitarian as well as in free societies than it was during the onset of the industrial revolution. Still, the travail engendered by that social cataclysm, as described in Karl Polanyi's *The Great Transformation*, is hardly such as to make its imitation in the now-developing countries a desirable event; accounts of mass behavior in Calcutta and São Paulo suggest that social adaptation to modernity is far from smooth. Perhaps the cultural lag is growing shorter in the West, or perhaps the negative reaction is only being delayed; but the specter of automation, for instance, seems kind as compared with the anguish caused by the spinning jenny. The nations of the West look so different today than they did in the 1930's and the victory of the welfare state is so complete as to suggest that national societies do learn to assimilate innovation. Values inimical to industrialism do yield, and aspects of the mass egalitarian society gain acceptance, in the sense that their opponents make reluctant peace with the new and still remain members of the society. If this is true at the national level, why cannot the same occur internationally? Can we not turn to action patterns of a non-chiliastic nature to eliminate cultural lag?

One way of doing this would be to continue to seek human adaptation to a changing international technology whose rate of progression remains unchecked. I do not know whether this is possible without serious schizophrenia, but the chiliasts as well as the actual historical pattern of adaptation suggest that, thus far, man has been malleable and technology rigidly demanding. To reverse the pattern would slow down economic and technical advance, but it would save us from the hyperbolic chaos to which unchecked innovation may lead. I therefore wish to look at the theoretical possibility of foreshortening the cultural lag by controlling the rate of innovation. Wishing to avoid the tyranny of the computer and feeling encouraged by the demonstrated inability of many famous scientists to forecast the effects of their own discoveries, I shall try to see, in the words of Robert Heilbroner, "the future as history." I am under no illusion that I am engaging in precise forecasting. But I also have shed the illusion that we can rely on

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the automatic forces of some impersonal divinity of competition to sift the desirable in science from the undesirable, to arrive at peace by unplanned rivalry, or to achieve stability on the basis of unilinear international economic and social progress. It is too late for any unbounded optimism in yearning for a world corresponding somehow to liberal values. But perhaps it is not yet too late for the reasoned pessimism which hopes merely to avert the worst by the application of historically sanctioned planning.

Historically sanctioned planning seeks to exercise that modicum of freedom of the will available to man within the sluggish context of abstract historical development. In the classical terminology, it involves the strategic exercise of *virtù*—albeit of a rather unheroic character—in a setting of *necessità*. Evolutionary changes involving the uncontrolled revolution of rising expectations in the material sense, the upsurging resentment against poverty, inequality, and indignity based on race, the snowballing of civilian and military science and technology as well as the possibilities of successful mass manipulation—all these are natural consequences of earlier unplanned historical developments: they cannot simply be brought to a stop. All man can do is to envisage possible alternative outcomes, predict the worst, and seek to guard against it with the limited means free will gives him. Planning and control, therefore, are conceivable only *within* these surging forces. But the example of successful totalitarian-revolutionary societies teaches us—among other things—that a conscious direction of the development of economic and political patterns is possible. In the words of Robert Heilbroner, "The possibility posed by history is not that of denying the advent of planning, but of seizing control of it to assure the kind of collective economic responsibility we want. . . . The issue is not the simple and clear-cut one of a greater or lesser freedom. It is the difficult and clouded choice of a subservience to the necessities imposed by the forces visibly at work in our midst, or the perilous freedom of an exercise of historic control over ourselves."[2]

This approach to planning is as germane to the solution of our national and local problems as it is to the international environment. But we have more control over the national scene, both in terms of legal powers and because of a greater homogeneity of values. The true challenge to *virtù*, then, lies in the effort to address ourselves to the kind of international planning which is historically sanctioned, which is conceivable within the confines of the hostile material, ideological, and military forces besieging us. And in this manner we may possibly suc-

[2] *The Future as History* (New York 1961), 188-89.

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ceed in stemming some of the destabilizing factors which threaten the international scene with even more terror than the thermonuclear variety to which some of us are growing accustomed.

III

To the superficial observer, contemporary international organizations appear to be very frail institutions for stabilizing anything: their involvement in the exchange of propaganda broadsides and their failures in guaranteeing the firm military security of the member states receive such disproportionate attention. But if viewed against the backdrop of the fundamental changes which the international environment has undergone since 1945, the organizations which make up the United Nations system appear to be remarkably adaptive contrivances. If such organizations manage to survive drastic changes in the nature of their membership and in the demands which the members pose, they must, by definition, adapt themselves. Since few such organizations possess an organic self apart from and greater than the sum of their member states, this is another way of saying that an evolving environment tends to convince the nations that new tasks can and should be imposed on established international organizations. To the extent that they are adaptive, then, international organizations are themselves part of the historical process and can become institutions of self-conscious historically sanctioned planning. I urge this view of the United Nations in order to expose as analytically erroneous and morally vicious the position of the patriotic realist who either shrugs off or condemns international organizations as "idealistic" or "utopian." But I also urge it to call attention to the historical soundness of these contrivances in juxtaposing them to the chiliastic impatience of the world federalist who would deny the moral validity of the existing nation-state system.

But thus to assert the integral role of the United Nations in the modern world is not to prove its capacity to deal with the problem of cultural lag. The policies followed hitherto in that organization with reference to technical, scientific, and economic innovation, far from foreshortening the cultural lag, have in fact contributed heavily to its intensification. Technical and economic assistance programs, because of the poor coordination and lack of prescience which have accompanied their implementation, have piled innovation upon innovation without apparent regard for the possibilities of chaos which remain implicit in this pursuit. If we wish to slow down the process of innovation by central planning to bring it into harmony with the adaptive capacity

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of underdeveloped societies, we must first alert the member governments to the dangers of chaos.

Examples such as the desperate birth control campaigns and the desire to gear the rate of industrialization to the expansion of the agricultural sector in India suggest that some awareness of the chaotic implications of unchecked innovation already exists. The first need, therefore, is to reenforce this sense of danger and to call attention to the intensification of the cultural lag. This must be followed by efforts within the United Nations system to stress the possibilities of controlling the process of innovation insofar as it is influenced by United Nations programs. Essentially this involves an effort to persuade the member nations to negotiate among themselves the kind of agreements which would subordinate development to planning, crass innovation to ordered evolution.

There is no more effective way of doing this than to follow the standard method adopted by the specialized agencies and regional economic organizations in launching major new programs. A general conference of the membership must be called; this, because of the heterogeneity of its composition and the complexity of the subject matter, will yield only the most general consensus; it will then be followed by meetings of experts, loosely and permissively instructed, aided by totally uninstructed experts from the international secretariats involved. Provided the recommendations of these experts address themselves to a problem experienced in common by all the member states, there is every reason to believe that not even the major ideological tensions of our period can block their adoption in some form. Once this much is accomplished, it would be a relatively small matter to bend the policies of such established international institutions as the Special Fund and the International Bank in the direction of controlling rather than accumulating innovation.

From an initial basis of field-by-field *ad hoc* consultations, there may emerge a modest international brain trust for the general planning of innovation. Composed of eminent scientists and philosophers and representing East, West, and neutrals, it would take as its task the review of all technical and scientific inventions in order to assess their probable impact on society. When persuaded that, if used properly, a given invention would conduce to orderly progress, this panel of reviewers could then license the invention for general application; the unlicensed utilization of inventions would become punishable. I can live with the idea of new drugs capable of controlling heredity and able to shape individual motivation only if their use is subjected to this

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kind of scrutiny; I am emboldened to think that adherents of mutually antagonistic ideologies would feel the same if they suspected that the enemy might otherwise possess a weapon favorable to himself.

While this review should be applied to all kinds of inventions, its efficacy is suggested, in fact, by the existing international system of control over narcotic drugs. Ideological differences have prevented its proposed application to the field of disarmament. But I suggest that a shared awareness of uncharted chaos resulting from scientific developments not yet consummated is a more potent source of shared fears than the existence of weapons to which we have, for better or for worse, adapted ourselves.

IV

More specific areas of possible agreement on which even ideological enemies can come to terms remain to be sketched now. The problems involved in the penetration of outer space provide us with an initial example of modest successes. A mere list of the peaceful implications of space lore suggests the existence of interests necessarily shared if the aims of any one nation are to be secured: orderly use of satellites for telecommunications purposes, cooperative weather forecasting and eventual weather control, aids to navigation, space colonization with a minimum of danger and conflict, and space exploration as a research tool in connection with biology, psychology, geophysics, and astrophysics. Some of these activities are irrelevant to the issue of socially destructive innovation; others, such as weather control, are central to it. But all of them, unless subjected to the order of space law and the rule of a central agency, will compound the chaos that accompanies intense political competition mixed with scientific rivalry.

While the Asimovs and the Bradburys predicted this dilemma some decades ago, governments have just begun to grasp it. Insofar as they merely seek to utilize space exploration in connection with political prestige and armament rivalries, they stretch the cultural lag rather than adapt innovation to world stability. The first halting and wholly inadequate steps of the United Nations Committee on Outer Space nevertheless suggest that governments, whether from conviction or from shame, are beginning to consider alternative and adaptive approaches. The Soviet-American agreement to explore possibilities of joint space research suggests the same trend. But let us recall the procedure used: scientists in their private capacities, united in the International Council of Scientific Unions, created the Committee on Space

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Research (COSPAR) and unofficially explored the areas where joint endeavors should supersede competitive ones. General discussion among worried governments in the United Nations was followed by expert proposals and met the private initiatives of COSPAR, to be followed eventually by efforts at a specific intergovernmental agreement, albeit as yet only bilateral. I do not wish to argue that scientists should be kings any more than computer programmers; but I do suggest that the contribution of scientists to the international control of innovation is indispensable once governments define the area of their common concern.

Where might this example be imitated? Gearing the massive advances in sanitation, maternal and child welfare, and disease control to the possibilities of expanding food production and limiting birth rates strikes me as fundamental. The World Health and Food and Agriculture Organizations should have one integrated program instead of undoing each other's work. If doctors and agronomists presented joint rather than competitive programs to the governments of underdeveloped nations, we might get beyond this dreary and destabilizing cycle.

This type of coordination is relatively simple. But it is equally urgent that we learn to control the unsettling consequences of economic development and social modernization. We have learned, to our chagrin, that economic development is as likely to result in political chaos as in peace, democracy, and welfare. We now accept that managerial and administrative skills, social mobility and literacy, an inquiring mind as well as a full belly, are essential to economic progress. Yet the typical stages of economic growth so tellingly outlined by W. W. Rostow tell us little of the necessary human adaptations and gloss over the deeply destabilizing social consequences. We must therefore establish the proper priorities and ratios of the kind and rate of development required *in each sector* if we wish to achieve net economic gain without social chaos. We should not aim at maximal economic development but at minimal social dislocation while introducing modernity. It is in this context that I am glad to make my peace with the computer. If operations research can determine the proper priorities for us in given national settings, I would hasten to make the establishment of a United Nations Computer Center a matter of urgency in my search to subordinate indiscriminate innovation to international planning and review. If computerized research on value change among crucial elites can teach us something systematic about the adaptive capacity of nations, I would endorse the Center's continuing the work begun by Stanford's RADIR Project over a decade ago.

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Computers might also be very useful in helping decide which new products, such as synthetics, could be thrown on the world market without causing any intolerable dislocation of established production, trade, and income patterns. The unplanned training of engineers and chemists, each eager to perfect processes destined to disturb some established economic pursuit, is certainly more laden with political danger today than it was in the days of James Watt. Already the United Nations Special Fund and the group of UN investment agencies largely determine which skills and which industries shall enjoy international support in the development process. Would it be such a radical step to add the analysis of probable dislocations and the prescription of proper timing in the introduction of innovations affecting world trade?

There can be legitimate doubt that the "new conservatism" in America is any more than ideological sentimentalism or plain nostalgia for a pre-New Deal society. But it may be suggested that a more meaningful conservatism is a dedication to the averting of international chaos by the kind of modest planning which flows from an understanding of social science and of history.

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BOMBER DISARMAMENT

By JEREMY J. STONE*

THIS article deals with bomber disarmament as a partial measure which might be agreed upon by the two major powers in the absence of more general progress toward disarmament. However, much of it is relevant to the suggestion that bomber disarmament be linked to the U.S. proposal for a freeze on procurement of strategic weapons. The relationship between a strategic freeze and bomber disarmament is very close.[1]

Our conclusions are simple and can be summarized here. The U.S. proposal to destroy obsolescent B-47's and outdated Soviet Badgers does not go far enough.[2] This agreement may well prevent further bomber disarmament for political reasons, and will, from a strategic point of view, do little more than would result from a few more years of obsolescence. On the other hand, the Soviet suggestion that all air force bombers throughout the world be destroyed seems—if taken literally—to be both ill-defined and unworkable.[3] We propose something that is likely to be quite desirable on strategic grounds, although it may be politically infeasible either here or in the Soviet Union. We suggest that

* This article is based primarily on Congressional Hearings of the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. Several different Secretaries of Defense, including Secretary McNamara, have emphasized both by direct comment and by the depth of their disclosures before these committees how important it is that potential adversaries appreciate the extent of our strength. As a result, these hearings are very useful for those interested in assessing the implications of disarmament agreements.

I am greatly indebted to Margaret Keating for her research and typing assistance. I am also grateful to many readers of a privately circulated draft for comments.

[1] Since a major Soviet objection to the U.S. proposal for a freeze is its failure to provide for some physical disarmament, the destruction of bombers would encourage Soviet acceptance of the freeze. Such Soviet acceptance is probably necessary to gain U.S. participation in bomber disarmament, inasmuch as growing Soviet missile forces during bomber disarmament would make a separate agreement on bombers considerably more difficult politically and in other ways. If the Soviet Union did accept the freeze proposal, bomber disarmament would be very likely to follow, since one-for-one replacement of obsolescent bombers is not very practical, especially in the United States, after production lines have been closed down.

[2] William C. Foster, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Secretary of State Rusk broached this possibility informally to Soviet officials on the occasion of the signing of the test ban in Moscow (*New York Times*, January 29, 1964).

[3] The Soviet proposal was contained in a memorandum presented to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference on January 28, 1964 (*ibid.*). The Soviet Union has since suggested that there is a possibility of "agreeing to start with the major powers" (*ibid.*, April 3, 1964), has promised to be "flexible" in negotiating, and has indicated that it will come forward with a series of proposals (*ibid.*, June 20, 1964).

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both sides simply phase out (and destroy) B-47's and Badgers, and that they begin proportional (heavy) bomber disarmament by phasing out (and destroying) Soviet Bears and Bisons along with U.S. B-52's over the next few years. The U.S. case for heavy bomber dismantlement is surprisingly strong. It would not only eliminate the Soviet bomber threat but it would also free several hundred missiles now tied down by the need to target Soviet bomber bases and Soviet air defense installations. U.S. savings would result from smaller air defense efforts and from the elimination of bomber maintenance costs. And U.S. bombers are playing an ever more marginal role in the U.S. strategy—hence their dismantlement would not be a great loss.

I. U.S. Bombers and Soviet Air Defenses

Composition of the U.S. bomber force

The United States has several thousand planes capable of dropping nuclear weapons. In view of the fact that very small tactical nuclear weapons exist, almost any plane could in principle deliver a nuclear weapon if no penetration or range problems existed. And, in particular, carrier- and European-based fighter bombers carrying nuclear weapons could reach Soviet targets to varying depths. With the procurement of the F-111 (TFX), the distinction between fighters and strategic bombers will be still further clouded. This plane will be capable of flying to Europe without refueling. It is known to have a nonstop ferry range of 3,300 miles and a bomb load capability of 10,000 lbs.[4] It will also be capable of aerial refueling.

There is little likelihood of eliminating these tactical bomber capabilities from the U.S. arsenal in any agreement that does not simultaneously have far-reaching implications for many other weapon systems. Such planes are designed for limited war, particularly for limited war in Europe. There is relatively little uncertainty in the U.S. Department of Defense concerning their utility. This is in sharp contrast to the controversy concerning strategic aircraft.[5]

[4] U.S. Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964*, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963, 191-93. It will cost "less than $3 or 3 1/2 million per plane," according to Dr. Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering (U.S. Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1963*, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, 1962, 977).

[5] For instance, Dr. Harold Brown testified: "In the case of tactical aircraft, Senator Thurmond, I think that the need will continue, so far or as far forward as I can see, 10 years, 20 years, indefinitely.

"For strategic aircraft it is harder to say. I am pretty sure the strategic aircraft will be important and useful as bombardment vehicles for at least another 5 years. They

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Therefore, while it is highly likely that tactical aircraft would be treated in detail in a general disarmament agreement, it seems equally clear that any partial measures or first steps that are to involve bombers *alone* should emphasize strategic aircraft.

The existing U.S. force of strategic bombers falls into three fleets:[6]

(1) About 700 subsonic B-52 (Stratofortress) heavy bombers. These planes have a best range of 10,000-12,500 miles and are capable of aerial refueling. Some carry only multi-megaton free-fall bombs but others, alternatively or in addition, carry two Hound Dog (4 MT) missiles capable of traveling a distance of about 600 miles (gross weight: 450,000 to 488,000 lbs; typical performance: 600 mph at 50,000 feet). These planes became operational in the period 1955-1962.

(2) About 700 subsonic B-47 (Stratojet) medium bombers. These planes can be refueled in flight. They have a best range of 3,200 miles (gross weight: 200,000 lbs; typical performance: 600 mph at 40,000 feet). These planes became operational in the period 1952-1957.

(3) 80 supersonic B-58 (Hustler) medium bombers. These planes can be refueled in flight and have a range of more than 5,000 miles at cruise (gross weight: 160,000 lbs; typical performance: subsonic cruise, Mach 2 dash). These planes became operational in 1960.

The B-52 subsonic heavy bombers (Stratofortresses) make up the largest and the most important element in the strategic bomber force. A B-52 can fly from the United States to the Soviet heartland with a 10,000-pound bomb load and return without refueling.[7] These bombers are *not* being phased out of the existing force, and the projected decline in their numbers over the next five years is due only to expected attrition. In all, 744 of these aircraft have been procured. No further procurement is planned, and it is estimated that 630 will be in the force in 1968.[8] (Since there are 45 planes in a wing, this represents 14 wings of B-52's.) However, the last B-52 was procured in 1962 and the production lines

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may be important for another 10 years, but I am not sure about what happens then or after then." (U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Military Procurement Authorization, Fiscal Year 1964*, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963, 475.)

[6] This information is taken from Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1963-1964* (London 1963); *International Aerospace Specification Tables*, issued by *Aviation Week & Space Technology* (New York 1963); Hanson W. Baldwin, "Strategic Air Outlook," *New York Times*, November 21, 1963; and U.S. Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1962*, 87th Congress, 1st Session, 1961, 862-63.

[7] U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960*, Part 1, 86th Congress, 1st Session, 1959, 800.

[8] U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Military Procurement Authorization, Fiscal Year 1963*, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, 1962, 47.

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have been closed down. There are no serious advocates of further procurement of B-52's, although there is some uncertainty concerning their expected lifetime.[9] Part of the problem is the difficulties that the airplanes expect to have in penetrating Soviet defenses, should war occur. Expensive modifications (retrofitting) in the B-52 structures have been undertaken in anticipation of these problems. They have already cost $1.6 billion, with an additional $306 million requested for fiscal year 1965.[10]

The aging B-47's are gradually being phased out of service on a schedule that has not changed during the last three fiscal years. The last B-47 will leave active service in 1966.[11] In early 1963, there were still about 700 such planes in the operational force.

The B-58 bombers are not being phased out of the force, but no more are likely to be procured. It is estimated that, as a result of attrition, there will be 72 B-58's in the force in 1968.[12] These bombers have had their reliability problems, as evidently all bombers do.[13] Secretary McNamara recalls being at Omaha on a day when "almost literally all of our B-58 bombers were unavailable for alert status because of mechanical failure."[14] Later testimony indicates that these reliability problems have eased. But the unit cost of B-58 bombers has been high ($10 to 12 million)[15] and since B-58's have a smaller bomb-load capability and shorter range than a B-52, they are not especially favored. Generals LeMay,

[9] For instance, the Air Force Chief of Staff was asked how long the B-58's and B-52's could be kept in operation. He replied: "This is very difficult to answer. . . . everyone assumes that these airplanes are going to go on indefinitely, that we will be able to fly them indefinitely. This may not be the case. They may wear out sooner than we think they are going to wear out.

"There is a lot that we don't know about fatigue in these modern high-performance airplanes. So this bothers me, that we may have to discard these airplanes sooner than we think." (Senate, *Defense Appropriations for 1964*, 356.)

[10] Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before the House Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1965-1969 Defense Program and 1965 Defense Budget, January 27, 1964, 33. (Cited hereafter as McNamara Statement.)

[11] See *Military Procurement, 1964*, 47; and, for a recent reaffirmation of the policy, McNamara Statement, 33.

[12] U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964*, Part 1, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963, 246.

[13] For instance, in 1956, four years after the first procurement of B-47's, they had an in-commission rate of only 65 per cent (U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on the Air Force of the Committee on Armed Services, *Air Power*, Part 11, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, 1956, 83).

[14] *Military Procurement, 1964*, 96.

[15] U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1962*, Part v, 87th Congress, 1st Session, 1961, 467-69.

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Power, and White all would prefer buying additional B-52's to B-58's, and in this judgment Secretary McNamara has concurred.[16]

U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARD BOMBERS

There is a school of opinion in the United States which is concerned that the manned bomber will disappear and which believes that a new fleet of bombers would be useful. In part this seems to stem from a conservative view of what constitutes utility in strategic weapons. For instance, General Taylor explained in 1959 that the other Joint Chiefs did not agree with him that we then had "an excess number of strategic weapons and weapons systems in the atomic retaliatory force." They felt, in his view, that ". . . there are so many incalculable factors that you can never over-insure in this field."[17]

But the urge to maintain bombers also arises from other factors, not all of which are especially subject to strategic analysis. In the eyes of their supporters, bombers are tried and true, but missiles are not. Often there are evident personal attachments to bombers. The top Air Force generals, and even some of the Senators most concerned about bombers, have had long personal experience in flying or directing them. Their concern is associated almost invariably with the "flexibility" that would be lost with the last manned strategic system. And evidently any manned system will do, no matter what its purpose.[18]

Perhaps a more fundamental obstacle to bomber disarmament, however, lies in the accumulated influence of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and its bomber forces as a result of its prime responsibility for deterrence during the 1950's. For instance, in *On Thermonuclear War*, Herman Kahn compares the U.S. dependence on the SAC bomber fleet to the British Empire's dependence on the British fleet.[19] Those who once molded SAC into an all-important force are naturally reluctant to see it disbanded. And the efficiency with which the Strategic Air Command officers have seemed to discharge their responsibilities has, over the years, heightened their influence in the Congress and else-

[16] *Ibid.*, Part v, 465, and Part vi, 192.

[17] House, *Defense Appropriations for 1960*, Part 1, 330-31.

[18] Secretary of the Air Force Zuckert testified: "We believe that as the General [LeMay] has pointed out, that our proper strategic posture demands some kind of a manned system because of the flexibility it gives you. If the B-70 proves to be a blind alley for any reason we have to explore all the other methods because we have to come up with a manned system, in our opinion." He then referred to the B-70 (2,000-mph supersonic bomber devoted to reconnaissance), Dromedary (a long-endurance, large, slow airplane designed to fly up to 48 hours, but not to penetrate defenses at all), and a low-altitude penetrator. (House, *Defense Appropriations for 1964*, Part II, 530-31.)

[19] Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton 1960), 373.

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where. This only begins to indicate the U.S. political obstacles to bomber disarmament.

THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF U.S. BOMBERS

The strategic role of U.S. bombers is severely limited by four characteristics. Bombers are vulnerable on the ground, slow to target, and of uncertain penetration capability, and they must be committed very early in a war. These problems will be discussed in order.

First, the U.S. bomber force cannot be depended upon for a high rate of survival from an enemy surprise attack because it is very vulnerable on the ground. In normal periods, in order to minimize this vulnerability, half of the SAC bomber force is maintained on a 15-minute ground alert with a small number on airborne alert.[20] The 15-minute warning is supposed to be provided by Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) stations in Clear, Alaska, Thule, Greenland, and Fylingsdale, United Kingdom.[21] Such notice would not be given if missiles were fired over the Antarctic—a widely discussed possibility that has been mentioned by Khrushchev, but one that would be expensive in accuracy and in payload—or if submarine-launched missiles were used. (Similarly, the Cuban missiles would have "outflanked" the warning system.)[22] The submarine-launched missiles, especially, pose a potential threat to ground-based bombers.[23] Against such problems the Department of Defense has maintained the capability to fly one-eighth of the B-52 force on airborne alert for about one year.[24] And the number of SAC bases has steadily grown in number. SAC now presents 55 domestic air base targets, 13 foreign targets, and, in times of immediate emergency, can be dispersed to 100 fields.[25] Even after

[20] McNamara Statement, 33. [21] *Military Procurement, 1963*, 64-65.

[22] Had heavy bombers been absent from the U.S. force, the strategic concern over Soviet missiles in Cuba would have been diminished, since the missiles would have had no highly profitable targets. This indicates one of the ways in which bomber disarmament will have a stabilizing effect.

[23] Secretary McNamara believes that "toward the latter part of this decade, we must anticipate that submarine-launched missiles or others coming with very little, if any, warning will very probably destroy the majority of aircraft on the ground" (Senate, *Defense Appropriations for 1964*, 191).

[24] McNamara Statement, 33. The Air Force had asked for one-fourth (U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961*, Part VII, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, 1960, 100).

[25] Baldwin, "Strategic Air Outlook," *New York Times*, November 21, 1963. Such dispersal plans were described to Congress as far back as 1956:

Colonel Nichols. Now we have a dispersal plan in SAC. It works like this: Each one of our bases, let's take the base at Fairchild, we have two wings there, each wing will have a plan and the plan will have the aircraft say take off from Fairchild and come down to these green areas. They are what we call orbit areas.

At that position the aircraft will circle. He will await then instructions from his

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such dispersal, however, SAC would still provide a first-priority target.[26] It should be emphasized that the bombers with their expected BMEWS warning would not represent an adequate deterrent were it not for the existence of protected missile systems. In this sense, they do not provide very adequate back-up protection for a situation in which our missiles could be successfully attacked.

Second, bombers are slow to target. If a bomber has a top speed of 500 mph and must travel 2,000, 4,000, or 6,000 miles to reach its target, it will take 4, 8, or 12 hours. Several different missile salvos can take place in this time. This means that bombers are especially unsuited to the "damage-limiting" strategy recently advocated by the Department of Defense. Only a "very, very, very, low percentage" of the effective forces will be bombers, despite the fact that they are capable of carrying a much larger number of megatons than are existing missiles.[27]

Third, there is a "substantial range between the optimistic and

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home base if it is not destroyed or from another source if his home base is destroyed, and then he will either land at what we call our dispersal base or go back to Fairchild, depending on what he is told. (Senate, *Air Power,* Part 11, 146.)

[26] For instance, consider the present situation. In 1960, General Preston testified that SAC's ultimate goal was one squadron (i.e., one-third of a wing of 45 bombers) of B-52's per base and one wing of B-47's per base. Since there are about 15 wings of B-47's remaining (the 700 planes noted earlier), 42 squadrons of B-52's (the 14 wings noted earlier), and about 6 squadrons of B-58's (the 80 planes noted earlier), this would require 63 bases. Since 68 are referred to above, this goal has evidently been effectively achieved. Nevertheless, the "bonus" to enemy attack that catches the bombers on their bases would be somewhere between 15-1 (heavy-bomber bases) and 45-1 (medium-bomber bases), even assuming that the bombers carry no larger weapons than the single enemy H-bomb that Secretary McNamara indicated would destroy every bomber on its base (McNamara Statement, 37). With 100 fields, the average bonus would be at least 14-1, since there are about 1,400 bombers.

[27] *Mr. Ford.* Somewhere in your testimony you indicate that we have sufficient strategic striking forces to destroy the Soviet Union. This is what I am talking about. . . .

Secretary McNamara. What percentage of that force are the weapons that will be carried by the bombers? I would say a very, very, very, [*sic*] low percentage, for this reason.

Off the record.

(Statement off the record.)

Mr. Ford. I am talking about 1968.

Secretary McNamara. Yes. The point I want to make is that the percentage of total warheads in our inventory carried by the bombers is a rather meaningless figure. I think the percentage to which you are now directing your attention is exactly the right percentage. What percentage of the force that destroys the Soviet Union is delivered by bombers? The answer to that is a very, very, low percentage. . . .

Mr. Ford. If that is the case . . . why do you keep bombers in the force at all until 1968?

Secretary McNamara. Because they add some insurance and because certain targets may be more effectively destroyed by bombs assuming the bomber can get there before the targets have been launched against the United States, *and that is quite an assumption* [emphasis added]. (House, *Defense Appropriations for 1964,* Part 1, 318.)

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pessimistic estimates" of the proportion of bombers that will penetrate the Soviet air defenses. But in both cases, "a higher proportion of the Minuteman force than of the B-52 force can be counted upon to reach targets in a retaliatory strike."[28] Speaking more generally of free-fall bombing, the Secretary of Defense termed it "nearly impossible" by the end of the decade.[29] This means that planes would have to be dependent upon their own guided missiles which would permit an attack from a distance. But as noted by Secretary McNamara, in canceling just such a missile (the Skybolt): ". . . [it] could not make a worthwhile contribution to our strategic capability since it would combine the disadvantages of the bomber with those of the missile. It would have the bomber's disadvantages of being soft and concentrated and relatively vulnerable on the ground and the bomber's slow time to target. But it would not have the bomber's advantageous payload and accuracy, nor would it have the advantages usually associated with a manned system. It would have the lower payload and poorer accuracy of the missile. . . ."[30]

Fourth, the Secretary of Defense indicates that bombers must be "committed very early" in a war and cannot be used "in a controlled and deliberate way."[31] In particular, the widely used argument that bombers can be "recalled" is quite misleading. The obvious answer to it is that invulnerably based missiles do not need to be fired in advance and hence the ability to be recalled is not at issue with them. Furthermore, recalling bombers is dangerous and difficult. They are not, in fact, very "recallable." The recalled fleet has tired, if not exhausted, crews and somewhere in the system there must be low, if not empty, fuel tanks. If the recall is a mistake, the bombers may have

[28] McNamara Statement, 37. Bombers were also rated lower in "system dependability," by which was evidently meant that the uncertainties associated with them were harder to estimate. In conclusion, the Secretary of Defense noted that "we can predict the results of a missile attack with greater confidence than those of a bomber attack" (*ibid.* 38).

[29] *Secretary McNamara.* . . . we will be in serious difficulty by the end of the decade if at that point our strategic force is dependent upon free-fall bombs as the primary weapon of attack, because no one in responsible position at the Pentagon that I am aware of believes that free-fall bombs can be placed over the prime targets in the Soviet Union at the end of this decade.

Senator Stennis. Why?

Secretary McNamara. Because by that time the air defense systems of the Soviet Union will be such as to make it nearly impossible for an airplane to advance to a position to launch free-fall bombs against that target. (*Military Procurement, 1963*, 93.)

[30] House, *Defense Appropriations for 1964*, Part 1, 114.

[31] U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1963*, Part II, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, 1962, 15.

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been effectively neutralized. Bombers are, for this reason, not even very capable of accepting an enemy surrender—the risk in recalling them to vulnerable bases (if there were no missiles) could make it impossible. Most important, the time for recall is limited. Congress has been told that civilian decision-makers would have to make some (recalling) decision within one and a half hours of the time the bomber force was launched toward its targets.[32] (Obviously this does not refer to an airborne alert, which might be maintained for relatively long periods.)

As a result of these restrictions, the utility of bombers is limited to certain special uses as "supplementary devices to the main force."[33] What are these supplementary uses? *Air Force/Space Digest* complained: "No mention is [being] made of the position that manned strategic aircraft greatly enhance operational flexibility by allowing: recall of an attack; unmistakable displays of resolve, through stepped-up airborne alerts and large-scale maneuvers, such as were used in the Cuban crisis; wartime assessment of target damage; location and destruction of mobile targets; a close matching of the weapon to the target; and when the occasion calls for it, the use of very-high-yield warheads."[34]

We have discussed recall of an attack. The threatening nature of a fleet of bombers on airborne alert is a more plausible but still quite dubious consideration. It has received wide attention.[35] In answer to a written question by Senator Margaret Chase Smith, Secretary McNamara said that the SAC bomber fleet's advanced state of readiness during the Cuban crisis was meant both "to avoid the possibility of surprise" and to "impress upon the Soviets our seriousness and determination."[36] In this latter effort it was presumably successful, although

[32] House, *Defense Appropriations for 1960*, Part II, 378.

[33] This comment of the Secretary of Defense was reinforced by the assertion: "There is no plan in the Air Force that I know of, or no thought of any plan to substitute air launch for sea and land launch for the great bulk of the megatonnage" (Senate, *Defense Appropriations for 1964*, 192).

[34] J. S. Butz, "The Future of Manned Bombers," *Air Force/Space Digest* (March 1963), 29.

[35] *Senator Cannon.* When we get to the point that we are practically phased out with our manned bombers under our present program we would have no method of making a visible display of strength insofar as SAC's posture is concerned, would we?

General LeMay. With missiles you cannot do anything except to say, "I will shoot my missiles," that is all.

Senator Cannon. You cannot very well take a picture of a man with his thumb about 6 inches above the trigger and say, "He is going to put it on down if you don't do such and such." That doesn't give you much of a bargaining point, does it?

General LeMay. That is correct. (*Military Procurement, 1964*, 932.)

[36] *Ibid.*, 85.

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it was most clearly only one element among other considerations. In speaking to the USSR Supreme Soviet, Chairman Khrushchev reported on the Cuban crisis as follows: "Events developed at a swift pace. The American command put all its armed forces, including troops stationed in Europe as well as the Sixth Fleet, in the Mediterranean and the Seventh Fleet based in the Taiwan area, in a state of complete combat readiness. Several paratroop, infantry and armored divisions, numbering some 100,000 men, were allocated for the attack on Cuba alone. In addition 183 warships with 85,000 sailors on board were moved toward the shores of Cuba. Several thousand warplanes were to cover the landing on Cuba. About 20% of all U.S. Strategic Air Command planes carrying atomic and hydrogen bombs were kept aloft around the clock. Reserves were called up. . . ."[37] While analysts that emphasize air power tend to argue that the "20% of SAC" was an important consideration leading to Soviet concessions, it is obviously impossible for anyone to say—perhaps even for Chairman Khrushchev himself. It should be noted that Soviet concessions did not coincide with the initial flushing of SAC bombers but were more nearly linked in time, it would seem, with U.S. mobilization for invasion of Cuba. It should also be noted that Soviet attitudes toward displays of strategic force are somewhat peculiar from a U.S. analyst's point of view. For instance, during the Paris Summit Conference in 1960, Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates ordered the Joint Chiefs to institute an alert. This alert involved both the Continental Air Defense Command and the Strategic Air Command. It lasted for seven hours and was justified by the importance of checking the ability of the President, while abroad, to keep in touch with U.S. forces.[38] (Nevertheless the action would seem to have been most provocative. The President argued that international negotiations had sometimes been used for concealing preparations for a surprise attack. This tends, in part, only to reinforce the seriousness of his act.) The reaction of U.S. strategists, had they been in policy-making positions in the Soviet Union, would have been to put Soviet forces on alert to decrease Soviet vulnerability. Instead, at a Paris press conference, Malinovsky volunteered that "We have not declared any military alert." And Khrushchev replied, "Correct. We have not declared an alert and will not declare one. Our nerves are strong."[39]

[37] Nikita S. Khrushchev, "The Present International Situation and the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union," report at session of USSR Supreme Soviet, December 12, 1962; quoted from *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XIV, No. 51, January 16, 1963, 5.

[38] *New York Times*, May 17, 1960.

[39] Hans Speier, *Divided Berlin* (New York 1961), 109.

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Whatever the psychological impact of airborne bombers, it can hardly fail but to decline rapidly. Our bombers, even from airborne alert stations, can hardly be within one half-hour of their targets, as are our missiles at all times.[40] Hence they do not add significantly to whatever threat of surprise attack exists. And even the implied threat to initiate a nuclear war deliberately will wear very thin in the face of increasing invulnerability of Soviet forces.

The merits of most of the remaining arguments for bombers—wartime assessment of target damage, location and destruction of mobile targets, use of very-high-yield warheads, and so on—depend in part on U.S. strategy and in part on a host of cost/effectiveness considerations. The present strategy is a "damage-limiting" strategy. The intention is to preserve the option of striking at many Soviet forces, after being attacked ourselves, so as to limit the size of a follow-on attack.[41] Secretary McNamara argues, without giving details, that "comprehensive studies" show that "under a wide variety of circumstances . . . forces in excess of those needed simply to destroy Soviet cities would significantly reduce damage to the U.S. and Western Europe."[42] It can be assumed that the studies are based, in particular, on the assumption that a nuclear war will be fought to a finish. (For instance, the Secretary intends to attack weapon *storage* sites with bombers.[43] This "limits" damage only if the war is not likely to be terminated quickly.) On the assumption that the Soviet Union achieves secure second-strike capabilities—a widely heralded expectation—these studies will become outmoded. The emphasis must then turn, in one

[40] Congressman Mahon described a situation in which war occurred after the bombers were approaching their targets and suggested that ". . . probably the missile would hit its target before the bomber." General LeMay replied: "Under most circumstances, yes." (House, *Defense Appropriations for 1964*, Part II, 527.)

[41] "Thus, a 'damage-limiting' strategy appears to be the most practical and effective course for us to follow. Such a strategy requires a force considerably larger than would be needed for a limited 'cities only' strategy. While there are still some differences of judgment on just how large such a force should be, there is general agreement that it should be large enough to ensure the destruction, singly or in combination, of the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the Communist satellites as national societies, under the worst possible circumstances of war outbreak that can reasonably be postulated, and, in addition, to destroy their warmaking capability so as to limit, to the extent practicable, damage to this country and to our Allies." (McNamara Statement, 32.)

[42] In another article, the author intends to trace the course of U.S. doctrines and show that this strategy is one of a sequence of successively weaker justifications for large U.S. strategic forces. These reasons have become weaker in direct proportion to Soviet second-strike capabilities and can be expected to continue to do so. At what point existing or planned forces will, or have, become unjustifiably large will be discussed.

[43] McNamara Statement, 33.

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way or another, to "war termination strategies." If one's enemy has secure second-strike forces, one will not be able to justify plans to eliminate quickly the residual forces of an aggressor. The tendency to do so now is reinforced by Soviet relative weakness, which permits the Secretary of Defense to state: ". . . today, following a surprise attack on us, we would still have the power to respond with overwhelming force, and *they would not then have the capability of a further strike*" (emphasis added).[44] When the Soviet Union can retain the "capability of a further strike," two different tendencies will discourage the use of bombers even if they exist. First, it will become relatively less likely that a Soviet attack would include U.S. cities—since the Soviets would want, and be able, to hold these cities hostage with their secure force. (Our policy takes this form.)[45] Hence an unrestrained U.S. response to attack would not be in order. But bombers are difficult to use in a restrained fashion, primarily because of penetration problems.

Second, there would be far less motivation to maintain the capability for such "bitter end" activities as assessment of target damage, destruction of weapon sites, location and destruction of mobile missiles, use of very-high-yield weapons, and so on.

But one need not envisage a diminishing utility for U.S. bombers to argue for bomber disarmament. Even at present it is likely that Soviet bombers would take a greater toll of U.S. lives than could be saved by using U.S. bombers to attack Soviet follow-on forces. Furthermore, and somewhat incredibly, the missiles (and B-52's) freed from bomber-related duties—such as air defense suppression and bomber base targeting—are probably, in terms of deliverable and survivable vehicles, greater in number than the B-52's to be dismantled. We could gain in useful weapons *after* disarmament! Next, the missiles freed from bomber-related duties are likely to be more effective in the damage-limiting strategy than the bombers dismantled, since they reach their targets more quickly and with greater dependability. (See conclusions 4 and 5 below for further discussion and argument.)

Finally, there is the question of a "proper mix" in our offensive weapons. While such a mix is highly desirable, it is inevitably going to be a mix of missiles, in the Secretary's view.[46] But missile-carrying

[44] Stewart Alsop, "Our New Strategy: The Alternatives to Total War," *Saturday Evening Post*, December 1, 1962, 18.

[45] See Secretary McNamara's Ann Arbor speech, *New York Times*, June 17, 1962.

[46] ". . . I do not believe it is proper to infer . . . that I am sponsoring for all time a mix that includes missiles and manned bombers launching gravity bombs. Rather, I am talking about a mix of systems. It could be a mix of missile systems. As a matter of fact, I believe it will have to be a mix of missile systems under any circumstances,

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bombers are not an especially good way to vary one's missile systems, in particular, for the reasons given on page 20 above.

FUTURE MANNED BOMBERS

Among the considerations involved in bomber disarmament negotiations will be the likelihood that the United States will wish to procure a new manned bomber or more bombers of an existing type. This likelihood is small if it refers to a new type of bomber procured in large numbers, but not small if the bomber is to be procured in relatively small numbers; e.g., three. At the present time, "even the Air Force is said to be losing faith" in the manned bomber furthest along in development, the B-70.[47]

There are now three B-70's due to be produced at about $50 million each.[48] For each such plane, it would be possible to procure and install in hardened silos about 12 Minutemen.[49] Similarly, a wing of 45 B-52's procured and operated for 5 years costs as much ($1 billion) as 250 hardened and dispersed Minutemen.[50] This illustrates the unfavorable cost/effectiveness of new or existing expensive bombers and emphasizes how unlikely it is that they would be procured in large numbers. No new procurement of any such bombers is now planned.

In addition to the low-level penetrator (LAMP) noted earlier, there is the Dromedary. It is also in too early a stage to be of concern to any disarmament negotiations. After he described its long endurance, slow speed, and stand-off characteristics, General LeMay was asked whether or not we had been studying this aircraft "for at least a decade." He admitted that it had been discussed "off and on" but argued that the Air Force was taking "another look . . . because of what has been brought about by the cancellation of the B-70."[51] However, this plane

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each system with characteristics different from the other systems and therefore adding in total to the problem of the defense." (House, *Defense Appropriations for 1964*, Part 1, 317.) Elsewhere he remarked: "No other airborne vehicle that I have heard described for us in the 1970's depends on anything other than a missile for its striking power. So it seems to me that all of the technical developments point to the use of missiles, and it is simply a question of what kind of missile and how many and where they should be located." (*Military Procurement, 1964*, 77.)

[47] See Jack Raymond, "New Strategic Bomber Gains Favor in Pentagon," *New York Times*, December 26, 1963. The *new* strategic bomber referred to is a low-level penetrator, but it developed in a later column that the "favor" which it had gained was simply a $5,000,000 research contract. This plane is apparently the LAMP (Low Altitude Manned Penetration aircraft), designed to fly at supersonic speed a few hundred feet off the ground below the beams of defensive radar. (Baldwin, "Strategic Air Outlook," *New York Times*, November 21, 1963.)

[48] *Ibid.* [49] House, *Defense Appropriations for 1964*, Part 1, 115.

[50] Senate, *Military Procurement, 1963*, 17.

[51] House, *Defense Appropriations for 1964*, Part 11, 530.

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was to stand off and fire "14-to-17" improved Hound Dog missiles from as much as 1,000 miles away.[52] It would seem that the cancellation of Skybolt would discourage the development of the required missile.

In short, it would seem very unlikely that large numbers of any future manned bomber will be procured under the present administration.[53] However, there is of course always the possibility of very substantial changes in technology which, when coupled with a specific use for a bomber, could make its procurement feasible.[54]

Nevertheless, this having been said, it is relatively feasible on technological grounds to argue for, or tacitly accede to, a cut-off in the production of "fleets" of new bombers. Such a cut-off would not be very restricting with present technological expectations.

SOVIET AIR DEFENSES

Soviet defenses have been characterized as "tremendously increased" in effectiveness since 1960. They are thought to include both high-altitude (SAM-II's) and low-altitude (SAM-III's) surface-to-air interceptor missiles around key points in Russia.[55] The number of persons engaged in air defense activities is thought to be very large. In 1956, there were 550,000 people engaged in Soviet air defense, or about four times the number engaged in U.S. defenses at that time.[56]

It is impossible, but perhaps unnecessary, to be very precise about the extent and costs of Soviet air defenses. There would seem to be great savings in defense costs to the Soviet Union if all U.S. bombers could be dismantled in a disarmament agreement. More limited agreements, such as a trade of Badgers for B-47's, would *not* permit this saving. And, to the extent that the Soviet Union intends to maintain air defenses against a growing French, and possible future German, threat, the savings would also be diminished. However, only a part of the present Soviet air defense operation would seem necessary as a defense against French bombers. For instance, force targets, of whatever nature, and cities deep in the Soviet Union might not need protection if the

[52] Baldwin, "Strategic Air Outlook."

[53] Other administrations might well adopt a different policy. Senator Goldwater has said that one reason he is running for President is to maintain a proper "mix" of bombers and missiles (*New York Times*, February 7, 1964).

[54] Such advances might be in variable-sweep wings, engine developments, penetration aids, and laminar-flow control. The last is a method of changing the lift/drag ratio of aircraft and permits substantial reductions in size for fixed performance. (Butz, "Future of Manned Bombers," *Air Force/Space Digest.*)

[55] Hanson W. Baldwin, "France's A-Bomb Deterrent Power," *New York Times*, January 25, 1963.

[56] Senate, *Air Power*, Part II, 269.

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U.S. bomber threat were removed. (We assume that British bomber disarmament would be part of any U.S.-Soviet agreement to scrap all strategic bombers.)

II. Soviet Bombers and U.S. Air Defenses

Composition of the Soviet bomber force

As is the case with the United States, a great many Soviet aircraft could carry nuclear weapons of one kind or another for varying distances. Again, it seems appropriate, in considering bomber disarmament as a separate measure, to restrict our attention to the Soviet strategic bomber force. This is thought to be made up of:[57]

(1) 70 turbo-prop Bears (Tu-20), range about 7-8,000 miles, capable of carrying two short-range air-to-ground missiles or one large winged missile with range about 1,000 miles (gross weight: 330,000 lbs; maximum speed: 550 mph). Became operational in 1956.

(2) The supersonic delta-wing 4-jet Bounder, not now in production, a possible replacement for Bison (gross weight: 300,000 lbs; maximum speed: 700 mph).

(3) 120 4-jet Bisons (M-4), range about 6,000 miles, equipped for aerial refueling, capable of carrying a winged missile (gross weight: 250,000 lbs; maximum speed: 610 mph). Became operational in 1956.

(4) An emerging twin-engined supersonic medium bomber, Blinder, similar to the U.S. B-58, capable of aerial refueling, with a long-range air-to-ground missile. Possibly a strike/reconnaissance aircraft (gross weight: 175,000 lbs; maximum speed: 1,000-1,300 mph). Became operational in 1962.

(5) 1,000 twin-jet medium-bomber Badgers (Tu-16), range about 3,500 miles, capable of carrying a single air-to-ground missile like the U.S. Hound Dog with range about 450 miles (gross weight: 150,000 lbs; maximum speed: 600 mph). Became operational in 1955.

The Secretary of Defense has announced that "latest national intelligence estimates indicate there will be a decline in the Soviet bomber force and one far earlier than a decline in our force."[58] The Defense Department recently estimated the bombers which the Soviets "could place over this country, on two-way missions" as "no more than approximately 120 heavy bombers plus perhaps an additional 150 medium bombers, the targets for which would be limited to Alaska and the

[57] This information is taken from Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1963-1964,* and *International Aerospace Specification Tables* (1963).

[58] Senate, *Defense Appropriations for 1964,* 192.

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Northwest areas of the United States."[59] Discussion of *two*-way missions indicates a doctrinal lag, and underestimates Soviet capabilities for a first strike.

SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD BOMBERS

Khrushchev stated, with the launching of Sputnik in 1957, that the era of the bomber had passed, and that bombers were in the "twilight of their existence." By 1960, he stated that "Almost the entire military air force is being replaced by missiles," and he suggested that he "probably will further reduce and even discontinue the production of bombers and other obsolete equipment." During this period, the Soviet Union was, or was thought to be, ahead in missile, and behind in bomber, capabilities. With the development of Soviet stand-off air-to-surface missiles, there was renewed support for the Soviet Air Force, which Khrushchev said the Soviet Union was "continuing to develop and improve." Some Soviet Air Force spokesmen—e.g., First Deputy Commander of the Soviet Air Force Air Marshal S. Rudenko and A. Tupolev, the Soviet aircraft designer—have mentioned the bomber in much the same terms used by U.S. Air Force spokesmen.[60]

Marshal Sokolovskii's *Military Strategy* takes a position very similar to that of our own Department of Defense. While conceding that long-range bombers are "rapidly yielding first place" to ballistic missiles, it asserts that this replacement may take "a long time" and that aircraft have not yet "completely exhausted" their combat potential. Reference is made to specific missions, such as striking mobile targets and so on.[61]

THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF SOVIET BOMBERS

In order to appreciate the strategic role of Soviet bombers, it is necessary to understand the general Soviet strategic posture as it has emerged over the years. This posture is exceedingly defensive in orientation—surprisingly so to many U.S. analysts. There are various possible reasons for this of a technical, social, political, economic, bureaucratic, or other nature. They need not concern us here. But some history is appropriate.

When the United States had the only significant strategic capability, it threatened massive retaliation and built forces that were quite capable

[59] Department of Defense Statement on U.S. Military Strength, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), No. 308-64, April 14, 1964.

[60] The information in this paragraph comes from comments of H. Dinerstein, L. Goure, and T. W. Wolfe, in their annotation of Sokolovskii's *Soviet Military Strategy*, RAND Corporation translation (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963), 351-52.

[61] *Ibid.*, 346-47.

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of accomplishing the destruction of the Soviet Union, whether or not such an action was preceded by Soviet provocation.[62] Part of the Soviet response was to emphasize defenses. General LeMay testified that ". . . they are spending a greater portion of their resources by far than we are on defenses."[63] Another part of the response was, of course, to procure strategic retaliatory forces. In fact, it was feared, especially during the missile gap period, that the Soviet procurement of missiles would be far more than sufficient to attack simultaneously all U.S. strategic weapons.[64] Very large numbers of relatively invulnerable U.S. missiles were ordered. Hence when Soviet procurement ceased to be as large as anticipated, the Soviet Union's capability for attacking our enlarged U.S. forces became extremely ineffective. The U.S. capability for striking Soviet weapons became significant, however, and, as has been noted, remains sufficiently large to respond to a Soviet attack in such a way that, theoretically, no *further* Soviet attacks would be possible. (Obviously this statement is an approximation.) This "damage-limiting" capability is not shared by the Soviet Union.[65] Instead they emphasize, at least in public utterances, "100" megaton bombs in relatively small numbers. These are better suited to attacking urban areas than forces.

As a result of these considerations, the role of bombers in the Soviet strategy would seem to be even smaller than the role of U.S. bombers

[62] In answer to questions which seemed to reflect on Air Force capabilities by emphasizing U.S. casualties in a general war, General LeMay testified, somewhat petulantly: "I wish that there was some way, Mr. Chairman, I could guarantee fighting a war without getting anyone killed on our side. Unfortunately, I cannot do that at this time. There was a time when I was commanding SAC that I think we could have retaliated with the strength we then had and destroyed the greater part of Russia and the loss rate would have been the loss we would have suffered from the normal accident rate of that many hours' flying time. The situation no longer exists because they have built up their defenses and they have an atomic capability of their own." (House, *Defense Appropriations for 1964*, Part II, 530.)

[63] U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 9751*, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, 1962, 1192.

[64] Concern among U.S. strategists was genuine. For example, the present U.S. preponderance in strategic forces is precisely the reverse of the situation repeatedly anticipated in Herman Kahn's *On Thermonuclear War*. This book was written in 1959 after the author had worked for a decade at The RAND Corporation. The size of the anticipated gap was enormous. The number of Soviet missiles thought to be in existence in mid-1961 was only 3.5 per cent of the number that had been anticipated two years earlier for that same date. Bomber misjudgments were only slightly less dramatic. See Stuart Symington, "Where the Missile Gap Went," *The Reporter*, February 15, 1962.

[65] ". . . the relative numbers and survivability of U.S. strategic forces would permit us to retaliate against all the urgent Soviet military targets that are subject to attack, thus contributing to the limitation of damage to ourselves and our allies. . . . [This] damage-limiting capability of our numerically superior forces is, I believe, well worth its incremental cost. It is a capability to which the smaller forces of the Soviet Union could not realistically aspire." (Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, remarks before the Economic Club of New York, November 18, 1963.)

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in our own strategic posture. In the first place, the relatively great U.S. capability to strike vulnerably based bombers decreases the utility of such forces to the Soviet Union. Second, the fact that the Soviet Union is not in a position to attack U.S. forces effectively at any stage in a nuclear war sharply diminishes "special purpose" reasons for retaining bombers. For instance, if the Soviet forces are insufficiently large to attack more than a small percentage of U.S. Minutemen, what need is there for Soviet strategic reconnaissance? Similarly, a capability for attacks on U.S. land-based mobile missiles—of which there are none at this time—becomes relatively pointless if a large number of other types of forces cannot be attacked.

These conclusions indicate that bomber disarmament of a suitably balanced kind should be quite advantageous to the Soviet Union.

FUTURE MANNED BOMBERS

There seems to be little public evidence of a new Soviet bomber, except for Blinder, which is thought to be a replacement for Badger.[66] However, information on Soviet research and development plans is obviously difficult, if not impossible, to come by. Hence no firm conclusions can be reached.

U.S. AIR DEFENSES

In assessing the strategic value of Soviet bombers, the effectiveness of U.S. bomber defenses must be considered. We should also consider those costs of maintaining defenses that might be saved under a bomber agreement.

As far as effectiveness is concerned, U.S. bomber defenses cannot be assessed without a war. They were not built with a clear notion of expected effectiveness. For instance, in 1956 General Partridge, then Commander in Chief, Air Defense Command and Continental Air Defense Command, testified as follows:

> *Senator Symington.* Do you think you could knock down 50 percent of the attacking force?
>
> *General Partridge.* I would not hazard a guess.
>
> *Senator Symington.* 75?
>
> *General Partridge.* The way to evaluate our air-defense system is to try to think of it as insurance which you carry for years and hope the house will not burn down.
>
> .....
>
> *Senator Symington.* You just don't know what you could do?
>
> *General Partridge.* No, sir; I have no basis on which to guess, but . . .

[66] Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1963-1964.*

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there is a terrific difference to the enemy between operating against some defenses and operating against no defenses.

If the enemy knows that we have no defenses, he can come in, cruise around the country, go anywhere he wants to, bomb one airplane at a time. If he does not like one approach, he can go around and make another one. He could use his fighters and just strafe up and down the streets, do anything at all.

On the other hand, if he knows we have some defenses, no matter how meager they may be, he must do many, many things which General LeMay so very effectively outlined on his chart. He must use large formations or large numbers of bombers, and he must come at night and in bad weather and so on and on and on, carry defensive weapons, perhaps carry fighters with him and so on. So his offensive capability is tremendously degraded just by the fact that there is an air defense even if we shoot down not one bomber.[67]

General Partridge went on to testify that it was almost impossible to get a "realistic" test of the system and that "as we build further to the North and put the sea flanks on, it is going to be impossible. . . ."[68]

In fact the system has many inefficiencies.[69] It very probably should not have been built in its present form—a form in which efforts are made to defend, essentially, the entire North American continent. And it is useful to note that this is the view of the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Taylor. He suggested in 1956 that "the concept of area defense in great depth . . . has not proved feasible, in my judgment, either technically or economically." He preferred a kind of extended "point" defense in which large urban and strategic complexes would be protected.[70] The deficiencies in our present defense should encourage attempts to negotiate bomber disarmament. At the present time, the United States plans no very strenuous efforts to improve U.S. defenses unless the Soviet Union deploys a new bomber.[71]

[67] Senate, *Air Power*, Part II, 255.

[68] *Ibid.*, 294. This continues to be the case. Asked what percentage of kill our anti-aircraft defenses would have, the Secretary of Defense replied: "It is a very difficult question to answer but I would say this, the answer depends upon a large number of factors that are in themselves unknown" (House, *Defense Appropriations for 1963*, Part II, 250).

[69] Herman Kahn suggested in 1960: "One way not to make a reputation as an analyst in the last five or ten years would have been to find a hole in our air defense system . . . people mostly think of it as being full of holes" (Kahn, 345).

[70] Senate, *Air Power*, Part II, 332-33.

[71] For instance, in discussing interceptors, Secretary McNamara stated: "We still plan to retain the existing interceptor aircraft in the force, but the number of aircraft will decline gradually because of attrition. We believe that this force will be adequate against what we presently foresee as a declining Soviet-manned bomber threat. However, if the Soviets should deploy a new long-range bomber, we would have to reconsider the size and character of our interceptor force and particularly the need for modernization." (Senate, *Military Procurement, 1964*, 47.) A somewhat more detailed

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Instead, the "main thrust" of our defensive efforts will be redirected to meet the rising missile threat, although so long as the Soviet Union continues to maintain a force of manned bombers capable of reaching U.S. targets, "we must continue to support a defense against them."[72] Supporting this defense generally costs about $2 billion each year. Not all of this could be saved even if every last Soviet intercontinental bomber were destroyed, but a fairly large proportion of it presumably could.

III. Third-Country Bombers

Wars involving aerial bombardment can be usefully divided into two categories. In the first category, at least one of Communist China, the United States, or the Soviet Union is involved. In the second category, none of these powers is directly involved. In the latter case, the conflict can be expected to involve close and/or relatively small powers. Hence, in these cases, relatively small numbers of easily improvised bombers are likely to be quite suitable for bombardment. As a result, bomber disarmament is hard to define for such powers, and it is not considered further in this article.

It is also assumed here that Communist China will not participate in any general dismantling of its bomber forces because of its political posture, and because Communist China has no bombers of the size discussed in this paper. (The largest bombers known to be in mainland China are Il-28 [Beagle] light bombers.) Although Soviet Badgers have been sold to Egypt and Indonesia, none were apparently transferred to China.[73]

As a result, it seems worth considering bomber disarmament only for the United States, the Soviet Union, and for Britain, France, and Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany has no bombers of the size discussed here. Hence its bomber disarmament must logically await disarmament of tactical fighter-bombers.

Having made the assumption that British bomber disarmament will not become an obstacle to major power bomber disarmament—a reasonable assumption on general political grounds—we are left with the problem of the French *force de frappe*. This force of Mirage IV, twin-jet supersonic light-attack, bombers is supposed to grow to 22 in 1964,

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statement is made by Dr. Harold Brown in Senate, *Defense Appropriations for 1964*, 1243.

[72] McNamara Statement, 44-45.

[73] Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1963-1964*.

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with another 22 delivered in 1965.[74] The force will hold 20 or 30 million Russians "hostage," assuming it is capable of penetrating Soviet air defenses. Most experts agree that it can, according to Hanson Baldwin.[75]

Although the French are considering Polaris-type systems for the post-1970 period, it would be premature for them to consider even "phased" bomber disarmament schemes. Hence without a change in French political and strategic intentions, French participation in bomber disarmament is not possible. This has, of course, far-reaching political implications for Soviet participation in a general agreement to dismantle all strategic bombers. The Soviet Union may well resist general disarmament of types of weapons that a particular Western ally wishes to retain.[76] It should be emphasized, however, that there are no good *strategic* reasons for this refusal—although there might be bargaining rationalizations. From a strategic point of view, Soviet bombers are not useful either for attacking or for defending against French bombers. Nor are they necessary for retaliating in response to a French bomber attack.

IV. Bomber Disarmament: Conclusions

This section describes some likely effects of bomber disarmament by giving conclusions with relatively self-contained explanations. These conclusions in no case follow *directly* from the preceding material and in all cases rest largely on the author's judgment of a variety of factors. Two different possible kinds of agreements are discussed. The first is a limited one involving the destruction of obsolescent Soviet Badgers and U.S. B-47's. The second is much more extensive and would accomplish the phasing out of long-range bombers as well.[77]

[74] *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, January 14, 1963, 30. The planes are to be based in southwestern France, and some will be kept on air alert. The French argue specifically that an attacking Mirage IV will be detected by radar at a distance of only one and a half miles—the plane will be some 100 to 300 yards above the ground—and that at 1,500 miles per hour a SAM-III battery will have just one, quite inadequate, second to fire at it. Other penetration aids are also envisaged. (W. Root, "France Expects A-Bomb Readiness Against an Enemy by the End of the Year," *Washington Post*, January 23, 1963.)

[75] Baldwin, "France's A-Bomb Deterrent Power," *New York Times*, January 25, 1963.

[76] But it is worth noting that the Mirage IV is a small, 66,000-lb. bomber and would not be of the size being dismantled unless and until the United States and the Soviet Union discussed tactical bomber disarmament.

[77] The designation "long-range" is used in a technical sense, defined in the 1958 Surprise Attack Conference at Geneva. It refers to aircraft with a radius of action of over 2,000 nautical miles (n.m.), and would include at least B-52's, Bisons, and Bears. Badgers and B-47's would be medium-range aircraft—those defined as having a radius

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TWO GENERAL ISSUES

(1) *Neither limited nor extensive bomber disarmament agreements will have much direct effect on the probability of war.* Such agreements would reduce the likelihood of accidents, incidents, and unauthorized behavior, but none of these is very probable and certainly none is very likely to cause a war, in and of itself. Nor is reciprocal fear of surprise attack, induced by vulnerable bombers, an important possibility in the present and anticipated strategic context. However, bomber disarmament would eliminate certain kinds of fears associated with vulnerable targets—such as the fear of "outflanking BMEWS" evident during the Cuban crisis. And favorable *indirect* effects on the likelihood of war are quite possible, such as those that arise from relaxation of tension.

(2) *Extensive, but not limited, bomber disarmament agreements could substantially reduce destruction if war occurred.* Whether or not the total quantity of weapons that can be delivered (deliverable megatonnage) is increased or diminished after a bomber disarmament agreement depends on missile procurement and on the remaining bombers. Measured by deliverable megatonnage, extensive bomber disarmament agreements are preferable to limited agreements, all other things being equal. With respect to the agreements hypothesized, the limited agreement—Badgers for B-47's—would diminish deliverable megatonnage only slightly, if at all, if these planes were, in fact, obsolete and incapable of delivering most of their weapons. In any case, extensive agreements would do a good deal better. However, these questions of deliverable megatonnage are less important than those of targeting and war termination. Extensive, but not limited, disarmament of bombers will remove basing or staging airfields from a military target list and hence will enlarge the potential separation of forces and cities. Furthermore extensive, but not limited, bomber disarmament will substantially increase the likelihood that war can be quickly terminated by eliminating the destabilizing decision to commit, or fail to commit, entire fleets of bombers.

UNITED STATES ISSUES

(3) *A limited bomber disarmament agreement may well prevent further bomber disarmament, for U.S. (and perhaps also S.U.) political*

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of action of from 750 to 2,000 n.m. It is not clear whether B-58's and Blinders are medium- or long-range. (*Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, Vol. II: *1957-1959*, Department of State Publication 7008, August 1960, 1230-43.)

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reasons. It has often been stated that comprehensive agreements are in many ways no more difficult to achieve than partial agreements.[78] One price of the atmospheric test ban was the elimination of all immediate hope for the total test ban treaty. In order to pacify the critics of the agreement, President Kennedy committed himself to a "vigorous series of tests."[79] In the same way, an agreement to destroy B-47's for Badgers would likely lead to Secretary McNamara's renewed assurances that the B-52 and B-58 fleets would remain in the force indefinitely. There may be similar political problems in the Soviet system, but the available information is insufficient to determine whether or not this is so.

(4) *An extensive bomber disarmament agreement will probably release considerably more survivable and deliverable U.S. weapons from bomber-related assignments than will be eliminated by destroying U.S. bombers.* Secretary McNamara has indicated that a few hundred Minuteman missiles have been procured for air defense suppression to substitute for the cancelled Skybolt missiles.[80] Furthermore it is quite evident that "quick-to-target" missiles, rather than "slow-to-target" bombers, must be used to attack airfields on which Soviet bombers are, or might be, based. Therefore an extensive bomber disarmament agreement could shorten U.S. target lists by eliminating these categories. It would presumably release several hundred missiles for other purposes. Only 315 B-52's are even on ground alert[81] and only about 80 of these can be kept aloft for long periods of time.[82] In either case, many of

[78] I agree, in general, with P. M. S. Blackett's statement: "To justify the labor of negotiating any agreed reduction and to offset the undoubted strains and disputes that will inevitably arise from the operation of any inspection and control system, the negotiated reduction must be a major one; in fact, of such magnitude as to change qualitatively the nature of the relative nuclear postures of the two giant powers." ("Steps Toward Disarmament," *Scientific American,* CCVI [April 1962].)

[79] *New York Times,* August 21, 1963. The Deputy Secretary of Defense in a "safeguards" communication drew together the commitments made by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, by the Secretary of Defense, and by the President. Among these four, and given first, was: "Safeguard (a). 'The conduct of comprehensive, aggressive, and continuing underground nuclear test programs designed to add to our knowledge and improve our weapons in all areas of significance to our military posture for the future.'" (Letter to Hon. Richard B. Russell, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, August 23, 1963, from Roswell Gilpatric, in U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,* 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963, 978.)

[80] For instance, he suggested that Skybolt would have cost "nearly $3 billion," that "incremental initial investment cost for a Minuteman missile, complete with its blast resistant silo," was "very close" to $4 million, and that a substitution of Minuteman for Skybolt would save about $2 billion. This suggests that about 250 Minutemen were to be procured for this purpose. (House, *Military Posture and H.R. 9751,* 35.)

[81] McNamara Statement, 36.

[82] *Ibid.,* 33.

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these bombers would presumably not penetrate the Soviet air defenses.[83] Hence relatively few survivable and penetrating bombers might be lost by an agreement.

(5) *The missiles released from bomber-related assignments will be more effective in the U.S. damage-limiting strategy, now and in the foreseeable future, than would be the bombers destroyed.* First consider conclusion 4. Second, as we noted earlier, the Secretary of Defense is dubious concerning the ability of bombers to arrive before the targeted Soviet weapons have been launched against us as part of a Soviet attack. Missiles are far more likely to exploit the raggedness in any such attack. More generally, war is not likely to occur in ways that call for all-out spasm bomber attack, whether directed at forces or cities. This and the other arguments against bombers are becoming stronger as the strategic context unfolds. Thus, bombers become more vulnerable, more likely to interfere with real prospects for war termination if war occurs, less likely to penetrate to targets, less likely to reach targets in time to limit damage even if penetration is successful, and less necessary as a supplement to growing missile forces.

(6) *An extensive, but not a limited, bomber disarmament agreement will remove the Soviet bomber threat.* The present bomber threat cannot be adequately defended against, and can be removed in no other way than by an extensive disarmament agreement of some kind. Nor is it likely that our own bombers could be used so effectively to attack Soviet follow-on forces as to offset the destruction arising from Soviet bomber attacks. An extensive bomber disarmament agreement is truly "defense through disarmament."

(7) *An extensive, but not a limited, bomber disarmament agreement would substantially reduce U.S. costs in air defense and in maintenance and operations of bombers.* Bomber maintenance and operation costs will not be greatly reduced by destroying obsolescent bombers, since the costs would ordinarily be eliminated in any case. Nor would it be possible to diminish the annual $2 billion air defense costs if many Soviet bombers remained. However, an extensive agreement might both permit a sizable reduction in air defense expenditures and save several billion dollars in bomber costs.[84]

[83] According to General Power: ". . . For example, in one weapon system, say a B-52 out of New Mexico going against the Soviet Union, if your realistic war games are thorough, you have a 50% confidence factor for destroying that target with a given weapon" (*Aviation Week*, September 23, 1963, 39).

[84] The maintenance and operation of the B-52 cost $820 million each year (Senate, *Military Procurement, 1964*). Phasing it out steadily over three years instead of keeping all B-52's until 1969 (as the present program anticipates) would save $2.8 billion. The

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(8) *An extensive bomber disarmament agreement would not decrease U.S. relative superiority over the Soviet Union measured in existing delivery vehicles.* Recent estimates indicate that U.S. missile superiority is about 4-1 or better and that our overall bomber superiority is 4-1.[85]

(9) *There would be no significant inspection problems associated with either a limited or an extensive bomber disarmament agreement.* Soviet knowledge of the size of our bomber fleet is, of course, complete. And our appreciation of Soviet bomber capabilities can be little inferior. Many public estimates of the older Soviet bombers are given to the nearest multiple of ten (e.g., 70 or 120). No Soviet government could assume that newer bombers could be kept secret, and there is little incentive to do so, since they are in no sense a decisive weapon.

(10) *The main obstacles to extensive bomber disarmament are probably U.S. political problems, and these are substantial.* The strategic case for extensive bomber disarmament is strong, but probably only the present Secretary of Defense would have any chance of persuading Congress of it. It would take a good deal of courage in various parts of the U.S. government even to propose dismantling the SAC bomber fleet.

SOVIET ISSUES

(11) *No advantages comparable to those of conclusions 4 and 5 would accrue to the Soviet Union in an extensive bomber disarmament agreement because its force posture and strategy differ from those of the United States.* The Soviet Union would not have many missiles released from bomber base targeting because its force is not sufficiently large to follow a "damage-limiting" strategy and is "at the present time . . . as Khrushchev had outlined it, a strategy directed primarily against our cities and our urban society," according to Secretary McNamara.[86] Similarly, it is unlikely that ICBM's from a small Soviet supply would be used to suppress partially effective U.S. air defenses in order to improve the penetration qualities of a 190-plane heavy-bomber force. Instead, air-to-ground missiles would probably be used. Therefore Soviet ICBM's would not be released from air defense suppression assignments.

(12) *Nevertheless an extensive bomber disarmament agreement*

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cost of modifying the fleet would also be saved—this is $306 million for fiscal 1965 (McNamara Statement, 33).

[85] See *New York Times,* August 18, 1964, 1 (picture).

[86] Statement of Secretary McNamara before Economic Club; Senate, *Military Procurement, 1964,* 125 and 147.

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would be very clearly in the Soviet interest. First, from the Soviet point of view, the Soviet Union would share in the benefits discussed in conclusion 2—less destruction if war occurs—and would have eliminated the potential U.S. bomber threat, at the cost of giving up vulnerable Soviet bombers. The U.S. advantages referred to in conclusions 4 and 5 (the release of U.S. missiles from bomber-related duties) should not discourage agreement unless the Soviet Union wishes to use airfields to draw "fire" or to encourage U.S. procurement of additional missiles.[87] The dismantlement of the SAC bomber force will seem to Soviet officials to be the end of an unfortunate era of U.S. strategic dominance. Possibly they will view it as a rebuke to U.S. Air Force generals whose unauthorized behavior may have been feared in the past. The agreement will encourage Soviet efforts to dislodge the United States from overseas bases which will be made unnecessary—perhaps even by a limited agreement.[88] Bomber maintenance costs would be saved. And unless French bombers and the U.S. TFX prevented it, much of Soviet air defense costs would be saved. The fissionable material in Soviet bombs could be used in Soviet missiles if it were in short supply. (A limited agreement would be of no greater assistance than obsolescence in this regard.) The bombers are not useful for the Soviet deterrent purpose because they are vulnerable and uncertain to penetrate, and hence less reliable as deterrents. Finally, a major disarmament agreement would represent a large part of that *détente* which is evidently the current interest of the Soviet Union. For propaganda purposes, the extensive agreement could be claimed to be nearer to the Soviet proposal than to the U.S. informal and limited suggestion.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

(13) *I believe it would be a good disarmament strategy for either or both sides to hold out for an* EXTENSIVE *bomber disarmament agreement.* Conclusion 3 indicates that the limited agreement may prevent further bomber disarmament. In any case, the nonsymbolic results of

[87] The United States can be encouraged to procure additional missiles even with its present large superiority. For instance, Secretary McNamara's testimony includes the paragraph: "We have tentatively programmed the funding of additional Minuteman silos after fiscal year 1965, but the actual number to be started will depend upon the situation prevailing a year or two years from now" (Statement, 35).

[88] It would also effectively comply with the Soviet draft resolution introduced in the Security Council on April 21, 1958, that called upon the United States "to refrain from sending its military aircraft carrying atomic and hydrogen bombs toward the frontiers of other states for the purpose of creating a threat to their security or staging military demonstrations" (*Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959,* II, 990).

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this agreement will soon accrue from obsolescence. (For example, the U.S. B-47's will be phased out in 1966[89] and the Badger force is as old.) The U.S. argument that the bombers will be prevented from falling into third-country hands is not persuasive. The United States controls the B-47's, and if the Soviet Union wished to, it could sell light Il-28 bombers to its friends and allies.[90] The extensive bomber agreements make much more sense than limited ones. As noted in conclusions 2 and 7, only extensive agreements will substantially reduce destruction if war occurs and reduce U.S. air defense and bomber costs. As noted in conclusion 6, only an extensive agreement will remove the Soviet bomber threat. And, as noted in conclusions 4 and 5, the extensive agreement alone will *strengthen* U.S. retaliatory forces by releasing missiles from bomber-related duties. Conclusion 12 indicates a real Soviet interest also in extensive agreements. A decision to try for such extensive agreement does not create an all-or-nothing obstacle to disarmament; extensive bomber disarmament agreements will eventually become feasible, if only because the heavy-bomber fleets will get older and less desirable. In time, if nothing is done earlier, offers will be made to trade obsolete B-52's for obsolete Bears and Bisons. Are we only to be capable of agreeing on disarmament through obsolescence, or can doctrine, analysis, and an enlightened attitude toward national interest on the part of both major powers shape the destiny of already procured, and still usable, forces? This is the question posed by bomber disarmament.

[89] *Military Procurement, 1964*, 47.

[90] U.S. B-47's have already been sold to Australia (*Aviation Week*, December 23, 1963).

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PATTERNS OF LANGUAGE PLANNING IN THE NEW STATES

By JACOB ORNSTEIN

THE proliferation of new sovereign states, well over sixty since World War II, has created language problems on a scale unknown in the past. In many of the emergent lands there is a great diversity of tongues, with none of them predominant. Ethnic and tribal rivalries quite often are so acute that the choice of any one language over the others would evoke stubborn opposition and fan already existing resentments. For example, Nigeria with some two hundred distinct languages simply saw fit to adopt English as the over-all official medium, although several important vernaculars are employed for primary education and local administration.

Language planning, or language engineering, as it is sometimes called, has occurred only sporadically and indirectly until recent times. Not until the First World War did it begin to assume large-scale proportions and to be placed on a legal basis. Undoubtedly Wilson's Fourteen Points and that statesman's views on ethnic self-determination furnished the greatest impetus to formal and deliberate language planning ever witnessed in the Western world. Most of the new states created by Versailles and related pacts possessed sizable minorities whose rights, linguistic and otherwise, were guaranteed by the respective constitutions. The right to employ their own languages freely, to receive primary and even higher education in them, or to have those languages considered co-official with the predominant tongues was by law assured to the main ethnic groups of the new states.[1]

It was, however, the USSR that undertook the vastest program of language planning ever attempted up to then. Having come to power with the considerable assistance of the minorities, the leaders of the Soviet Union wished to show the world that the Marxist principle of "national in form, socialist in content" could work. Russian was made the over-all official medium, together with fifteen languages of the union republics, while about sixty minority tongues were used as languages of primary instruction. In most of Eastern Europe, nevertheless, the

[1] The best general treatment of this topic, country by country, is to be found in Stanley Rundle, *Language as a Social and Political Factor in Europe* (London 1944). Consult also J. Vendryes, *Language: A Linguistic Introduction to History* (London 1931).

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rise of authoritarian governments resulted in a whittling down of the role of the minority tongues, reflecting, of course, the worsened status of their speakers. While still considered important for mass political work at the grass-roots and for primary education, and for the development of a certain amount of folk literature and even technical works, ever since the early 1930's the minority languages of the USSR, some two hundred in all, have been assigned an increasingly circumscribed role, while Russian has been steadily upgraded.[2]

Notwithstanding all this, the experience of the interwar period was instructive. Such small states as Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, whose tongues had never been employed for the multifarious purposes of a modern, technological society, were able within one generation—that is, by 1939—to adapt their languages to such needs. They were, to use a term coined by the German writer on socio-linguistics, Heinz Kloss, able to make them "sociologically complete."[3] At the same time these small countries were obliged, as is Finland or Hungary today, to rely on "languages of wider communication"—that is to say, international languages—for higher specialized research and for foreign contacts. Today Finland uses Finnish for most of its linguistic needs, but relies heavily on German and English, as well as Swedish, for specialized purposes and for communicating with the outside world. The roles of languages may, with political changes, become diminished on the world scene, or they may gain importance. Finland's language was a century ago little but a group of peasant dialects, and Russian, although spoken by many millions, did not become a language of international significance until the last few decades.

The ethno-linguistic problems of the East European lands, however, pale by comparison with those which have been harassing the leaders of many of the bewilderingly multilingual nations of South Asia and Africa. There are at least eight hundred distinct tongues spoken in sub-Saharan Africa and, to make matters worse, not a single one of them is spoken by more than 8 per cent of the population—the figure for Swahili and Hausa. In India there are perhaps a hundred major lan-

[2] See Jacob Ornstein, "Soviet Language Policy: Theory and Practice," *Slavic and East European Journal*, III (Spring 1959) 1-24; and Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Soviet Education Laws of 1958-59 and Soviet Nationality Policy," *Soviet Studies*, XIV (October 1962), 138-57. For a Soviet view, consult "K izucheniyu sostoyaniya i razvitiya natsional'nykh literaturnykh yazykov narodov sovetskogo soyuza" [For the study of the status and development of the national literary languages of the peoples of the Soviet Union], *Voprosy Yazykoznaniya* (Moscow), No. 4 (1962), 3-8. This is an unsigned lead article presumably written by the editorial staff.

[3] See Heinz Kloss, *Die Entwicklung neuer germanischer Kultursprachen von 1800 bis 1950* (Munich 1952).

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guages or dialects, of which the new Republic of India has chosen Hindi to be the over-all medium, together with a subsystem of twelve regional co-official tongues, such as Rajasthani, Bengali, and Panjabi, as well as Sanskrit. English was kept on as a sort of unofficial junior partner with Hindi, but the target date of 1960, by which time Hindi was to have replaced English, had to be postponed, and the reliance upon English in government, industry, research, and higher education is still very great. The situation in India is staggeringly complex. In the southern portion, where Telugu and other Dravidian (non-Indic) tongues are spoken, there is strong resentment against "Hindi imperialism" and, as a buffer against this, English is favored by many.[4]

In Africa and elsewhere, even the most rabidly nationalistic and anti-Western elements have found themselves linguistically dependent upon the tongues of the former colonizers, particularly French and English. The speed with which the new states have been gaining their independence in the past two decades has forced their leadership to make many language-planning decisions on the basis of expediency, since they must somehow communicate both with their own citizens and with the outside world. Under this categorical imperative a new trend has been initiated, particularly in Africa—the choosing of an international language, not native to the country, as the official medium. French and English, the languages of the former colonizers, have thus become the "national" languages in countries where only a tiny percentage—anywhere from 1 to 10 per cent—can speak these Western tongues of wider communication. Given the problems facing these new states, it would have been difficult at this stage to have made any other decision.[5]

[4] A vast number of articles have appeared on this subject in Indian, Pakistani, British, and American periodicals. See particularly Alfred Pietrzyk, "Problems in Language Planning: The Case of Hindi," in B. N. Varma, ed., *Contemporary India* (London 1964), 247-70. Some useful books are Charles A. Ferguson and J. J. Gumperz, eds., *Linguistic Diversity in South Asia* (Bloomington, Ind., 1960); Selig S. Harrison, *India: The Most Dangerous Decades* (Princeton 1960), particularly 55-95 and 278-84; W. Norman Brown, *The United States and India and Pakistan* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), 226-34.

[5] Here again the bibliography on this subject is an enormous one, consisting of numerous articles scattered throughout a wide variety of periodicals appearing in the respective countries and abroad. See, for example, W. H. Whitely, "Language and Politics in East Africa," *Tanganyika Notes and Records*, Nos. 47-48 (September 1957), 159-74; Ruth E. Sutherlin, "Language Situation in East Africa," in Frank E. Rice, ed., *Study of the Role of Second Languages in Asia, Africa and Latin America* (Washington 1962), 66-78. A series of articles on the language problems of different regions of Africa will appear in the Proceedings of the Second Meeting of the Inter-African Committee on Linguistics (Symposium on Multilingualism), held in Brazzaville, July 16-21, 1962. These are to be published in London under the editorship of M. Guthrie. Some pertinent books are John Spencer, ed., *Language in Africa* (London 1963); Center

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In all, thus far eight new African nations have chosen English as their sole official medium: Uganda, Kenya, Ghana, Bechuanaland, Nigeria, Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, and Sierra Leone. The following eleven states, all formerly parts of French or Belgian colonial holdings, have adopted French: Central African Republic, Chad, Dahomey, Gabon, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Léopoldville), Guinea, Mali. One nation, Cameroun, opted to make both French and English official. In Somalia, formerly colonized by Italy, although the Somali tongue is universally employed, no standard writing system has as yet been adopted and most official writing is done in Italian.

Highly significant is the fact that, realizing the tremendous burdens involved in running an officially polyglot state, very few countries are adopting the multilingual pattern after the manner of the Soviet Union. About the only ones which have done so are India, with thirteen native languages plus English, and Yugoslavia, with Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian, Macedonian, and Albanian.

Where there are two or three decidedly widespread tongues, however, the tendency is to adopt a bilingual or trilingual solution. This is being done despite the knowledge that where there is official bilingualism, there is usually one language which carries greater prestige and gives advantages to its users. Thus, there is something of the Orwellian "more equal" in the real situations, as recent "language riots" in such advanced countries as Canada and Belgium attest. It should be noted that there is much more involved in carrying out a pluralistic language policy besides the matter of conducting official business in government offices. In a bilingual or trilingual country, schoolchildren are ordinarily required to learn both or all three tongues, plus one or two foreign languages. Hence, one will readily find in the educational literature of such lands frequent complaints from parents or even school officials about the inordinately heavy burden of language learning which falls upon the youngsters, and the disproportionate share of the curriculum which this subject comes to occupy.

At any rate, the bilingual, and occasionally the trilingual, pattern is still a fairly common solution. Since World War II the following lands have adopted this pattern:

Afghanistan—Pashto and Persian
Algeria—Arabic and French

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for Applied Linguistics, *Second Language Learning as a Factor in National Development in Asia, Africa and Latin America* (Washington 1961).

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Burundi—Kirundi and French
Cambodia—Cambodian (Khmer) and French
Cameroun—French and English
Ceylon—Sinhalese and Tamil
Cyprus—Greek and Turkish
Kenya—Swahili and English
Laos—Laotian and French
Malagasy Republic—Malagasy and French
Malawi—Nyanja and English
Malaysia—Malay, English, and Chinese
Pakistan—English, Urdu, and Bengali
Philippine Republic—Tagalog, English, and Spanish
Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar—Swahili and English
Rwanda—Kinyarwanda and French
Union of South Africa—English and Afrikaans

No matter which pattern is followed, however, be it monolingual, bilingual, or multilingual, the fact remains that in the new states there is, of necessity, a heavy reliance upon international tongues. In Africa, as we have seen, French, English, and Italian play important roles in all fields beyond mere informal discourse and writing. In the Middle East, where of course Arabic has a long written tradition and, together with Islam, serves as a unifying factor, English and French are a significant part of the communication pattern vis-à-vis the outside world and in technology and higher education. In Southeast Asia, French and English are greatly depended upon, with an ever greater role being assumed by English. In Vietnam, for example, although French has for years been the main international tongue, English is coming into more widespread use as a second language. In any event, particularly in the underdeveloped countries, knowledge and use of these international languages are a *sine qua non* for the enormous tasks of economic and educational development, despite the growing tendency of the United States and other major countries to instruct outgoing foreign service officers and technicians in the local tongues.[6]

In the Bloc countries, of course, Russian and Chinese play roles similar to French and English elsewhere. In Outer Mongolia, for example, Russian is the international tongue of wider communication. Interestingly enough, however, even within the Bloc, English (and sometimes French) is heavily relied upon by technical missions and conferences of political and other types.

[6] For the most convenient summary of the major official and nonofficial languages utilized in the African, Asian, and Latin American states up to 1962, see the charts in Janet Roberts, "Sociocultural Change and Communication Problems," in Rice, ed., *Study of the Role of Second Languages*, 112-20.

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The implications of the growing role of the international languages are profound and many-sided. In general, it may be said that in such an area as Africa the use of the native vernaculars—that is, languages used mostly orally—equates with tribalism, and that of international languages with nationalism and internationalism. Consequently, it is natural that within a given country one might expect to find latent or open conflicts between regional and tribal forces and those that are more broadly oriented. To what extent this is the case varies, of course, with the country and the facts of social dynamics within it. To a certain extent, the growing significance of international tongues in the emergent lands contributes toward the building up of a small but exclusive elite, with access to the power structure and to leadership, based to a large degree on knowledge of French or English. For example, in most of East Africa, unless a youngster can pass his English examination (sent all the way from England), he loses the opportunity to go on to high school and thence to college. To make matters worse, wide illiteracy and the tremendous shortage of educational facilities make it impossible for many to attend school at all, while a great number of bush schools furnish instruction in language and other subjects which is woefully substandard. This inequality can only be remedied with the expansion of educational opportunities. American foundations, colleges, and such government agencies as the Agency for International Development have during the past fifteen years helped to set up much-needed facilities abroad for teaching English as a second language. Assistance has also been coming from Great Britain and, for French teaching, from France.

If the new states stay with their original choice of international languages, they naturally have a ready-made vehicle of expression understood throughout the world. However, if national pride or other considerations prompt them to adopt native vernaculars as official or co-official, as Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanganyika have done, they are faced with the task of equipping those languages for communication tasks in a complex world, rapidly becoming more technological. Here we come to the point about the nature of language which has been and still is grossly misunderstood even by highly educated non-linguists. Contrary to the idea that some languages are too "inherently primitive" to express "advanced" concepts, the fact is that within its own structure any tongue can be made to express any human concept. All that is required is for new terminology and vocabulary to be coined or borrowed from other tongues, and to put these new terms into circulation through dictionaries, periodicals, books, and instructional

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media. Ordinarily the technical part of this task is entrusted to language specialists functioning in special committees, such as Indonesia's Terms Committee, or in special Academies of the Language, as in Israel.[7]

Nevertheless, the job of making languages "sociologically complete" is a time-consuming one, and it would be a human impossibility in such an area as sub-Saharan Africa to develop all eight hundred or so languages spoken there. Fortunately, there have grown up a number of pidgins and creolized lingua francas, which serve as the means of communication between peoples of different speech. In East Africa, Swahili, which developed as a pidgin between Arab slavetraders and Bantu natives, is a lingua franca understood in vast areas. Hausa plays a similar role in Nigeria, as does Lingala along the Congo, Krio in Sierra Leone, and Sango in the Central African Republic. However, all these widespread native tongues suffer from a serious drawback in their lack of prestige and their lack of usefulness on the international scene. Many African parents feel that their children will advance further if they know an important international language rather than the native ones. In the summer of 1961 a conference on multilingualism was held in Brazzaville, in which attempts were made to seek solutions for Africa's language problems. In it very little sentiment was expressed for choosing native languages as official mediums. A questionnaire distributed among students at the University of Accra in Ghana by Professor Gilbert Ansre revealed that the overwhelming majority felt that English had been the best choice for their national language, although a number believed *their* vernacular ought eventually to be developed for some sort of national use. Thus far only five countries have adopted a native African language as official or co-official. Tanganyika has adopted Swahili as its official tongue, Zanzibar has chosen Swahili and English, Kenya has done likewise, while Rwanda adopted Kinyarwanda and French, and Burundi chose Kirundi and French. It is a question to what extent other African nations will follow these examples, and how soon they may do so.

The observer of language planning throughout the world cannot help but gain the impression that, in contrast to the interwar tendency

[7] Consult the following works, which explore a wide range of problems related to the process of standardization: Punya Sloka Ray, *Language Standardization: Studies in Prescriptive Linguistics* (The Hague 1963), and his "Language Standardization," in Rice, ed., *Study of the Role of Second Languages*, 91-104; Roman Jakobson, "The Beginnings of National Self-Determination in Europe," *Review of Politics*, VII (January 1945), 45-58; Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), esp. 97-126 and 204ff.; and also Uriel Weinreich, *Languages in Contact* (New York 1953).

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to promote native languages, a task undertaken with almost sacred devotion, practical considerations today militate for international tongues. Examples are legion. When in 1957 the Middle East Technical University was founded in Ankara, a great controversy arose over the language of instruction. Finally Turkish academicians prevailed on the politicians to adopt a Western language, which they argued would be better equipped than Turkish to handle the teaching of modern technology. English was chosen because of its widespread use and the easy availability of texts and laboratory manuals in it.

Other forms of language planning today include the reform of the language itself or of the writing system. Norway has for a number of years been attempting to create a "new Norwegian" language based largely on peasant dialects and differing as much as possible from the Danish-oriented *riksmål*. Interestingly enough, this has led to conflict between the political conservatives, to whom the older traditional forms appeal, and the liberal elements who espouse the new Norwegian.[8] In Red China, a two-way reform has been going on. On one hand, the regime has commissioned linguists to simplify the number of components in the Chinese characters, so that less strokes are required to write them, and all publications are following the new system. On the other, it has devised a Romanized system for use in schools at certain levels and in literacy programs.[9]

A number of factors, both social and linguistic, are involved in the success or failure of any program of language planning. The language situation is not quite the same in any two countries. A common denominator, however, in the emergent lands which choose to promote a vernacular to official status is its standardization. This necessitates deciding which dialectal variants are to be selected, developing a writing system, and coining a new terminology. All official tongues have undergone this process. Let it be recalled that John Wycliffe said of English when he was told that it was too "rude" to be used for religious purposes, "It is not so rude but they are false liars." The Romance languages were at one time considered crude dialects unsuited for refined usage, and far inferior to Latin.

What is in prospect today is not less but more language engineering. Yet the rapid pace at which it is occurring makes it difficult to view the matter in any perspective. One thing is clear, however, and it is

[8] See Einar Haugen, "Planning for a Standard Language in Modern Norway," *Anthropological Linguistics*, I (March 1959), 8-21.

[9] See John de Francis, *Nationalism and Language Reform in China* (Princeton 1950); Harriet C. Mills, "Language Reform in China," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, XV (August 1956), 517-40.

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that programs of language planning must have much more than sentimental justification to succeed at all. Recent history affords several very fine illustrations. When the Irish Republic came into being some forty years ago, English had long been the normal speech of most of its population. However, it was decided to revive Irish Gaelic and make it co-official with English. Several years ago the Irish Ministry of Education compiled a report admitting that the program to make Eire bilingual had been far from successful.[10] This is hardly surprising, for most Irishmen find English quite suitable for all their needs and do not regard Gaelic as worth the effort. In Israel, by contrast, it took less than two decades to equip Hebrew, up to then a dead language, with terminology for modern needs and make it the common medium of communication.[11] Motivation was in this instance high, and the desire for the creation of an Israeli identity ruled out English, German, or other Western tongues which many Israelis already knew. As with most small countries, however, Israel must also depend for research and for foreign contacts upon international languages. English is the second language for these purposes, although German is widely used in scientific circles.

Another successful case study is that of Indonesia, where a hundred or so major languages and dialects are spoken. Although Malay was a literary language, enjoyed high prestige, and was familiar to a large percentage of the population, the new state decided in favor of a "neutral" solution. It resolved to develop a new language, Bahasa Indonesia, based on Bazaar Malay, a simplified form of Malay used as a lingua franca throughout the area. Bahasa is being taught throughout the school system, although for the first few years of primary school seven regional vernaculars will also be used until they are displaced completely by Bahasa.[12] Under the Ministry of Education, a Terms Committee is busy coining new terms relating to modern technology and sociology and issuing periodic lists. As an auxiliary international tongue, English is widely taught and used, having all but replaced Dutch, which was felt to be too reminiscent of the colonial past.

[10] Colman L. O'Huallachain, O.F.M., "Bilingualism in Education in Ireland," in *Georgetown University Monograph Series on Languages and Linguistics*, E. D. Woodworth and R. J. di Pietro, eds., XV (1962), 75-84.

[11] See Haim Blanc, "The Growth of Israeli Hebrew," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, V (December 1954), 385-92; idem, "Hebrew in Israel: Trends and Prospects," *Middle East Journal*, XI (Autumn 1957), 397-408.

[12] R. Nugroho, "The Origins and Development of Bahasa Indonesia," *Publications of the Modern Language Association*, LXXII (April 1957), 23-28.

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If one were to draw up a list of the factors which have proved to be most important in determining the success or failure of a given program, it would include the following:

(1) The thoroughness with which the language policy provided for by law or other means is implemented.

(2) The extent to which the use of the languages is stimulated by official and nonofficial means. These include the establishment of academies of the language, and support of citizens' groups devoted to use and development of the languages.

(3) The degree to which the languages have been standardized and to which further codification and word coinage are needed.

(4) The prestige of the languages in the areas where they are being promoted, and the attitude of rival groups.

(5) The degree of literacy in the country.

(6) The educational facilities and the intensity and efficiency with which they make it possible to teach the languages.[13]

(7) The relationship of knowledge of the language to vocational opportunity and other opportunities to advance.

(8) The extent of exposure to the languages after formal training, and the opportunities of using it.

On the basis of the above variables, it is to be expected that results of the language planning undertaken by the new nations in the past few decades will differ widely. It would, however, seem fitting that both linguists and social scientists begin to study the subject with something more than the cavalier treatment accorded to it thus far. In a day of interdisciplinary approaches to many problems, the phenomenon of language policy in multilingual states badly needs the insights of both the language expert and the social historian.[14]

[13] In this connection, consult UNESCO, *The Use of Vernacular Languages in Education* (Paris 1953). This touches upon problems of language planning and education in many parts of the world.

[14] Up to this writing, not a single monograph has appeared on the subject of language planning, although there seems to be an increase in the amount of periodical literature devoted to it.

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SOCIETY, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY TURKEY

By KEMAL H. KARPAT

I

THE internal political life of Turkey since the revolution of 1960 has been beset by military coups and conflicts between political parties and social groups far more frequent and intensive than might normally be expected in a post-revolutionary period. This unrest contrasts sharply with the political stability which prevailed before 1960, and comes after a series of constitutional changes intended to establish a better system for orderly change and control of government.

The overthrow of Adnan Menderes's Democratic Party government on May 27, 1960, by a military group, brought to power the Committee of National Unity (CNU). But roughly six months after the revolution the actual control of the government was in the hands of a shadow council, composed of some 67 top army commanders who influenced considerably the policies of CNU, and later those of the civilian governments. In November 1961 the Committee of National Unity formally surrendered its powers of government to a civilian administration chosen one month earlier in national elections. However, this did not create stability. The government went through three successive coalitions, each headed by Ismet Inönü and his People's Republican Party, although this party did not have an absolute majority in the Parliament.

The military opposed any government headed by the Justice Party or the New Turkey Party—both of which were supported largely by ex-members of the ousted Democratic Party—as likely to succumb to the economic and social philosophy of their predecessor. The National Republican Peasant Party, which later split in two, was not considered strong enough to form a government. Instead, the majority of the military trusted the Republican Party, whose reformist etatist ideology and historical connections with the army, as well as its opposition to the Democrats, seemed to ensure them against any reprisals. But this arrangement did not please all the military. Colonel Talat Aydemir staged an unsuccessful putsch in 1962. He was pardoned, but attempted another coup on May 21, 1963. This time he was tried by a military tribunal and sentenced to death; the sentence has now been carried

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out. A few other revolutionary organizations were discovered before they engaged in open action.

Intellectuals and even military leaders warned the people not to support any group associated with the old Democrats or those upholding their policies. Yet, the village and municipal elections held on November 17, 1963, gave the Justice Party, the heir to the Democrats' vote, the highest percentage of seats. The Turkish voter apparently followed his own political judgment and was not intimidated by the groups that had ruled him so long in the past. One may assume that this political tenacity had some deep social roots which help to explain not only the background of Turkey's recent agitated political life, but also subsequent developments.

II

The political unrest in Turkey is caused on the one hand by the breakdown of narrow traditional forms of organization and values, and on the other hand by the pressing need to reorganize the society and its economy into modern, broader social and political units suitable to the requirements of a nation-state. This entails a process of social and political adaptation and integration, as well as a change of political philosophy. The government is compelled to come closer to and normalize its relations with the society and the individual, whereas local communities must accept broader political allegiances. In comparative terms, in the Middle East only Turkey has reached this stage of social transformation.

The modernization of Turkey during the first three decades after the establishment of the Republic in 1923 dealt primarily with the form of the political structure, the modern nation-state. Today the problem is to consolidate the internal structure and achieve a more natural relationship between various social groups and the government. This may result in a new internal balance and stability, more natural and more durable than in the past.

Previously, the political stability of Turkey was maintained by a power coalition of two groups. One, at the national level, controlled the government and had monopoly over all means of violence. The other, at the local and provincial levels, had no means of physical power but controlled the economic and social life of the various localities.

The first "modern" group consisted of "civilianized" military men, intellectuals, and professionals closely associated with the government. These accepted the supremacy of the state in the belief that the state embodied modern ideas and could spread them through reforms to the

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entire population. The ruling groups regarded the nation as the proper basis of the state. However, there was as yet no Turkish nation in the modern sense of the word. The average individual felt allegiance either to his local community or to the universal state of Islam, and was indifferent to the exigencies of the nation-state. The problem faced by the central authority, therefore, was to broaden the communal allegiance, while at the same time limiting the loyalty felt toward the universal Islamic *umma* (community) and state. It wanted to create a modern, secular nation whose ideals were confined to the territorial limits of the state.

The second power group—the one at the local level—consisted of landlords, ex-officials of religious orders and government, some craft groups, and a variety of individuals who had leading religious or cultural positions in the traditionalist era.[1] These had been affected by the general process of social change and gradually acquired influential economic and social positions. The profound changes in land ownership in the nineteenth century, which resulted in the passage of *miri* or state lands into private hands, as well as the increase in trade and new occupational habits, had altered the social and economic roles of the old community leaders and transformed them into a special type of middle class. They were still conservative and committed to orthodox Islamic values, but in the Republic they no longer had the government's political support, since the latter accepted secularism and nationalism as its basic principles.

On balance, the economic and social interests of the countryside groups seem to have outweighed their cultural and religious loyalties, although at first sight the latter still appeared to be quite strong. This situation had vital importance, since it enabled these countryside groups eventually to compromise with a government and a regime that respected their economic and social position. Hence one can say that they could accept the concepts of nation-state and republicanism as long as the government was willing to respect their local supremacy.

The government's idea of establishing a modern secular Turkish nation, however, based on unity of language and culture, presented a number of difficulties. The local leaders had secured the allegiance of individuals in their communities as the representatives of religious and cultural values, most of which had stemmed from the universalist

[1] Occasionally tribal leaders were included in this group, but their power was limited. Possibly only six provinces of Turkey have felt their influence. In the Erzurum area, this writer investigated a tribal group—the heirs of Sheik Said, the instigator of a Kurdish revolt in 1925. It turned out that the party supported by the Sheik won the least votes in the district.

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dogma of Islam. They spoke on behalf of the universal nation—the Muslim *umma* based on religious unity. To make language and territory the bases of nationhood violated the ancient concepts of social and political organization. As we have indicated, the local leaders were willing to integrate themselves into a new political organization—namely, the nation-state—if they were assured of retaining their positions. But to accept the modern concept of nation would have created new foci of loyalty, a new cultural orientation, and would have raised the prestige of linguists, artists, and scholars as the representatives of national values.

Consequently the local leaders fought vigorously to maintain the Islamic understanding of the nation by rejecting objective elements of nationhood and by stressing religious ties. This explains the bitter animosity shown by these groups toward the People's Houses established to create a national culture based on language, folklore, and the native way of life. Yet, the point remains that not only was a modern Turkish state successfully established, but the local groups were incorporated into it. The next problem is to determine how this was accomplished.

The new central Turkish government was certainly modern in intentions and form, but in spirit, attitudes, and especially philosophy of power it preserved much of the traditionalist approach. The ideas of Western writers affecting the Republican leaders' thinking were combined with traditional, moralistic concepts of social organization and authority. The government had maintained the idea of state supremacy and the immutability of the social structure. These had been the foundations of government and society in ancient Islam and were further consolidated by the Ottoman state, the predecessor of modern Turkey. The traditional understanding of the state was largely preserved in the first decades of the Republic. The state was the symbol of, and the means of fulfilling, the highest moral aspirations of the new nation, as decided by its leaders, who knew where its best interests lay and felt morally responsible to guide it by sheer force of intellect toward the supreme goal.

In the past, the supreme goal had been preservation of the integrity of the Muslim community and its defense against infidel invaders. Now the state's purpose was to preserve its national territorial integrity and to modernize the country. Modernization was supposed to enhance the welfare of the Turks, but in reality the state was far more interested in its own institutional interests than in the people as individuals. (This is a problem which cannot be fully explored in

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this article, for it involves a separate critical analysis of the relations between the bureaucracy, as inherited from the Ottoman Empire, and the new elite groups that emerged in the Republic.)

Thus, if the groups in the countryside accepted the state's political authority, and if the state in turn recognized the economic and social supremacy of local groups, the coalition between them could become a fact. This indeed is what happened. The opposition of the Republican government to structural changes, incorporated in penal laws prohibiting any attempts to change the established social order, is one of the main evidences of this tacit agreement. Hence, by the late 1930's it was no rare sight to see as the leader of the Republican Party's provincial or district organization a bearded man with a shaven head and a rosary in his hand, who had been on pilgrimage to Mecca, and was an utter reactionary but spoke warmly of the great Turkish Republic and nation. This man would often be a landlord or the owner of a flourishing commercial enterprise.

However, this does not imply that the state and the local groups preserved their original positions intact. A series of influences forced changes on both of them, brought them into conflict, and opened the way to truly modern social developments that will be examined later in this article.

III

The social structure of the countryside groups deserves further scrutiny. Family attachments provided internal solidarity, cohesion, and continuity in such groups. Consequently, they can be regarded more as an outgrowth and extension of the family than as a rationally conceived association for the defense of economic interests and of social positions. Yet, in due course family attachments and economic interests had become identified and indistinguishable from each other. Thus, the countryside groups appeared as the social, economic, and political expression of the family and assumed public roles by preserving their original family allegiances.

The groups appeared at first sight to be disorganized and loose, with individual families often in conflict with each other. But all these tensions were contained, harmonized, and stabilized in the family before they reached the breaking point. Similarities of attitude and philosophy of life engendered within the family seemed to prevail over differences arising from influences outside its sphere. The basic attitudes of individuals, their philosophy of life, expectations, and the

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satisfaction of their intellectual needs, were all affected in one way or another by family relationships. In this context the family may be considered an integral primary unit with social, political, economic, and cultural functions, generating its own social and political ideology. Even the modern forms of alienation and intellectual expression preserved the family spirit.

This writer is convinced, on the basis of field investigation in the Middle East, that modernization and change, and hence politics, in this area cannot be properly assessed without understanding the family system, both as a nuclear unit of social organization and as a conditioning political and economic organization when it takes an extended form.

The extended family system in Turkey still constitutes the center of social, economic, and political life and particularly of political parties at the local level. At the national level, family influence is rather limited. In some cases, scions of a local family may acquire a position in the city, through the backing of their friends and relatives at home. But soon they become assimilated into the cosmospolitan life; normally the second generation is well assimilated. Indeed, at the national level a variety of influences—immigration, government service, contacts with foreigners—tend to break down the narrow circle of family attachments developed at the local level. However, at the provincial level such attachments are quite strong and play a significant part in politics.

Basically, in the Turkish family system, aside from some nomadic groups, blood relationship seems to have less importance than in Arab countries. In ordinary circumstances, a third generation may be estranged from its original group. Moreover, place of origin does not have a status-giving role, although occasionally it fosters group solidarity.

Family relations seem to acquire importance as a basis for status when members of a given family achieve prominence by acquiring wealth, political power, government position, or erudition. Government position and erudition (joining the *ulema* ranks), usually consolidated by wealth, had priority in the past, but in the past fifty years the chief emphasis came to be placed on economic power, which in turn led to social and political status. Thus, a family may originally acquire status by achievement, but later the status is passed on by ascription, and kinship acquires importance as an identifying factor and serves to maintain internal family cohesion. Even at this stage, devotion to a person—usually to the man who achieved fame or

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leadership in the family—seems to be matched by a desire to preserve the family honor, power, and prestige.

Leading families in rural areas and small towns, even those residing in provincial capitals, still maintain almost absolute control over the economic, social, and political life of their respective communities. The totality of these families, ranging from a few in small places to several hundred in larger towns, cannot be described as a social class or a feudal group. They do not conform fully to Western criteria in this regard. They are special interest groups, rooted culturally in Islamic traditions of social organization and leadership, adapting themselves to new economic and political conditions in order to maintain their supremacy.

It would be difficult to envisage any major development in the towns of Turkey without the consent or participation of the dominating family groups. Even the central government, however progressive, could hardly cope with these family oligarchies without reaching some agreement with them. Consequently, all the governments in the past have been forced to work out a tacit agreement with these ruling families, as implied before, whereby the government's political authority is accepted in exchange for recognition of their social and economic supremacy. Each government in the last century—Abdulhamid (1876-1909), the Young Turks (1908-1918), and the Republic (1923-1946, 1946-1960)—created family groups of its own, superimposed on the existing social structure.

The local families were often divided by a variety of internal factors, but could combine forces to oppose interference from outside or internal challenges from peasants, employees, and the like. The settlement of land disputes furnishes a good illustration of their method of operation. When a new family rose to prominence, it soon identified itself with the ruling ones rather than with the lower social group from which it emerged. Occasionally, a new rising family would use its mother group to dominate the elites among which it was accepted. The members of these local families often filled positions in institutions of learning and government, and imbued them with their parochial mentality.

The alliance between the government and family groups in the Republic, however, proved to be temporary. It was deprived of the commonly shared set of beliefs and values that had achieved the solidarity between state and society in the sultans' time. Secularism and

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nationalism, and the slow but steady growth of new social groups such as labor, business, and intellectuals of lower social origin, diversified the social structure. These also corroded the traditional foundations of authority and created a secular social and political orientation. True, nationalism and the very idea of state and government had borrowed heavily from the traditional *umma* philosophy of organization and group solidarity. But this did not change the main trend of fragmentation and stratification, which eventually transformed the moral state into a power state and opened up the closed society of the towns.

Traditionalism and modernism had combined in some intricate and devious ways to prepare the transition of Turkish society from a universalist to a national state. The social and economic supremacy of family groups in the countryside was recognized, legalized, and protected through a series of modern laws within the framework of the nation-state. Thus, the reasons for opposition were eliminated and the successful establishment of a modern political structure was assured. It may be said that the legal reforms, especially those concerning trade, property relations, and contracts, prepared the legal bases for a sort of middle class rooted in economic occupations which finally emerged in the 1940's and 1950's. Henceforth this group was preoccupied with the question of how to protect its property and hence change the political order to this end. The state, on the other hand, was primarily concerned with creating wealth as a basis for its own power. The idea of creating wealth for the general welfare emerged much later.

The establishment of a national state, however, was the precondition of true modernization, and not the end-result, as both the government and the family groups seemed to believe. The next stage of development was a corollary to the establishment of a modern national state. It consisted of a transfer of power from the bureaucratic intelligentsia to the economic groups, and of the involvement of the lower social groups in the political process. The parochial, semi-feudalistic outlook of local communities was to be replaced gradually by a sense of civic responsibility and identity with larger social and political units.

IV

The political alliance of the family groups with the government had restrained the lower urban and rural groups and contributed to political

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stability. But the introduction of a multiparty system in 1945-1946, and the subsequent acquisition of power by the Democratic Party in 1950, started an intensive upward mobility that shattered the previous power structure. There is no reason to believe that either the Republican Party or the Democratic Party, the main protagonists in this political struggle, had advisedly sought to release the lower social groups or wanted to change the elite organization and its philosophy. In fact, the opposite is true. The Republican Party believed that its strong organization in the countryside, supported by local "modernist" families, could successfully cope with any opposition group.

The Democratic Party leadership at the local level came from lower family groups in the towns, as well as from landowners who had been alarmed by a land reform law introduced by the Republican Party in 1945, largely on the initiative of Inönü and a socially minded bureaucratic group. (The law was drastically amended in 1950.) Thus, the leadership in both parties in the countryside was in the hands of family groups. The Democrats lacked a basic ideology or even an organization at the beginning. They were able, nevertheless, to mobilize large segments of the rural and lower urban groups and set them against the Republican Party, which had been in power for over two decades.[2]

The mobilization and political education of the masses occurred not as a result of a premeditated plan but as an accidental result of the need to secure votes and support at a popular level. Indeed, according to the new democratic ideas, the source of power did not reside in small elite groups but in the masses, hitherto ignored. The search for popular support forced both the Republicans and the Democrats to establish thousands of party organizations throughout the villages and towns of Turkey, which became centers of political education and social mobilization.

The main party organizations at the provincial and district levels were controlled by local families, but in small towns, neighborhoods, and villages the leaders came from less well-known families, closer in mentality and outlook to the factual, pragmatic, and materialistic view of the masses. Moreover, once they acquired power in 1950, the Democrats retained the lower groups' votes through a variety of incentives, ranging from welfare projects to cash in the form of credits. They abolished agricultural taxes, and were able to retain power in the elections of 1954 and 1957 through the popular vote. All these factors accentuated the pragmatic and materialistic tendencies, and also created a demo-

[2] I dealt extensively with this problem in an address to Chatham House, which appeared in *International Affairs,* XXXVIII (July 1962), 304-23.

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cratic understanding of government. This development becomes more relevant when it is contrasted with the previous traditional ascetic philosophy of life and the disinterest in government among the commoners.

The liberal economic policy initiated by the Democrats after 1950 resulted in the intensification of economic activities and an increase in private enterprise. It also led to the integration of villages and towns into larger economic units, and in the full emergence of a cash economy and production for market. As usual the economic activity revolved around family enterprises, although its effects were felt throughout all social layers.

Studies published after 1955, and especially after the revolution of 1960, denounced the Democrats' unplanned economic policy, the unbalanced distribution of income, the faulty tax policy, and their abuses in awarding contracts to their own followers. There is truth in all these accusations, particularly in the fact that the inflation hit the salary and wage earners hard. But economic policy of the Democrats also produced some other results which are largely ignored now. New jobs were provided for millions of people in transportation, machine maintenance, food processing, small industries, and other related fields. Land values increased, credit facilities expanded, and usury was considerably reduced. People were aroused from centuries of social and economic inertia and discovered new opportunities and goals in life. Certainly Turkey became incomparably more dynamic in the 1950's than in the 1930's and 1940's. One can readily perceive in any town in Anatolia the changes in living and mentality that have occurred in the past fifteen years.

This intense economic activity resulted largely from short-range projects. It attracted low-paid laborers from the villages, who flocked to the cities by the thousands without any guarantee of continuous employment. The urban population swelled from 18 per cent to more than 31 per cent in one decade. Today, all the major cities of Turkey are surrounded by slum belts in which new urban dwellers are exposed to modern standards of living. City districts with fashionable buildings house the new middle class of Turkey, created largely since 1950 through the Democrats' economic policies.

The majority of this class is formed no longer of intellectual, military, and bureaucratic groups as in the past, but of tradesmen, entrepreneurs, contractors, and a variety of other groups whose wealth was derived from some sort of economic occupation, including trade. The increase in the volume of internal and external trade provided a unique

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possibility of enrichment. A simple importing license could net millions of lira a year, since the taxes paid amounted to a trifle of the profit.

V

The rise of this new middle class was greatly enhanced by economic aid from the United States. A good part of the aid was diffused to the commercial groups, in the hope that this would stimulate the birth of a large middle class which would in turn provide a stable basis for Turkey's democratic regime, as in the West. This scheme overlooked the cultural and political orientation of Middle Eastern society, its patterns of social stratification, as well as the political attitudes of the emerging middle classes. In fact, all these differed considerably from their counterparts in the West.

The original "middle class" in Turkey that emerged at the end of the nineteenth century, and especially at the beginning of the twentieth, was comprised of the intelligentsia, bureaucracy, and military. The small entrepreneurs, businessmen, and service groups functioned in a subordinate position to them. True, the middle class formed in 1923-1940 included a large number of wealthy families enriched through association with the state, but their position was not challenged since they had accepted the supremacy of the bureaucracy and intelligentsia, temporarily at least. But during the Democrats' rule the lower economic groups acquired control of party organizations at the local level. They played vital roles in elections and were thus able to influence the government and consolidate their own position.

The political ascendancy of economically powerful groups relegated the intelligentsia and the military to a secondary position and oriented them toward a new social and economic philosophy that gave a "socialist" interpretation to etatism, and an economic-social meaning to the concept of class.

Etatism and social reforms turned into weapons directed against the economic groups, whereas the latter, understandably enough, opposed state intervention and welfare measures as instruments of bureaucratic domination and dictatorship. At present the intelligentsia refers to the new wealthy groups as a "class" and accuses them of having destroyed the old "classless" social arrangement that functioned smoothly under its own direction. (For thirty years the official line was that Turkey had no social classes.) The "new bourgeoisie" in turn vehemently denies being a class and condemns all such notions as undermining the unity of the nation, for in its view a nation is an amorphous group.

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Furthermore, the middle class supports the democratic parliamentary system in its present form and ultimately may not be averse to a strong government, be it civilian or military, as long as it respects its own political and economic supremacy. The bureaucratic groups also favor a "true" democracy, provided that it levels off differences of wealth and functions under their own leadership. In both cases, elitist views dominate; the intelligentsia demands leadership on the basis of erudition, while the economic groups relying on popular support claim power as the "representatives of the nation."

The rise of a labor force, however, has placed both the struggle between the bureaucratic and economic middle-class groups and the question of economic development in a new perspective. Up to the present time, all major political and economic decisions were made with little, if any, consultation with labor, as one might expect in an elitist society. But there is a growing labor force (of 12.5 million workers in 1961, 78 per cent were in agriculture, 9.5 per cent in industry, and 12.5 per cent in services). This force is being increasingly organized in trade unions (about 400,000 members) as the modern type of economic enterprise replaces the traditional crafts, and a politically minded labor substitutes for the apolitical, mystically minded journeymen of the old guilds. But private entrepreneurs, with some notable exceptions, still regard labor as a servant class. They expect labor to consider their own family enterprises as national institutions and to strive for success with the abnegation and humility of docile servants.

The situation is not better in the state enterprises, which opposed trade unionism and the right to strike in the past. So far these have operated inefficiently and only recently raised wages to about $1.20 a day, while wages in private enterprises have almost doubled in the last ten years, following the market demand for manpower. Thus, the inefficiency of state enterprises, and their reliance on government power to silence workers' demands in the past, have led labor to adopt a rather favorable attitude toward private entrepreneurship. This may not last long, however, if private enterprise abuses it.

VI

We have attempted to analyze in the preceding pages some of the main political and economic developments during the Democrats' rule in order to place in better perspective the social and political changes which have taken place since the revolution of 1960. But, before proceeding further, it is essential to point out that all the developments

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in 1946-1960, which were fundamental indeed, took place without major political disturbance. Both the Republicans and the Democrats had undertaken far-reaching measures with the assumption that they had a legitimate possession of power, and that the traditional loyalty to the state and respect for government authority would prevent major opposition and violence. Throughout Turkish political history, governments have strived to preserve an appearance of formal legitimacy, a mental attitude inspired by Islamic practice, and were thus able to muster popular obedience. It is in this sense that Turks in general have developed a sophisticated and civilized understanding of authority and power.

The peaceful transfer of power to the Democratic Party in 1950, through elections, preserved this tradition of legitimacy by replacing its Islamic moral aspect with the modern idea of government by popular will. But the traditional obedience to government, while contributing to the maintenance of order and stability in the past, also helped to perpetuate conservative concepts of authority and social organization, though dressed in modern garb. The revolution of 1960, and the forceful assumption of power by the military, divested the concept of authority of its moralistic, traditionalist cloak and plunged Turkey into the age of group conflicts and power politics. The problem henceforth was to regularize and humanize the use of power through secular moral and political principles, to the extent that it was possible to do so.

The military intervention was precipitated by the dictatorial measures undertaken by the Democrats in 1959-1960. Its express goal was to establish a sounder democratic regime than the previous one. Basically, however, the revolution was the reaction of a power group—that is, the military—which had been associated with government for centuries, to another group—the Democrats and their supporters—who had recently acquired power.

The group motivation of the revolution, despite official pronouncements rejecting it, is revealed by the repressive measures taken against the Democrats and the new wealthy groups they had created. It is also evident in a series of measures which restored the military, the intelligentsia, and the bureaucracy to power and status. But this policy aimed at restoring the *status quo* resulted in tensions, unrest, and economic stagnation. The social structure had changed. The new middle class was too strong to allow the old ruling bureaucratic groups to revive the power arrangement prevailing from 1920 to 1946, even though the possibility of coalition between the old and the new groups was not excluded.

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The acceptance of the legitimacy of economic motivation was another major consequence of the revolution. In fact, economic matters acquired top priority and resulted in freedom for occupational groups to organize themselves and seek economic and social advantages. Possibly this is a long-range gain of the revolution, since it implies acceptance of a pluralist social order. Consequently, the trade unions were freed of police controls and, guided by capable leaders who had risen from the rank and file, shortly became one of the most powerful forces in Turkey. The service groups further consolidated their existing organizations and became a sort of interest group. The Chambers of Trade and Industry, spurred by this movement among employees, articulated their views and began to display a new dynamism and initiative by taking a firm stand on economic and social policies. For the first time in the Middle East, economic groups dared to stand by their economic convictions, irrespective of the government's attitude. Several leading businessmen and bankers publicly stated their views on political and economic matters.

The revolution did not affect directly the organization or the conservative mentality of Turkey's political parties. To the contrary, it enhanced the power of the leading family groups in the countryside by abolishing all the party precincts in village and town neighborhoods. These were the only organizations through which the lower groups could make themselves heard. The military's justification was that political discussions in party precincts caused friction and dissension among the population.

The proportional representation adopted in the election of the lower house may eventually facilitate the emergence of ideological parties, but for the time being Parliament is in the hands of conservative forces. The use of progressive terminology on their part does not prevent the existing party organizations at the local level from confining themselves to the narrow ideology of their sustaining social basis, the family.

The Republican Party, leaning heavily on its etatist doctrine, had shifted toward the left immediately after 1960, under the influence of a social-minded bureaucratic group. This group was supported by some urban intellectuals, village teachers, and government officials who demanded social and economic development, mainly through state action, but their power is now on the decline.

The die-hards of the days of the single party, who were on the rise when the multiparty experiment shattered their expectations, have made a comeback since the revolution and are gaining power once more. The Republican Party harbors other intellectuals, mostly pro-

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fessionals who have become identified with the economic groups and in fact depend on them for a living and often voice their viewpoint in the press and Parliament, but do not possess much power in the party. Inönü, the party's leader, seems to understand the military and the bureaucracy better and prefers to deal with them. Each of the groups is struggling for influence, but as long as Inönü is at the helm, the chances for spectacular power shifts among them, although not excluded, are somewhat limited. Should he retire, the fermenting intraparty struggle may burst into the open. Some groups may court military support and establish closer relations with the family groups, both within their own ranks and in other parties. This may lead to the establishment of an all-encompassing political organization, outwardly modern and economic-minded, but politically elitist and conservative.

The Justice Party, on the other hand, is dominated largely by new economic groups and their families, and includes a substantial part of the professional intelligentsia in the countryside. In matters of economic policy it is arch-liberal, which dilutes somewhat its traditionalist, conservative, and anti-intellectual attitude toward social and political problems.

The difference of views on economic policy—that is to say, liberalism versus etatism—is the dividing line between the Republican and the Justice parties. This was the main cause of the breakup of their coalition government in 1962. The Republicans, impressed by the outcry for social justice and economic development, seemed determined to carry out the recommendations of the State Planning Organization that was established shortly after the revolution. But the imposition of high taxes on agriculture and real estate, the increased state intervention, and a tendency to grant extensive powers to the Organization after 1960 created conflicts in the coalition. Finally the Justice Party broke away, under the politically expedient pretext that the Republicans refused to grant full amnesty to the jailed Democrats. In reality the Republicans had agreed to most of the amnesty conditions, despite strong opposition from the army and intellectual groups, but refused to change their views on economic policy.

The second coalition government included the New Turkey Party and the National Republican Peasant Party. It was formed only after the Republicans agreed to adopt a more liberal economic policy; Ekrem Alican of the New Turkey Party became Deputy Prime Minister and assumed direction of economic affairs. The Planning Organization was placed under stricter parliamentary controls. Soon this coalition faced the same dilemma—that economic liberalism and etatism could

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not be implemented by the same government, and that one had to give way to the other. The coalition was a political anomaly which survived through artificial combinations that produced stagnation and mistrust and prepared the way for extremist currents. Since the Republican Party held the main power, the public regarded it as responsible for any evil that befell Turkey. The other parties in the coalition were accused of supporting the Republicans' policies. The election for municipal and village aldermen on November 17, 1963, showed that the population did not trust even the small parties in the coalition. Consequently, the two minor parties withdrew and the coalition collapsed. The third coalition, again headed by Inönü's Republicans, is composed of independents and a scion of the National Party. It has stayed in power chiefly because of the Cyprus dispute; otherwise it would topple and the road would open to new elections.

VII

The political stalemate, coupled with growing demands by lower-income groups for economic benefits and the continuing domination of family groups in the countryside, has created a favorable condition for the development of socialism. The junta members declared in 1960 that socialism was not to be condemned but regarded as a possible solution to Turkey's problems. Socialism at that stage was associated, at most, with legitimate social democratic demands. But once the taboo on the concept was removed, the idea caught on fast and spread to other groups.

One socialist group includes teachers, some government officials, and intellectuals who demand equality of wealth, speedy cultural reforms, wider literacy, and secularism, much in the spirit of earlier days of the Republic. (The majority of these intellectuals supported the Republican Party in 1950-1962 but, seemingly disillusioned by its social conservatism, are now abandoning it; this has compelled the Republican Party to stress its etatism to win them back.) This brand of socialism, although partly affected by Marxist views, is basically rooted in the traditional philosophy that regards the government as a sort of moral institution administered by intellectual groups.

Another socialist trend of thought, discernible among the trade unions, takes the form of demands for social legislation and higher wages to be brought about by parliamentary action and collective bargaining. Unlike the first group of socialists, labor still favors parliamentary institutions, primarily because the etatism enforced in 1930-1947, as men-

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tioned before, worked to its detriment. Some labor leaders believed that a party of their own would enhance their political influence in the Parliament, but an attempt made in 1962 to establish a *Çalişanlar Partisi* (Workingmen's Party) failed, largely because of opposition from rank-and-file labor leaders. The involvement of some "socialist-etatist" intellectuals in this project, and the affiliation of some labor leaders with the Republican Party, seem to have caused considerable suspicion that the proposed party was a scheme by the old ruling groups to capture control of labor.

Finally, a third socialist group is represented by the *Türkiye Işçi Partisi* (Labor Party of Turkey), headed by Mehmet Ali Aybar, a former professor at the University of Istanbul. Aybar, who has a Marxist background, regards socialism not as a technique of power but as a way of life based on a total social and economic reorganization. He nevertheless accepts the parliamentary system. The party has about 10,000 members among the trade unions, extending over 7 provinces and 12 district seats, mainly in southeastern Turkey. Here trade unionism appears as the best means to break the power of the traditionalist family groups in control of the economy. At the beginning, the Labor Party did not attract many intellectuals. Then, for a while, it appeared to gain power, but in the municipal elections it received a total of only about 35,000 votes. The situation may change in the general elections of 1965.

All these socialist groups seem to agree that a change in the social structure is a basic condition for the achievement of modernization. They demand the elimination of family rule in the countryside, which is indeed a continuous threat to real progress in all fields of endeavor.

The military stands in the middle of these developments, torn between an impelling desire to return to political neutrality and regain the traditional popular confidence in its impartiality, and a fear of civilian reaction. It suspects the Justice Party of intentions to amend the laws passed by the junta after the "revolution of 27 May," and initiate reprisals against the military. Recently the Parliament, acting under heavy pressure from the Justice Party, refused to lift the parliamentary immunity of a deputy who in a public speech urged the population to oppose by force any new military takeover. He was held liable for insulting the army, a mortal sin, but has remained unpunished so far, thus precipitating the abortive putsch of Colonel Aydemir in May 1963.

Social, economic, and political developments in the past fifteen years in Turkey have changed considerably the traditional functions of the military and their symbolic place in society, and have opened the way

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to a new type of military-civilian relationship. The revolution in turn projected the military onto the national scene as an interest group. It no longer appeared as the sole representative of the highest national virtues and ideals, but as a group bound to coexist with other social groups and accept them as equals. Traditional concepts of a "Praetorian Guard" or a "people permanently in arms," as well as popular beliefs about the army's place in national life, were considerably amended. Individualistic symbols of solidarity, deriving from a new organic understanding of nation and state, replaced much of the ancient national collective myths. Traditional power conceptions still survive among the elder officers who control the high command positions, but the younger officers seem to be more impressed by current social and economic trends. The military, like all other social groups, faces the difficult task of adapting itself mentally and functionally to the new social structure and its pluralist philosophy.

The political future of Turkey depends largely upon the power alignment of the various social groups. The present fear of socialism may induce some officers, professional groups, and old-time etatists to form a rightist social coalition. This in turn will push labor definitely to the left and away from its current social democratic stand. Today, only labor displays class characteristics and has inherent power, but so far it appears willing to collaborate with management and share in increased production. If it is allowed to organize further and its collective bargaining rights are respected (a law granting the right to strike was enacted recently), there are definite indications that this may compel the family groups that control the private sector of the economy to adopt a rational economic outlook. The latter groups may in fact become a modern type of middle class with a social consciousness of their own. Some recent publications and speeches by spokesmen for these groups point to the fact that their narrow family orientation is being replaced by a middle-class philosophy.

Parliamentary democracy is discredited among the intellectuals and there is mounting public demand for political stability at all costs. Yet, there is no general consensus that dictatorship is the ultimate salvation for Turkey. Even the most extreme socialist groups believe that conditions are not yet ripe for a social revolution. Furthermore, these socialists believe that the revolution of 1960, and especially the subsequent political developments which reestablished the elite rule, have somewhat alienated the peasantry from the family groups in the countryside, and thus paved the way for the long-awaited turn to the left. They are hopeful that the political stalemate, and especially eco-

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nomic stagnation, will discredit all the traditional power groups and prove that a middle class cannot advance social welfare, thus causing the establishment of a socialist order to appear as an inevitable course.

VIII

There is a general consensus in Turkey, fully shared by this writer, that the ultimate outcome of the nation's political life depends on its economic policy and rate of development. In fact, the current political malaise, as implied before, is the result of a malfunctioning traditionalist economy geared to serve a few upper groups or the government. The mentality and methods, both of the private and state sectors, are obsolete, bureaucratic, and uneconomic. The State Planning Organization has improved the situation somewhat but has not yet attacked its real cause. The truth is that this so-called "mixed" type of economy is traditionalist, conservative, and elitist in spirit. The state and private enterprises have failed to accept the ideas of growth from below or production for mass use. Their use of modern terminology is deceptive. The private sector does not conform to the standards of modern capitalism, or the state enterprise to those of true socialism, but reflect conditions specific to Turkey's social and economic history. The understanding of "capitalism" and "socialism" is primitive and highly oversimplified. The government interferes in economic life through a series of regulations and controls which create waste, delays, and irritation, but also provide jobs for a bureaucracy overly eager to invent new regulations.

Theoretically, an unequivocal acceptance and enforcement either of modern economic policies prevailing in the West or of socialist principles, but not both of them at the same time with the same priority, could bring the Turkish economy fully into the present era.

Present conditions, if considered objectively, seem to favor the adoption of Western economic principles. The recent acceptance of Turkey into the Common Market as an associate member may in fact expedite the transition to a modern Western-style economy. Should this transition be obstructed by insufficient investment, political strife, or growing social tension in the next five years, no conceivable power could prevent Turkey from going to some extreme. Thus, an accelerated economic development in the right direction and the maintenance of political freedom are two major conditions to bring Turkey out of its impasse. Political freedom is necessary to achieve a natural balance among the various social groups.

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Turkish economic development, according to some reports, has kept a steady pace at about 5 or 6 per cent in the last year and a half. Inflation has been checked, but without producing any widespread relief for the growing unemployed population. (The manpower force increases by about 400,000 per year.) Internally there seem to be adequate amounts of capital accumulated in private hands. If the economy were to acquire some vitality and the political situation some stability, a larger proportion of this capital might be invested. The private sector has usually invested the share stipulated by the State Planning Organization. The state sector has failed to raise enough capital. Recently the government tried to increase taxes, since some sectors, agriculture in particular, are undertaxed.

Economic development depends vitally on outside assistance at a mean rate of $350 million a year, or $1.8 billion in the next five years, as estimated by the Planning Organization. (The total investment for 1965 is $1,250 million.) But economic aid from abroad during 1962 and 1963 averaged about $290 million a year, or just about $150 million more than the amount Turkey returns annually to the West to repay debts and interest. (The total aid received by Turkey from the West since 1948 is a little over $3.5 billion, mostly supplied by the United States. Of this total, about two-thirds was used for military aid and the remaining for economic development.) Meanwhile, Turkey's foreign trade, as usual, is in heavy deficit: $640 million in imports and $370 million in exports in 1962. The small but vociferous group of importers and the monopolistic exporters' unions—there is a plan to disband them—have continued to net handsome profits, a good part of which, according to reliable reports, are safely deposited in foreign banks.

Turkish economic thinking is stricken with a chronic illness; the bureaucracy and intelligentsia envisage economic life as being totally subordinated to social and cultural goals, whereas the promoters of private enterprise ignore the social and human aspects of economic problems. Practically all economic thinking revolves around these two ideas in a vicious circle that can be broken only by initiating a growth from below, involving the masses in the economic process and giving them a sense of participation by actual sharing in benefits. The government's recent campaign to stimulate popular interest in economic development and to induce the individual citizen to participate in it has met with remarkable success.

A substantial increase in economic assistance from abroad can intensify the rate of industrialization and lead to a new, sound agricul-

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tural policy, and create enough self-perpetuating economic movement. But the basic economic thinking must be revitalized and modernized. The traditional Islamic ideas of private enterprise, and especially the medieval elite concept of etatism, must be abandoned. Without a bold application of new ideas of business administration and management, all the economic aid from the West will only increase the tensions and confusion and create greater demands. True, measures to modernize the economy have been initiated in every field, but not thoroughly enough to have widespread effects. Yet the Turkish economy is closer to the "takeoff" point than one is led to believe. Conferences of experts held in 1962 and 1963 found that Turkey possessed all the basic conditions for a sound economic development. The impediments resulted from lack of precision in objectives and psychological, social causes.

IX

Economic development in Turkey obviously will considerably affect her internal politics, and ultimately her foreign policy. And, needless to say, Turkey's present economic and political situation is in some measure the consequence of her foreign policy. The internal developments during the past three years in Turkey therefore must also be appraised in relation to her foreign policy.

Turkey joined the Western bloc after the Second World War as a direct consequence of Soviet policy. Some available evidence supports the view that Turkey had visualized relations with the Soviets in the postwar period as remaining in line with the basic policy established by Lenin and Atatürk. A strict adherence to this policy, and the interest in the new nations shown during Atatürk's lifetime, might possibly have led Turkey to a sort of neutralist stand. But the Soviets' demands in 1945-1946 for bases on the Straits and for territory in northern Turkey and their rejection of previous agreements wiped out in one stroke the basic foundations of earlier Soviet-Turkish relations: mutual respect for each other's national independence, integrity, and regime. Furthermore, the Soviet Union's might and the prestige it had acquired in the war magnified the threat and forced Turkey to seek avidly any kind of alliance with the West; such alliance in fact became her foreign policy under the Truman Doctrine in 1947. Turkey joined NATO in 1952, became a member of CENTO and of European regional organizations, and was thus securely attached to the West. Neutralism was rejected and full alignment was described as the only possible course suitable to Turkey's national interests. The Soviets' unfriendly attitude toward Tur-

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key had an additional internal impact in providing a good excuse for the government to control unwelcome social movements as potentially subversive and to back rightist conservative groups.

The association with the West, particularly with the United States, produced profound repercussions in every field of activity and substantially altered the overall orientation of Turkey. The emphasis in 1923-1947 was placed on principles, institutions, and intellectual supremacy, whereas after 1947 pragmatism, individualism, and an increase in upward mobility prevailed. The democratic ideas preached in the previous decades materialized now in the form of concrete policies.

Throughout 1945-1960, all major political parties jointly supported the government's pro-Western policy, while the intellectuals tried to emulate the West in cultural and artistic fields, with greater freedom of choice and taste. Yet, by 1959 some minor, but highly significant, nationalist opinions began to be heard which indicated that new thoughts on foreign policy were being born. The Middle East Technical University and especially Robert College in Istanbul, which used English in their curricula, were criticized as violating the cultural and linguistic integrity of Turkey. The German, Italian, and French high schools (whose prewar European middle-class philosophy superimposed on conservative Islamic foundations did more harm than good to Turkey) were partly excluded from criticism. These were lower-level schools and had also some intellectual affinity with the critics of Anglo-Saxon schools. The French-inspired Anglo-Saxon phobia was brought to Turkey by a small group of pseudo-intellectuals who had studied in France in 1946-1955. Left Bank imports reached the Bosphorus shores.

The immediate cause of this anti-Western, and especially anti-American, feeling was the economic assistance Turkey was receiving, which supposedly enabled the Democrats, according to the opposition, to perpetuate themselves in power. This assistance also enhanced the power of the new middle class, as mentioned before, and brought about the eclipse of the former ruling bureaucratic-intellectual groups. Anti-Western feelings were expressed through the old familiar claim that foreigners were taking over the country and running it.

The revolution of 1960 brought closer to the surface current feelings on foreign policy. Some junta members went so far as to declare publicly that Turkey "could not make a move without the approval of Americans" and that a neutralist course would be more advantageous to Turkey's interests. The Algerian revolution was hailed as a great movement of national liberation, and some Turkish units in Korea were withdrawn. However, some vague friendly overtures toward the

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Arabs remained without effect, when the latter reiterated Syria's claim to the province of Hatay (Alexandretta), ceded by France to Turkey in 1938-1939.

Some junta members and intellectuals privately contended that the assistance given to Turkey by the West served primarily military purposes and consequently had limited impact on economic development. They believed that Turkey could achieve economic development even without assistance from abroad, as in the early days of the Republic, provided the nation's internal economic and social life was reorganized properly. Some civilians, on the other hand, resenting the military's involvement in politics, contended that the commitment of Turkey to the cold war had unduly increased the army's importance and supported its claim to high status and a position of leadership in society. Others maintained that the development of new weapons had changed old strategic concepts, that the thaw in international relations would inevitably diminish the strategic importance of Turkey, weaken her position among the Western powers, and eventually isolate her, since Turkey's foreign policy was based on the assumption of a continuous cold war. All these factors, it was said, would lead to the total curtailment or sharp reduction of the economic aid on which Turkey's development depended. Furthermore, these critics of foreign policy claimed that a total commitment to the West had limited Turkey's influence among the newly rising nations and estranged her from all her neighbors except Iran. Finally, they contended that the Democratic Party's tendency to exploit the tensions between East and West for the sake of its economic ambitions had hurt Turkey's prestige at home and abroad.

The government and the Parliament, on the other hand, have firmly stood by the alliance with the West in NATO, CENTO, or the European regional organizations. Nevertheless, criticism of the West, and particularly of the United States, has continued to increase among some of the socialist groups, nationalists, etatists, and even conservatives. The socialists have insisted that historically the association with the West had been detrimental to Turkey's long-range interests, and that the record of modernization was better when Turkey acted on her own. The conservatives, on the other hand, have claimed that the Western views on freedom, popular participation in government, intensive social mobility, etc., contradicted the native understanding of government, although they did not hesitate to use these concepts when suitable to their own purposes. Possibly all that has been said above could be accepted as normal in a free society, except that in Turkey public utter-

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ances on foreign policy are rare and, when they occur, they usually forecast a change of thought. This debate has been further intensified by the ambivalent attitude of the United States toward the developing crisis in Cyprus. It has also been affected by France's subtle attempts to resuscitate interest in France as the symbol of true Western culture.

The relations of Turkey with the Soviet Union and East European countries have been affected but not substantially altered by the revolution of 1960. Russian sources (Russian studies on all aspects of Turkish life are very numerous) indicate that the Soviets have followed social and economic developments in Turkey very closely, presumably with the expectation that they would affect the public's attitudes toward socialism in general and the Soviet Union in particular. The Soviets have also kept a close watch on the nationalist movements in Turkey, lest a revival of Pan-Turanism (although officially condemned by the government) resuscitate some nationalist feeling among the 34 million persons belonging to the Turkic groups in the Soviet Union. The Soviets are also keenly aware that the course taken by Turkey's internal regime could have profound repercussions in other Muslim countries. It is difficult to estimate whether the Soviets have grasped the true nature of the social change in Turkey, but as early as 1955 they seem to have decided that a friendly attitude would yield better results than a show of animosity. The Soviets denounced their own claims of 1946 to bases on the Straits as stemming from Stalin's power ambitions. They declared themselves ready to return to the policy of Lenin and Atatürk, and even offered economic assistance at low interest rates. (Just before his overthrow, Adnan Menderes had accepted an invitation to visit Moscow.)

After the revolution of 1960, the Soviet Union, wisely enough, did not make any attempt to take advantage of the existing confusion but contented itself with denouncing Menderes's regime, and renewed its offers of economic assistance and friendly relations. Premier Khrushchev declared that these offers were not necessarily contingent on Turkey's immediate withdrawal from NATO or CENTO. Later, when the junta's socialist tendencies did not materialize, the Soviets still preserved their conciliatory attitude and expressed their disappointment by reproducing articles from Western newspapers critical of Turkey's internal politics. The Chinese, on the other hand, devoted special attention to the Turkish revolution, in line with their growing interest in the Middle East. They hailed it enthusiastically as an anti-Western action, but later charged it with having degenerated into a bourgeois revolution of the leading cadres. Recently, a Turkish parliamentary

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mission, the first in several decades, visited the Soviet Union and was received by Premier Khrushchev, who repeated the earlier promises of aid and good neighborliness.

The Balkan countries with which Turkey had intensive political, cultural, and economic relations in the past have followed the Soviets' policy. The resulting increase in visits, sports meetings, and even trade must be regarded not as a change of policy, but rather as a normalization of relations. The Black Sea basin has been Turkey's normal trading sphere and sizable Turkish minorities with relatives in Turkey live in these neighboring countries. Internal developments in Turkey and the conciliatory attitude of the Soviets, coupled with the emergence of socialist groups, have tended to lessen the previous suspicion of the Soviet Union, or at least to rationalize it.

Today, there is no question of imminent changes of Turkish foreign policy, or mass antipathy toward the West. However, if economic development continues at a slow pace, social reforms are delayed, and power remains in the hands of a few privileged groups, the regime will be further discredited and, along with it, the West that served as its model. But nothing could discredit the present regime more than a rightist bureaucratic order. This would quell the social fears of a few rightist groups, but would alienate the larger groups of intellectuals, workers, and peasants.

Turkey is an important country and deserves closer attention than it has been accorded so far. It is a key country in the Middle East and is pregnant with crucial events which may indicate the possible course of social and political development in the emerging nations. Further change in Turkey is inevitable to bring her more fully into the modern age. Orderly change, within the limits of democratic ideas, is both preferable and possible. It will ultimately benefit the country more than an order imposed by force. And this should be achieved now, when there is still time.

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ONUC'S CIVILIAN OPERATIONS

State-Preserving and State-Building*

By HAROLD KARAN JACOBSON

I

THE United Nations involvement in the Congo crisis can be viewed in various perspectives. It is a significant example of the UN's peace-keeping activities and a formidable test of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld's concept of preventive diplomacy. From the viewpoint of legal analysis, it shows the flexibility of the Charter. In terms of the UN's institutions, it demonstrates both the potentialities and the perils of the development of the executive capacity of the Secretary-General. In addition, in the Civilian Operations of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (abbreviated as ONUC, the initials of *Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo*), it has another, less widely known facet. Alongside efforts to contain, ease, and ultimately eliminate the political-military crisis in the Congo, the United Nations has undertaken through ONUC's Civilian Operations emergency and longer-term functions which can most appropriately be called "state-preserving" and "state-building."

These terms need to be defined and their relationship to the more commonly used term "nation-building" explained. Decolonization left the formal structure of a modern state in the Congo, sovereignty and all of its manifestations, the machinery of state, and a complex economic and social structure. State-preserving involved keeping this heritage intact, protecting it against the danger of imminent collapse. It meant maintaining the infrastructure of the state and the level of modernity that had been achieved. In performing this function, ONUC's Civilian Operations filled a crucial gap in the administrative structure of the Congo, assumed important educational and medical functions, and provided vital emergency relief. One could also think of state-preserving in a wider sense as including protection of the territorial integrity of the state, and in an instance such as this, where secession was attempted, a strong case could be made for the broader definition. However, since that aspect of the UN's activities was so complicated and since its

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character was essentially different from that of the Civilian Operations, the narrower definition was chosen for purposes of this analysis.

State-building in the Congo involved the creation of a viable structure to replace the precarious one which had hastily been contrived out of the remnants of the colonial regime; the formal structure of the state had to be given substance and revised in relation to the realities of independence. This meant training Congolese cadres for executive, administrative, and professional positions and assisting the Congo in adjusting its inherited institutions so that they would fit its independent resources and new status as a sovereign state. Nation-building, on the other hand, is a broader concept than state-building.[1] It involves the development of a cohesive spirit, a sense of national identity, as well as the instruments of modern government. Obviously the three concepts are related. State-preserving is a prerequisite for state-building and nation-building, unless one is to start with a different basic unit. State-building cannot ultimately succeed without nation-building occurring; in the end the structure of the state cannot function without a degree of cohesiveness. Conversely, state-building contributes in various ways to nation-building. The creation of institutions is a vital part of nation-building, and these institutions can be used to develop national consciousness. But for analytical purposes, and in practice, the three tasks can be separated. Among other things, it is much easier for external actors to contribute to the first two.

The activities undertaken by ONUC's Civilian Operations were unprecedented in several respects. In no other place had the UN undertaken such extensive tasks. A unified administrative structure had never been attempted before. UN personnel had never exercised as significant authority as some did in the Congo. For these reasons alone, ONUC's Civilian Operations are worthy of study. Moreover, an analysis of this facet of the UN's involvement in the Congo could have more than historical importance. State-preserving and state-building tasks comparable to those faced in the Congo cannot be ruled out in speculation about the process of decolonization in the southern third of Africa. Another Congo crisis, albeit with special permutations, is a distinct possibility. An examination of this case may yield some guidelines for future policy.

[1] For thorough treatments of nation-building, see Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity* (New Haven 1962), esp. parts I and VI; and Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, eds., *Nation-Building* (New York 1963).

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II

An analysis of ONUC's Civilian Operations must be set against the special characteristics of the Republic of the Congo (Léopoldville). With an area of more than 900,000 square miles, the Congo is the third largest state in Africa. Its ethnically and culturally diverse population of between 13,000,000 and 14,000,000 is also the third largest in Africa.

The Congo is richly endowed in mineral resources and has conditions favorable to agricultural development. Significant economic progress occurred under the Belgian administration, and by the time of independence the Congo was, in African terms, relatively highly developed. The benefits of this economic development were not confined to the approximately 125,000 Europeans resident in the Congo, although they certainly fared well. On the contrary, the average Congolese probably had better material standards than the indigenous inhabitants of many, if not most, of the neighboring territories. Per capita gross national product figures show this, as do other perhaps more meaningful indices. For example, before independence the Congo had the best-developed medical infrastructure in Africa, and at the time of independence more than one-third of the active male population were wage earners.

There were, it is true, interstices and oddities in the economic development achieved in the Congo under Belgian colonial rule. While transportation by air and internal waterways was highly developed and almost 90,000 miles of roads existed, it was impossible to cross the country by motor vehicle. Prior to independence, nearly one-third of the Congo government's ordinary revenue was collected in Belgium by direct taxes on firms operating both in the Congo and in Belgium. Much of the basic structure of the Congo's economy was in the hands of para-statal organizations, autonomous bodies wholly or largely owned by the government. These peculiarities, though, cannot detract from the general relatively high level of economic development.

Economic growth was the goal which Belgian colonial policy had sought. As it became concerned about the fate of the indigenous inhabitants, and to the extent that it did, Belgian policy consciously emphasized the economic and social aspects of colonial tutelage. It assumed that the basic needs and desires of the Congolese lay in these areas and that prosperity would forestall the development of political demands. Questions relating to political advancement were hardly considered by Belgium until the period of its rule was nearly at a close, and very little action was taken in this area. Three schools of adminis-

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tration for indigenous personnel were opened in 1955, only to be closed two years later. The first elections in the Congo were held in 1957, and then only at the communal level in Léopoldville, Elisabethville, and Jadotville. Until the late 1950's, for several reasons, including Belgium's ability to exercise effective control and the degree of validity in the emphasis on the gratification of material needs, Belgian policy could be considered a success in its own terms. Political parties were not formed until then, and political demands were seldom heard. The cry for independence was not clearly formulated by Congolese until 1956.

The character of Belgian policy and its emphases were glaringly evident in the sphere of education. In 1959-1960 approximately 1.5 million Congolese children were enrolled in primary schools, over 70 per cent of the eligible total. By far the largest share of these students —1,259,652—were in Catholic schools. A much smaller number went to Protestant schools, and a still smaller number attended those administered exclusively by the state. Most of the mission schools received some form of government support. The quality of the education which the Congolese received is difficult to gauge. Only a few followed the so-called "metropolitan" curriculum, in which standards were equivalent to those in Belgium. Moreover, there were serious questions about the regularity and length of attendance; it was not clear how many students stayed in the primary schools long enough for their education to have a lasting effect. Only 3,500 of the 16,000 primary schools provided teaching beyond the second grade. Nearly 70 per cent of the students left school before completing four years, the minimum considered necessary to maintain literacy, and only 9 per cent completed the full six-year curriculum. Even so, the total enrollment in primary schools was impressive. However, during the same year secondary school enrollment in the Congo was only 28,900, and Europeans constituted over half of this figure. Using the broadest definition of a university education, including work at Lovanium and the State University in Elisabethville and training for the priesthood, the number of Congolese who had received training at this level as of June 30, 1960, was at most several hundred, with priests predominating. Only 17 Congolese had received European university educations. In 1960 there were no Congolese medical doctors, dentists, or lawyers. There was only one Congolese agricultural engineer and there were no Congolese officers in the *Force publique*. The educational program had a broad base, perhaps the broadest in Africa, but an exceptionally narrow peak.

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Belgian policy was aptly labeled "paternalism" by both its proponents and its critics. The material standards of the Congolese generally were raised, but there were sharp cut-off points beyond which the Congolese individually could not rise. Under certain circumstances Belgian policy, which resulted in considerable equality as well as relative prosperity among the Congolese, might have appeared wise. Had decolonization proceeded at an unhurried pace, the Congo might have emerged singularly well-prepared for democratic self-rule. This is not to say, though, that such would inevitably have been the result. Whether Belgian policy in practice would have placed sharp limits on Congolese aspirations for an indefinite period, rather than allowing gradual but steady growth, is debatable. In any case, decolonization occurred at a lightning pace—in terms of Belgian expectations—and the Congo emerged from colonial rule with a relatively complex administrative, economic, and social structure, and with almost no Congolese trained to operate this structure and with very little experience in self-rule. As the Congo came to independence, it was obvious that if deterioration and disintegration of its complex state structure were to be prevented, and *a fortiori* if the processes of national development and modernization were to be continued, the services of a large number of foreign experts would be needed for some time. As an indication of the magnitude of this need, in the year before independence more than 10,000 Belgians were employed in the Congo by the government.

The difficulties inherent in this situation were compounded by the fact that at the time of the transfer of power from the Belgian administration to the independent regime, the Congo's economy was in far from perfect health.[2] The growth rate of the gross national product had slackened in 1957, and the following year the GNP had actually declined. Although economic activity revived moderately in 1959, there were still signs of weakness. Fixed investment in the Congo continued to decline. Because of large-scale capital flight, the deterioration of the Congo's gold and foreign exchange reserves, which began in 1957 as a consequence of the deficit on the current account, continued in 1959 and 1960. During the three and a half years preceding independence, there had been a substantial rise in unemployment in the urban centers. Beyond these immediate problems, as a consequence of borrowing to finance development plans, at the time of independence the Congo's

[2] See UN Economic Commission for Africa, "Economic Development in the Republic of the Congo (Léopoldville): 1957-1960," *Economic Bulletin for Africa*, 1 (January 1961), 90-102.

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direct public debt stood at about $900,000,000, and almost a quarter of the annual national budget was required to service this debt.

Most Congolese political leaders realized how much their country needed external assistance, and some dimly perceived the precarious state of the Congo's economy. However, as independence approached, they became increasingly wary of any step which might compromise their newly won sovereignty. Moreover, from January 27, 1960, when the decision to grant independence was announced, until June 30, 1960, the day of independence, their attention was focused almost exclusively on immediate political problems involving the first nation-wide elections, held in May, and the formation of the first Congolese government. Economic issues were postponed until a second Roundtable Conference. When this meeting convened in April, the principal Congolese leaders were too busy to attend, and many of those who did were ill-informed and preoccupied. Although this conference solved certain matters, it left a vast number of issues unsettled.

It is worthy of note, however, that even though this step may have been taken without great enthusiasm, in that same month the Central Committee of Joseph Kasa-Vubu's Abako party sent a mission headed by one of its members, Joseph Yumbu, to the United States to explore the possibility of external assistance with officials of the United Nations, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the American government.[3] Among other things, this mission was instructed to ask for the establishment of a UN technical assistance mission in Léopoldville, UN supervision or control of the forthcoming elections, and the dispatch of a UN police force to the Congo. It was also instructed to explore the possibility of the UN's naming an international commander-in-chief for the *Force publique* and appointing a commission to supervise the Africanization of this organization, and in addition to determine whether or not the UN could in some way guarantee the neutrality of the Congo. M. Yumbu's mission was to ask the Executive-Director of IBRD if he could and would nominate an individual to serve as governor of the Central Bank of the Congo. He was also to be asked if the World Bank would participate in and assist the Congo in negotiations with Belgium concerning economic matters. The hope was that involving UN and Specialized Agency personnel in high-level positions might permit the retention of Belgian

[3] See Antoine A. J. van Bilsen, *L'Indépendance du Congo* (Tournai 1962), 165-74. M. van Bilsen, who in 1955 had been the first Belgian to suggest publicly a timetable for granting independence to the Congo, served as an adviser to M. Kasa-Vubu in 1960 and was a member of M. Yumbu's mission.

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technicians for some time and simultaneously guarantee their gradual withdrawal. It was also hoped that the UN and Agency personnel would train Congolese cadres and assist in adjusting the Congo's institutions to its new status.

Except for assurances that the Congo would receive technical assistance, the inquiries of this mission were largely rebuffed. On a substantive level, Secretariat officials expressed the belief that the UN could not legally take several of the actions which were requested unless there existed a "threat to the peace." Procedurally, no action was required since the inquiries were not formal requests, which at that time, barring violence resulting in open civil war, probably would have had to come from the Belgian government.

Even if the Executive College, the joint Belgian-Congolese authority which acted from the time of the initial Roundtable Conference until the formation of the first Congolese government, had made such requests, it is unlikely that Belgium would have transmitted them to the UN. Belgium had been out of sympathy with the UN's activities concerning colonial issues for some time. In 1953 it had ceased participating in the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, which considered statistical data on economic, educational, and social conditions in those territories, including the Congo. Despite Belgium's extensive economic development programs in the Congo, it had never requested the services of UN experts. A few Congolese, however, had held UN fellowships.

This situation was symptomatic of a deep-seated attitude which would have militated against Belgium's transmitting to the UN such requests for assistance as those raised by M. Yumbu's mission. During the period of colonial rule, non-Belgian influence was generally unwelcome in the Congo and was sharply limited and controlled. As Belgium looked forward to the transfer of power, it regarded post-colonial assistance as an important matter and almost as its own exclusive prerogative. It assumed that Belgium and Belgians would continue to occupy an important role in the Congo after independence. Belgium promised the Congo substantial technical aid and it was envisaged that a number of Belgians would serve in the Congolese government. Significantly, the extent to which these individuals would remain under the direct control of the Belgian government was somewhat ambiguous.[4] In this

[4] Colin Legum has asserted that they would remain under Belgian control (*Congo Disaster* [Baltimore 1961], 93); however, the documents are less than clear on this point. See W. J. Ganshof van der Meersch, *Fin de la souveraineté belge au Congo: Documents et réflexions* (Brussels 1963), 361-62; and J. Gérard-Libois and Benoît Verhaegen, *Congo, 1960* (Brussels, n.d.), I, 46-47, 67-69, 97, and II, 526-30.

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connection, it should be mentioned that in March 1960, to prop up the Congo Central Bank, the Belgian National Bank agreed to guarantee the former's operation on the condition that a considerable portion of its gold and dollar reserves be lodged in the vault of the Belgian National Bank in Brussels, and that the monetary and public investment policy of the Congo should be settled by agreement between the two banks.[5] Despite these exclusivist tendencies, though, Belgium did describe the Congo's precarious financial status to a number of countries, including the United States, which it hoped might be sources of assistance to the new republic.

What happened in the days immediately following independence—the mutiny of the *Force publique* and the flight of the Belgians who were so vital to the new Congolese state—is well known. Only a few statistics are needed to convey the magnitude of the crisis. Prior to independence there were 61 foreign specialists working in the meteorological field; only 18 remained after the July incidents. On June 30, 1960, there were 324 Belgian technicians dispersed throughout the country maintaining the telecommunications network; in October there were only 24. Of the over 700 doctors in the Congo prior to independence, only 200 remained after independence, and of the 250 postal officials, only one. The situation was chaotic. Routine but vital tasks such as refuse disposal were left undone. Untrained clerks promoted themselves to higher positions and in many cases then found that they were ignorant of and incapable of performing the functions of their new offices. The Congo faced imminent collapse. It was into this situation that ONUC's Civilian Operations were thrust.

III

The United Nations had anticipated the Congo's needs to a certain extent; it had, after all, been forewarned in April. A small group of technical assistance officials had been sent to the Congo at the time of independence, and Sture Linner of Sweden had been named Resident Representative of the Technical Assistance Board. By July 10, however, it was apparent that the Congo's needs exceeded this modest mission, and a request for assistance was urgently transmitted to the Secretary-General through Ralph Bunche, who was in the Congo to represent the UN at independence ceremonies and to constitute a UN presence during the transition period.[6] The request stressed the need for military

[5] Gérard-Libois and Verhaegen, I, 88.
[6] *Ibid.*, II, 541.

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technical assistance to aid the Congolese government in reorganizing the *Force publique*. The Secretary-General treated this request as a matter falling within his own competence and the following day instructed Mr. Bunche to report his agreement in principle. The Secretary-General circulated the request on an informal basis to the members of the Security Council, and on July 12 he discussed it, as well as the plan which Mr. Bunche had worked out with the Congolese government for the administration of security, with the representatives of the nine African states that were then members of the UN.

That same day the problem was thrown into a new perspective by the Congo's request for the dispatch of a UN military force.[7] In the ensuing debate in the Security Council on July 13 and 14, the problems of state-preserving and state-building tended to be submerged by the seemingly more urgent questions surrounding the creation and deployment of a United Nations Force (UNF). Some delegates in passing endorsed the Secretary-General's action with respect to the request for technical assistance, but there was no detailed substantive discussion of this issue.

The resolution which the Security Council adopted mentioned state-building only in the following paragraph:

> 2. *Decides* to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks.[8]

In presenting the Congolese request to the Security Council, the Secretary-General appeared to regard the role of a UNF as that of a temporary instrument which could be used to restore and maintain order while the longer-term training program was being implemented,[9] and the resolution confirmed this concept.

In the following days, the UN's perception of the Congo's needs in the area of state-preserving and state-building broadened swiftly. On July 18 the Secretary-General reported that he had asked eight countries for food supplies to alleviate the shortages (especially acute in Léopoldville) which had been caused by the breakdown of transportation and

[7] For an insightful analysis of the United Nations Force in the Congo, see Arthur Lee Burns and Nina Heathcote, *Peace-Keeping by U.N. Forces: From Suez to the Congo* (New York 1963).

[8] UN Document S/4387.

[9] UN Security Council, *Official Records* (873rd meeting: 13 July 1960), 3-5 (hereinafter cited as SC, *Records*).

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public services, and that seven of the eight—including the Soviet Union and the United States—had already responded affirmatively.[10] Maurice Pate, Executive-Director of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), arrived in the Congo on July 17 to ascertain what his agency could contribute and to direct the emergency food supply. The World Health Organization (WHO) began to take action to supply doctors and other medical personnel.

When the Security Council met on July 20 to resume its consideration of the Congo crisis, the Secretary-General presented this broader picture. To facilitate his dealing with the many emergency and longer-term problems, he asked the Council to request the Specialized Agencies to give him their assistance, and such a request was written into the resolution which the Council adopted.[11]

On August 11 the Secretary-General outlined an overall plan for ONUC's Civilian Operations, which had been worked out in consultation with and approved by the Republic of the Congo.[12] His scheme was ambitious. He envisaged activities which would follow the established patterns of the UN's technical assistance and Operational and Executive Personnel (OPEX) programs. (Under the latter, UN specialists serve as staff members of the administrative services of the beneficiary governments.) In addition, he foresaw the need for "activities on a level of higher administrative responsibility, for which the experts employed must receive a new and so far untried status." These officials would "be available at the call of the government to give advice on various problems and provide the government with such studies as it may request for the planning of its activities and its decisions." Formally having functions only within the United Nations orbit, and without being accredited to the Ministries, they "would *de facto* be able to serve, with senior responsibility, at the request of the Government, the various Ministries and departments." This group of officials would carry the title "Consultants to the Chief of the Civilian Operations," would be responsible to him, and would comprise a "Consultative Group." The group would consist of consultants in (1) agriculture; (2) communications; (3) education; (4) finance; (5) foreign trade; (6) health; (7) instruction (national security forces); (8) labor market; (9) magistrature; (10) natural resources and industry; and (11) public administration. Most of the officials would be

[10] UN Document S/4389, 11.
[11] UN Document S/4405.
[12] UN Document S/4417/Add. 5. The following quotations are taken from that memorandum.

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appointed by the Specialized Agencies as their representatives in the Congo and then be appointed by the Secretary-General to the Consultative Group. This structure would give ONUC's Civilian Operations an unprecedented unity, since the relationship between Specialized Agency personnel and the United Nations Resident Representative of the Technical Assistance Board has normally been much looser. This has at times resulted in relationships between the UN and the Specialized Agencies in the field being marked more by competition than cooperation.[13] Whether or not the members of the Consultative Group would have unprecedented powers within the Congolese administration would depend upon the arrangements which were worked out in practice. Sture Linner was appointed Chief of ONUC's Civilian Operations (in addition to his position as Resident Representative) with rank and authority equivalent to that of the Supreme Commander of the United Nations Force. The plan was partially implemented by the time that the Secretary-General presented it and, in accordance with his original interpretation, he never asked for nor received the formal approval of the plan by the Security Council or any other UN body.

The resemblance between the Secretary-General's plan and the activities which the UN actually undertook and the assistance requested by M. Yumbu's mission is significant, although the conditions prevailing at the time of the UN's involvement were much more difficult than had been envisaged. In considering future contingencies, it may well be wise to reflect about the extent to which the Congo crisis could have been averted had the UN been involved more substantially at an earlier stage.

The budgetary arrangements for ONUC's Civilian Operations have been complex. The Secretary-General's August 11 memorandum stated that all posts which he approved would be financed from United Nations funds and that the UN would also reimburse the Specialized Agencies for their "extra costs" in connection with seconded staff and technical assistance personnel. When the financial arrangements for the entire operation were settled later in the fall of 1960, these charges were applied to the *Ad Hoc* Account for the United Nations Operation in the Congo, which was to be funded by fixed assessments. In 1962 the General Assembly accepted the opinion of the International Court of Justice that these assessments are "expenses of the Organization" within

[13] See Walter R. Sharp, *Field Administration in the United Nations System: The Conduct of International Economic and Social Programs* (New York 1961), 379-87; and Andrew Shonfield, *The Attack on World Poverty: A Comprehensive Report on the Problems of Assistance to Underdeveloped Countries* (New York 1960), 102-8, 204.

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the meaning of Article 17 of the Charter;[14] thus Member States which fail to pay their assessments jeopardize their right to vote in the Assembly. In addition, the services provided by ONUC's Civilian Operations in the fields of aviation, telecommunications, and meteorology, which were used extensively by the UNF, were charged to the *Ad Hoc* Account, as were the allowances and related costs for a unit of 400 Nigerian police. These arrangements were in effect through 1963. Starting in 1964, in connection with the plans for the withdrawal of the UNF and the efforts to reduce the size of the obligatory assessments, these charges were excluded from the *Ad Hoc* Account.

In his August 11 memorandum, the Secretary-General stated that the special arrangements which he outlined were not intended to preclude financing the more normal technical assistance activities through the usual UN and Specialized Agency channels, and these channels, including regular budgets and the accounts of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund, have all been used. Among the Specialized Agencies, the World Health Organization especially has carried as an item in its regular budget a considerable portion of the assistance that it has rendered to the Congo.

The Secretary-General's early request for food supplies indicated that the Congo would need material assistance as well as advisory and operational personnel. The United Nations Children's Fund, the only UN agency which could readily supply funds for such purposes, entered the situation immediately and has made frequent material contributions. In September 1960, when it became apparent that the Congolese government would also need budgetary and foreign exchange assistance, the Secretary-General asked the Security Council to establish a fund to be raised by voluntary contributions and to be used under the control of the United Nations for such purposes.[15] Although a Soviet veto blocked the Council's taking such action, the General Assembly, acting in Emergency Session, established the United Nations Fund for the Congo on September 20, 1960.[16] Grants of $5,000,000 and $10,000,000 for import support were given to the Congo from this fund in 1960 and 1961 respectively. Beyond that, the fund has been used to finance several of the technical assistance programs of ONUC's Civilian Operations, and in 1964 those costs which were formerly charged to ONUC's *Ad Hoc* Account began to be charged to the fund.

Finally, as a result of agreements worked out in 1961, the United

[14] General Assembly Resolution 1854 (XVII).
[15] UN Document S/4482, 3-4.
[16] General Assembly Resolution 1474 (ES-IV).

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Nations has been given some control over certain counterpart funds resulting from bilateral grants to the Congo. Committees have been established in Léopoldville consisting of representatives of the Congolese government, ONUC, and the donor country and unanimous agreement is necessary for the utilization of the funds.

Two other matters relating to the establishment and framework of ONUC's Civilian Operations need to be considered before turning to substantive activities. The first is the Soviet Union's disaffection. As early as July 21, 1960, the USSR lodged the caveat that it did not regard the Security Council's initial resolution "as endowing the United Nations with the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of a State and to assume responsibility for a country's domestic laws and regulations."[17] The Soviet view was that the fundamental purpose of the UN's intervention should be to secure the withdrawal of the Belgian forces; beyond that, matters should be left to the government of the Republic of the Congo.

A month later this demurrer became a strong dissent. In a letter to the Secretary-General on August 20 and in a vituperative statement in the Security Council the following day, V. V. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, attacked the plan outlined in the Secretary-General's memorandum of August 11.[18] He asserted that the plan involved "the limitation of the sovereignty of the Republic of the Congo," and in effect meant "the placing of the Congo in the position of a Trust Territory, which is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations." Secretary-General Hammarskjöld's response that the position of the members of the Consultative Group in relation to the Congolese government was a "weaker one than that of technical assistance in the conventional sense"[19] failed to still Soviet criticism. In view of the role that at least some of the members of the Consultative Group were expected to play, and that some in fact did play, the explanation seems rather disingenuous.

The Secretary-General appeared to be somewhat more sympathetic to a second aspect of the USSR's criticism of ONUC's Civilian Operations. Kuznetsov pointed out that 21 of the 65 individuals in the field as of August 15, occupying the posts of key significance, were nationals of the United States or countries aligned with it, and that the staff included no nationals of Eastern European (i.e., Soviet bloc) countries. He went on to assert that because of these facts, and the

[17] SC. *Records* (879th meeting: 21 July 1960), 24.
[18] UN Document S/4446 and SC, *Records* (888th meeting: 21 August 1960), 15-17.
[19] *Ibid.*, 21.

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dominant role of citizens of Western countries in the UN Secretariat (the USSR had already been critical of the prominent position of Ralph Bunche in ONUC and of his activities), "the implementation of the proposed plan would mean that the development of the Congo would be conducted along lines satisfactory to the United States, and this might in fact not only jeopardize the independence of the Republic of the Congo but also create a dangerous precedent for the future."[20] In the debate the Secretary-General agreed that the geographical distribution of personnel on ONUC's Civilian Operations was not satisfactory.[21] He attempted to explain the existing situation by referring to the necessity of quick recruitment and to the fact that he had had to rely to a large extent for recruiting on the services of the Specialized Agencies, thereby inadvertently implying—perhaps correctly—that the Agencies were less impartial in the cold war than the UN.

A more fundamental issue, though, was really at stake. The core of the Soviet position was that state-preserving and state-building were not and could not be treated as apolitical tasks. This issue was never joined.

The other matter relating to the framework of ONUC's Civilian Operations that must be considered at this point also involved the Soviet Union, although it affected several other states as well. It concerned the relationship between bilateral aid programs and the UN program. Whether because of its perception of the way in which ONUC's Civilian Operations were developing, or because it preferred this method to any other, the Soviet Union soon began a bilateral program of assistance to the Congo. Actually this program was rather short-lived, for immediately after his coup in mid-September 1960 Colonel Joseph Mobutu expelled all Soviet bloc technicians. A modest Soviet bilateral program was reinstated somewhat later in Stanleyville, but it was of insignificant proportions. By virtue of the pre-independence arrangements, Belgium had a large bilateral program from the outset. After the Congo's independence, various African states also dispatched several semi-technical advisers to one or another faction of the government. The United States in contrast, although it continued a modest bilateral program planned prior to independence that involved 300 training and scholarship grants, once the crisis began almost ostentatiously eschewed taking further independent action, and for some time channeled the major portion of its aid through the UN and carefully cleared the remainder with the world organization.

[20] UN Document S/4446, 2.
[21] SC, *Records* (888th meeting: 21 August 1960), 22.

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Despite its short life, the Soviet program provoked the initial debate and decision in the UN on this matter. The circumstances surrounding the Soviet program are somewhat obscure, but the initial shipments appear to have left the USSR in late July or early August 1960.[22] One hundred trucks were involved and some technical personnel—exactly how many is not clear.[23] The medical part of the program had a loose connection with ONUC, but the other aspects did not. The issue became prominent when the Soviet aid was used to facilitate the movement of forces of the *Armée nationale congolaise* (ANC—the new name for the *Force publique*) to Kasai. The purpose of this movement was apparently to quash Albert Kalonji's "*état autonome*" in South Kasai and to prepare for an attack against Katanga. While in Kasai, in late August 1960, the disorganized ANC units apparently killed hundreds of Balubas in actions which the Secretary-General asserted had "the characteristics of the crime of genocide."[24]

When he reported these incidents to the Security Council in early September, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld asked the Council to request that *all* assistance to the Congo "should be channeled through the United Nations, and only through the United Nations."[25] The Secretary-General was obviously disturbed by the massacre in Kasai. Moreover, the Soviet assistance had enabled Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba to attempt to solve by force constitutional problems which the Secretary-General felt should be solved by negotiations. Finally, the Secretary-General clearly feared the development of competitive intervention, following the pattern of the Spanish Civil War. In his appeal, he also alluded to the problems caused by the Belgian assistance in Katanga.

The debate on this matter was carried on at length in the Security Council and then, after a Soviet veto, continued in the General Assembly. The USSR met the Secretary-General's point head on. It asserted, as it had previously in an exchange of correspondence, that the Security Council resolutions did not contain any provisions restricting the right of the Congolese government to request assistance directly from other states, or the right of other states to render assistance to the Congo.[26] Indeed, the USSR even implied that by aiding the Central

[22] See the text of the USSR's statement on this matter: UN Document S/4416.

[23] Colin Legum puts the figure at 200 (*Congo Disaster*, 141). The official Soviet account lists only 29 (UN Document A/C.5/837).

[24] SC, *Records* (896th meeting: 9-10 September 1960), 18.

[25] *Ibid.*, 20.

[26] UN Document S/4503, 3; and SC, *Records* (901st meeting: 14-15 September 1960), 12.

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Government of the Congo it was actually doing more to comply with the intent of the Security Council resolutions than ONUC. The USSR extended its concept to the logical conclusion by proposing that, rather than create a United Nations Fund for the Congo, the Security Council should merely ask governments to provide financial and economic assistance directly to the government of the Congo.[27] Only Poland supported the Soviet proposal. On the other hand, during the debates, only Australia, Norway, and the United Arab Republic argued, as the Secretary-General had, that *all* assistance to the Congo should be channeled through the United Nations.

The resolution which the General Assembly finally adopted, 1474 (ES-IV), contained this prohibition:

> 6. Without prejudice to the sovereign rights of the Republic of the Congo, *calls upon* all States to refrain from the direct and indirect provision of arms or other material of war and military personnel and other assistance for military purposes in the Congo during the temporary period of military assistance through the United Nations, except upon the request of the United Nations through the Secretary-General for carrying out the purposes of this resolution and of the resolutions of 14 and 22 July and 9 August 1960 of the Security Council.

Obviously it left many loopholes. The initial phrase—"without prejudice to the sovereign rights"—reflected a general concern for sovereignty and also doubt, felt especially by several newly independent African states, about the wisdom of restricting the right of a government to request and receive assistance. Limiting the prohibition to military assistance and to a temporary period was another expression of these concerns. Furthermore, during the last days of August, a group of African political leaders, meeting in Léopoldville, had explicitly urged African states to supply more bilateral assistance to the Congo.[28]

As indicated by the innuendoes of the USSR in justifying its own policy, the question of confidence in ONUC's policies was also at stake. These debates occurred while the quarrel between Prime Minister Lumumba and Secretary-General Hammarskjöld was at its height. It would have been difficult for states which seriously disagreed with ONUC's policies to grant it an exclusive right to supply assistance to the Congo. It is significant that the Assembly went as far as it did in limiting bilateral assistance.

By September 20, when the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1474 (ES-IV), the Soviet technicians had already left the Congo. From

[27] See the draft resolution proposed by the USSR: UN Document S/4519.
[28] *New York Times*, September 1, 1960.

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the long-run point of view, the problem of Belgian bilateral activities and Belgian technicians was much more troublesome than the Soviet program. The involvement of Belgians in the Katanga imbroglio is well-known. In addition, after Colonel Mobutu's coup and the establishment of the College of Commissioners-General, a large number of Belgians returned, or were recruited, for service as technicians in the government of the Republic of the Congo. A special recruiting agency was established in Brussels. Senior United Nations officials felt that many, if not most, of these Belgians were hostile to ONUC and charged that they sought to block cooperation between the Congolese government and the UN.[29] Therefore the resolution which the Security Council adopted on February 21, 1961, urging "that measures be taken for the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign and para-military personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations command, and mercenaries,"[30] was aimed at the whole of the Congo, not only Katanga, although its application was confined almost exclusively to that province. This resolution broadened the exclusion established in General Assembly Resolution 1474 (ES-IV), so that it covered foreigners who exercised an undesirable (that is, anti-UN) political influence as well as the narrower category of military personnel. The resolution also made the exclusion apply to individuals in the named categories who had come to the Congo on their own initiative rather than as a result of governmental agreements.

Through these two resolutions, the UN sought to debar bilateral aid which might be used for military purposes (a neat problem of definition—the USSR asserted that it had only supplied civil trucks and aircraft) and also personnel who might complicate ONUC's tasks. In actual practice, the UN Secretariat went beyond these legal restrictions and sought to have *all* aid to the Congo channeled or cleared through the UN. The United States strongly supported the Secretariat's position. The Secretariat did not alter its attitude until early 1963, after Katanga's secession had been ended. In his report of February 4, 1963, Secretary-General U Thant allowed that it might be "advisable and desirable to envisage . . . an increase in bilateral aid."[31] The United States began to shift its position somewhat earlier. Although it continued to obligate the major portion of its assistance via the UN through fiscal year 1963, in late 1962 it began to administer the import program

[29] See UN Document S/4557.
[30] UN Document S/4741, 1.
[31] UN Document, S/5240, 11.

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on a more direct basis with the Congolese government, and a United States Agency for International Development Mission was formally established in Léopoldville in October 1962.

IV

Instead of examining ONUC's Civilian Operations in the Congo in considerable detail, it may be sufficient here simply to establish certain categories of action and to cite a few illustrative examples.[32]

A large number of the tasks performed by ONUC's Civilian Operations can best be described as emergency operations. Examples include the reactivation of the ports and the railway system; the distribution of food and medical supplies; the provision of temporary care and the facilitation of the resettlement of refugees (principally Balubas); and the initiation of public works for unemployment relief.

Secondly, the UN has provided, from the United Nations Fund for the Congo, financial assistance to meet urgent foreign exchange needs. Grants amounting to $15,000,000 were made during the first year of ONUC.

Thirdly, the UN has performed a number of operational tasks. It has supplied most of the technical staff to man the airports and the telecommunications systems. In addition, it has provided teachers and medical and legal personnel. At the end of 1963, the UN was supplying 801 secondary-school teachers, nearly 200 doctors and other medical technicians, and 47 jurists and legal experts.

Fourthly, the UN has provided the services normally encompassed in its technical assistance programs. During the first year of operations, nearly 1,000 Congolese were enrolled in training courses organized within the Congo by ONUC, and 84 were given fellowships by the UN for study abroad. By the end of 1962, 9,464 Congolese had enrolled in various ONUC training courses within the Congo and 332 students had been sent abroad by the UN. ONUC has also been instrumental in the creation of various permanent training institutes

[32] For more detailed descriptions of the substantive activities of ONUC's Civilian Operations, see the serial reports published intermittently by the UN Secretariat. Of these, the most interesting are: No. 5, which covers the period from mid-July through October 1960; No. 10, covering the first year of operations; the report dated May 1, 1963, which was released on July 15, 1963; and the report covering 1963, which was issued on April 30, 1964. In addition, Ritchie Calder's popular account, *Agony of the Congo* (London, 1961), which focuses particularly on the activities of WHO, is worthy of note, as are two articles: Robert L. West, "The United Nations and the Congo Financial Crisis: Lessons of the First Year," *International Organization,* XV (Autumn 1961), 603-17; and Garry Fullerton, "UNESCO in the Congo," *Unesco Courier,* XVI (December 1963), 4-11.

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within the Congo, including the National School of Law and Administration. Among other things, the UN has provided a number of fellowships for study at these institutes.

Fifthly, members of the Consultative Group and other ONUC personnel have given high-level policy advice and have served in executive capacities. The Consultant in Finance has served as President of the Congolese Monetary Council since its creation. This body was established on the advice of ONUC, and it has extensive powers over the Congo's economy. The Consultant in Education has assisted in the preparation of far-reaching programs for revising the Congolese educational system. In 1962 four UN experts prepared a draft of a new constitution for the Congo. UN experts played a vital role as assistants to Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula in his negotiations in early 1964 with Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak concerning the Congo's pre-independence public debt and the shares that the Belgian colonial administration held in private companies operating in the Congo.

Finally, ONUC's Civilian Operations have cleared, coordinated, and to some extent controlled bilateral aid. The system of tripartite control over counterpart funds has already been mentioned. At a very early stage a Fellowship Service was established to centralize the processing of applications by Congolese for overseas training. At the UN's suggestion, a Bureau of Economic Coordination was established in the Prime Minister's office. This organ, headed by a UN official, has the express function of attempting to coordinate external assistance to the Congo. Of course, the degree of collaboration between ONUC's Civilian Operations and bilateral programs has varied greatly. As has been mentioned, there was little contact between ONUC and the Soviet program. Relationships with the Belgian program have been severely strained at times, and even though there has been gradual improvement since the coming to power of the Christian Social-Socialist coalition in Belgium in May 1961, the connection is still far from tight and cordial. On the other hand, the United States has always worked very closely with ONUC.

The speed with which ONUC's Civilian Operations were established, the extent of the tasks which have been undertaken and their coherence, and the quality of some of the key personnel have been most impressive. There can be no question that ONUC's Civilian Operations have been vital to the continuation of the administrative, economic, and social structure of the Congo since its independence.

The accomplishments of the Civilian Operations, however, have extended beyond this. Had the former metropole been the predominant

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source of post-independence assistance, given both the extent to which the Congolese lacked training and the nature of the arrangements which had been made prior to independence, it probably would have been difficult to alter the habits of the past, particularly the pattern of paternalism. Unencumbered by this heritage, ONUC's Civilian Operations have been able to give the Congolese a new sense of dignity. This is of course not to say that all Belgians were paternalistic or that all UN personnel have treated the Congolese as equals, for there have certainly been exceptions on both sides. It is rather to attempt to assess the cumulative impact. Moreover, because of its multinational composition, the Civilian Operations have opened new vistas for the Congolese, have made them aware of alternative ways of viewing problems and of alternative techniques for attempting to resolve them. Perhaps this has been most evident in the sphere of education, where the system has been significantly revamped on the basis of UN recommendations.[33] Moves have been made toward the secularization of the school system, greater emphasis has been put on secondary education, and curricula have been reworked, adjusting them to the needs of a newly independent country. For example, the teaching of Greek and Latin has been deemphasized and greater stress has been placed on technical training. In 1963-1964, there were almost three times as many children enrolled in secondary schools as in 1959-1960 and, in contrast to the earlier year, most of the students were Congolese. This increase would have been impossible without the secondary school teachers supplied by ONUC. Although the evidence may be less striking, the same phenomenon has occurred in other fields.

On the other hand, there are certain things that ONUC's Civilian Operations have not been able to accomplish. Although the UN has been able to prevent the disintegration of the administrative, economic, and social structure of the Congo, it has not been able to prevent severe deterioration in these sectors. This is partly attributable to insufficient resources.

The funds at the UN's disposal have been sharply limited. The controversies and difficulties surrounding the *Ad Hoc* Account for the United Nations Operations in the Congo have been amply commented on and analyzed elsewhere.[34] These have had some effect on the Civilian Opera-

[33] See UN Secretariat, "Report of the United Nations Civilian Operations in the Congo," May 1, 1963, 35-42; and Fullerton, "UNESCO in the Congo."

[34] See Leo Gross, "Expenses of the United Nations for Peace-Keeping Operations: The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice," *International Organization*, XVII (Winter 1963), 1-35; and Norman J. Padelford, "Financial Crisis and the Failure of the United Nations," *World Politics*, XV (July 1963), 531-68.

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tions since, as has been mentioned, some of the activities have been financed on this budget, and because they have engendered a general opposition to large expenditures for the Congo. The United Nations Fund for the Congo has fallen disappointingly short of the $100,000,000 target set by the Secretary-General when it was created. As of January 1964, less than half that amount had been contributed and the United States had given more than 75 per cent of the total. The idea of using the United Nations Fund for the Congo for import support grants had to be dropped after the first year because of the limited resources of the Fund and the predominance of the American contribution. Meeting this need through bilateral grants appeared to be a simpler and more direct technique, and also made it easier for the United States to impose conditions to protect its balance-of-payments position.

On balance, it has proved more difficult to raise funds for the Civilian Operations than for the United Nations Force. ONUC's political-military functions have seemed more urgent than its state-preserving and state-building tasks to a majority of the UN's members. In addition, a number of newly independent states have felt that their economic and social problems are equally as grave as the Congo's and have privately expressed some resentment about the relative magnitude of the UN's assistance to the Congo. Significantly, there has been no discussion of making contributions to the budget for ONUC's Civilian Operations obligatory. The financial pressures reached a climax during the planning of the program for 1964. A severe cut had to be made in the "minimal" program planned by ONUC, and even the reduced program could only be sustained by a substantial grant from the Congo.

Financial limitations, however, have been only part of the problem. It has also been difficult to obtain sufficient and adequate personnel for ONUC's Civilian Operations. Although the Civilian Operations team totaled 1,149 on December 31, 1962, ONUC's plans envisaged a staff at least 300 larger and at that time financing was available for these posts, but the UN could not find suitably qualified individuals for appointment. The requirement that the experts have a working command of French was one obstacle. The French-speaking parts of the developed world are not as numerous as the English-speaking areas, and France itself was deeply committed to assisting its own former colonies in Africa and less than enthusiastic about the UN's involvement in the Congo. The problem was compounded by the chaotic security conditions in the Congo, which discouraged interest in volunteering for ONUC. It is possible that deeper motivational problems were also involved. The UN could not draw on the same patriotic motives that a

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national effort could. At the same time, ONUC had too many political ramifications to appeal to purely humanitarian motivations. The problem of recruitment could have been eased had the UN been more willing to hire Belgians, and had more Belgians been willing to work for the UN, but as of December 31, 1962, only 15 Belgians were employed in the Civilian Operations. In view of the tradition of Belgian colonial policy, and the special way in which the Civilian Operations assisted in decolonization, the UN's reluctance to hire Belgians is understandable. However, it is possible that some UN officials were as doctrinaire in their opposition to Belgians as some Belgians were in their opposition to ONUC, and one wonders whether it would not have been possible to develop appropriate screening mechanisms so that more Belgians could have been used. Short of the actual hiring of Belgians, perhaps more effective means for coordinating ONUC activities with Belgian bilateral programs could have been found. Of course, this would have required efforts on both sides. With respect to the quality of personnel, some deterioration has been noticed as the proportion of individuals on permanent UN contracts has declined, as it has since the first year of operations. The UN employee may feel a greater stake in the outcome of the operation and beyond that, by virtue of his affiliation, in most cases he has a better background for making policy decisions. In addition to these general problems, the UN has also found it especially difficult to recruit vitally needed financial experts.

The UN's inability to prevent the deterioration of the administrative, economic, and social structure of the Congo is also attributable to its lack of power. The position of ONUC's Civilian Operations vis-à-vis the Congolese government was defined in the relevant sections of the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly and in a series of agreements between the Secretary-General and representatives of the Congo.[35] Although these guaranteed ONUC freedom of movement, and gave its personnel the requisite privileges and immunities, they did not give the UN power to take executive action. The mandate of the Civilian Operations was to serve in an advisory capacity. When individuals performed tasks that went beyond this, it was at the invitation of the Congolese government. In some cases, even though the Central Government asked an expert to serve in an executive capacity, the provincial authorities in the area involved refused to concur, and the mission consequently could not be executed. The division of the Congo into twenty-three provinces rather than the original six obviously multiplied these problems. Finally, the UN was

[35] For the latter, see UN Documents S/4389/Add. 5 and S/4807, Annex I.

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enjoined not to become a party to internal conflicts, constitutional or otherwise, or in any way to intervene or attempt to influence their outcome.

Almost all individuals connected with ONUC's Civilian Operations, from the Secretary-General down, at one time or another have felt severe frustration because of these limitations. Innuendoes—and often direct complaints—about the unwillingness or inability of Congolese officials to take what appeared to ONUC personnel as obviously necessary action can be found throughout the Progress Reports of the Civilian Operations. This passage from the report covering the month of February 1961 is an example: "Preoccupied with political issues, neither the Central nor the Provincial Authorities have seemed to pay sufficient attention to the economic situation under their respective control. In spite of repeated warnings and recommendations by ONUC's advisers, no practical measures have been taken so far to check or alleviate the danger of further disintegration."[36] In private conversation, UN personnel have spoken in even stronger terms.[37]

The Congolese were extremely sensitive about their sovereignty, and thus quick to assert their prerogatives. At the same time, they were untrained and inexperienced. Ralph Bunche has asserted that Congolese officials resented the need for UN assistance, "or at least having to seek and ask for it."[38] Moreover, these officials were often much more deeply concerned about their political futures than about the maintenance of the modern sector of the Congolese economy, in which they may not have played much part prior to independence.[39] To compound the situation, from September 1960 until August 1961 there was no legally constituted Central Government. As a consequence of all these factors, at times there were no officials with whom ONUC could deal. At other times, contacts between ONUC personnel and Congolese officials were limited as a consequence of ONUC's refusal to grant full recognition to the College of Commissioners and Joseph Ileo's government. Even when these problems were not involved, the extent to which UN recommendations would be implemented was problematical. Given the visible deterioration in the administrative, economic,

[36] UN Secretariat, "Progress Report No. 9 on United Nations Civilian Operations in the Congo during February 1961," 1-2.

[37] See also Calder, *Agony of the Congo*, 38-39, 145.

[38] Dag Hammarskjöld Memorial Lecture, delivered at Columbia University, March 16, 1964.

[39] Lucian W. Pye has noted the general preference of leaders in newly independent states for the drama of politics as opposed to the routine of administration (*Politics, Personality, and Nation Building*, 5 and *passim*).

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and social structure of the Congo, for the UN to be limited to giving advice was inevitably frustrating.

The UN's lack of power has stemmed not only from its formal, legal position, but also from its inability to use informal techniques. One method of attempting to secure the implementation of recommendations is to make granting assistance conditional upon the fulfillment of specified actions. Although the UN has attempted to do this to some extent,[40] its efforts have at best had only limited success. One explanation is that the resources at the UN's disposal have been extremely limited; thus the reward for compliance has not been very large. Further, the debate on the United Nations Fund for the Congo suggests that the imposition of stringent conditions on grants of aid from the United Nations would not win majority approval in the Assembly. Most delegates were extremely sensitive about questions involving the Congo's sovereignty and sought to avoid any action that might prejudice it. In addition, many delegates from newly independent countries appeared to desire to avoid creating precedents which conceivably could cause difficulties for their own countries in future contingencies. Finally, since one purpose of ONUC's Civilian Operations was to forestall bilateral intervention, to take actions which might make the Congo prefer bilateral assistance would be self-defeating.

The deterioration in the administrative, economic, and social structure of the Congo has been most noticeable in places other than Léopoldville and Elisabethville.[41] In outlying areas the various inabilities of ONUC's Civilian Operations have combined with cumulative effect. Other than technical assistance personnel, the staff in the field has typically consisted of a Chief ONUC Civilian Officer posted in the capital of each of the six original provinces and possibly one other ONUC Civilian Officer posted either in the capital or in some other urban center. These individuals have often been confronted with overwhelming problems, yet their resources and powers have been extremely limited. Their situation became even more difficult when the Central Government's authority in the provinces declined. At times ONUC's Civilian Operations have had virtually no contact with large sectors of the Congo. The inauguration of a series of air missions to remote areas in early 1962 did much to improve the situation, but contact was still sporadic.

[40] UN Secretariat, "Report No. 10 on United Nations Civilian Operations in the Congo: First Year of Operations, July 1960 to June 1961," 10-11.

[41] The UN, of course, cannot claim credit for the continued viability of Elisabethville, since there were virtually no Civilian Operations there until January 1963.

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Beyond this broad incapacity to prevent the deterioration of the administrative, economic, and social structure of the Congo, there are also certain specific things that ONUC's Civilian Operations have been unable to accomplish. Very little has been achieved in the field of military and internal security, although providing training in these areas was originally regarded as one of the most important functions of the Civilian Operations and ONUC personnel have continued to have a sense of urgency and disquiet about Congolese inabilities in these matters. The UN has found it impossible to launch significant programs, and those which have been put into operation have not had outstanding results.

General Ben Hamou Kettani of Morocco was named ONUC Consultant for Military Instruction at an early stage, and he remained in the Congo through January 1961. His activities were limited to preparing plans which were accepted in principle by the Commander-in-Chief of the *Armée nationale congolaise*, but never put into effect, and to assisting in the preparatory training of one para-commando battalion.[42] The Consultantship in Military Instruction has remained unfilled since General Kettani's departure, except for the brief appointment in August 1961 of General Mengasha Iyassu, who was able to accomplish even less than his predecessor. After the secession of Katanga was ended, ANC forces stationed in Katanga were placed under ONUC command, but this was done for security reasons rather than as part of a training program.

According to Ralph Bunche, at one stage the UN would have been willing to disarm the ANC forcibly and to impose a training program, but only at the request of the Congolese government.[43] Such a request was never made. At that time—late August and early September 1960—Major General H. T. Alexander, commander of the first United Nations Ghana contingent, argued that the UN should take this action even over the objections of the Congolese government, but Mr. Bunche insisted that from a legal standpoint such a course would be out of the question.[44]

Since it proved impossible for ONUC and the ANC to implement a training program, in the winter of 1962-1963 Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula proposed a modernization program for the ANC involving

[42] See UN Secretariat, "Progress Report No. 5 on United Nations Civilian Operations in the Congo," 28. After this report, which covers the period from mid-July to October 1960, there is no mention of activities in this field in ONUC's reports.

[43] Dag Hammarskjöld Memorial Lecture.

[44] See UN Document S/4451 and King Gordon, *The United Nations in the Congo: A Quest for Peace* (New York 1962), 49-50.

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bilateral assistance from Belgium (army), Canada (communications), Italy (air force), Israel (paratroops), Norway (navy), and the United States (equipment), with the UN serving in a coordinating capacity.[45] The Secretary-General's Advisory Committee on the Congo balked at the choice of countries, there being objections to the fact that all of the donors were Western and particularly to the inclusion of Belgium and Israel. The Advisory Committee refused to approve the program and also refused to agree that if the Congo proceeded to implement the program without UN participation it would not violate paragraph 6 of General Assembly Resolution 1474 (ES-IV), barring bilateral assistance for military purposes. Despite this, the Congolese government attempted to put the program into effect; however, Canada and Norway refused to participate without the UN's sanction. So far, Belgium, Israel, and the United States have gone farthest in implementing the program.

The UN's difficulties in this area have partly been attributable to its failure to establish a firm working relationship with General Mobutu. The difficulties started with ONUC's refusal to recognize the legality of his military coup and the College of Commissioners-General. Probably more fundamental factors have also been involved. Training a military force is obviously one of the most crucial aspects of state-building; it goes to the core of sovereignty and also can have significant international ramifications. The state involved will naturally want to maintain a high degree of freedom, and external forces will attempt to intervene, overtly and covertly. It is therefore understandable that so little has been accomplished with respect to the ANC. Bilateral programs in this area in other countries have also encountered severe difficulties.[46]

The UN has been somewhat more successful in implementing programs for police training. Programs in this area have been in operation since February 1961. Over 1,500 police officers have received some training, but the effects of it can be questioned. The Léopoldville police mutinied in May 1963 and had to be replaced by ANC forces. It is perhaps significant that in 1963 Nigeria was asked and agreed to provide police training on a bilateral basis. Subsequently this arrangement was altered, and the United States agreed to finance a program that would be conducted under UN auspices.

[45] The exchange of correspondence on this matter between Adoula, on the one hand, and the Secretary-General and his representative in the Congo, on the other, is contained in UN Document S/5240 and Add. 1 and 2.

[46] See John D. Montgomery, *The Politics of Foreign Aid: American Experience in Southeast Asia* (New York 1962), esp. 36, 64-70.

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ONUC's Civilian Operations have also been able to do very little to assist in the political development of the Congo. Although the UN provided experts to prepare a draft constitution, there has been no way that it could force the Congolese to accept this or any other constitution. Thus until July 1964 there was no agreement in the Congo about the basic legal framework of the state. Moreover, while some UN personnel have served as advisers to leading Congolese politicians, and while the UN could facilitate the convening of parliament, ONUC's Civilian Operations have legally and practically been unable to do much to teach the Congolese the political skills necessary for the operation of a modern state. On the other hand, by strengthening the bureaucracy through its training programs, the effect of the Civilian Operations may well have been to strengthen authoritarian and centralizing tendencies in the Congo. It should be noted, however, that bilateral programs in other parts of the world have also done little to transmit political skills, and that their effect often appears to have been an augmentation of centralizing and authoritarian tendencies.[47]

In reviewing the achievements of ONUC's Civilian Operations, one is impressed by the closeness of the connection between these relatively technical activities and the UN's more publicized involvement in the political-military aspects of the Congo crisis. Perhaps the Katanga imbroglio provides the best broad illustration of this point. It is widely known that the failure of *Union Minière du Haut Katanga* to pay taxes to the Central Government contributed to the Republic of the Congo's budgetary crisis. However, the secession of Katanga also contributed to the budgetary crisis in another way. There was universal agreement among ONUC personnel and other external observers that the Congo did not need as extensive a military force as the ANC and that the ANC was taking too large a share of the national budget. Congolese officials were of the same opinion, but it was politically impossible for them to contemplate reducing the size of the ANC as long as the Katanga secession continued.

In view of the interlocking nature of the several aspects of the UN's involvement in the Congo, ONUC has wisely refrained from attempting to maintain a rigid separation in its own administrative arrangements. ONUC has operated from a central headquarters in the Hotel Royal in Léopoldville, where close contact between various branches of the operation has always been possible. There has also been a considerable interchange of personnel. Chief ONUC Civilian Officers in the provinces have been responsible for all ONUC activities in their territories.

[47] See *ibid.*, 160, 166; and Pye, *Politics, Personality, and Nation-Building*, 297.

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On the other hand, such division as has existed has allowed a measure of cooperation at the technical level even when relationships between ONUC's high command and the *de facto* government of the Congo were severely strained.

There is also a broader sense in which the connection between the technical and the political aspects of the UN's activities is evident. In many ways Mr. Kuznetsov's prediction that the outcome would be the one desired by the United States has been proved correct. One need only take the testimony of various Americans. On several occasions, official spokesmen have praised the UN for keeping the cold war out of the Congo, and in their more candid moments they have substituted "communism" for the "cold war."[48] ONUC's Civilian Operations have contributed to this result.[49] State-preserving and state-building are tasks which have very wide political ramifications; the external actors involved in giving assistance cannot help but influence the future political orientation of the recipient. Surely this has been the case in the Congo. While ONUC's Civilian Operations may not have done much to advance the goals of democracy, they certainly have done nothing to advance the goals of communism and their influence has been basically Western.

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Since ONUC's Civilian Operations are still in process and there is no way of knowing how lasting their effects will be, it is much too early for any definitive evaluation. Some conclusions, however, can be drawn.

On balance, as of the moment it appears that the UN has performed its state-preserving and state-building tasks creditably and with a fair degree of success. The Congo has been preserved as an administrative entity and as a functioning state, and there has been no sharp lapse from the level of modernity achieved prior to independence. In the realm of state-building, a number of Congolese have received training to equip them for executive, administrative, and professional positions. Steps have been taken to increase vastly the number of secondary school graduates, and thus the pool of manpower available for semi-technical positions and further training. Some progress has been made in adjusting the Congo's institutions. Admittedly there have been

[48] See Inis L. Claude, Jr., "United Nations Use of Military Force," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VII (June 1963), 128.

[49] Significantly, the staff has never included any citizens of the USSR, although as of mid-1964 it did include 17 Polish citizens and four Czechoslovakians.

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areas—most notably, the field of internal security—where the UN's accomplishments have been less than might have been hoped, and whether or not the overall gains achieved thus far will stand once the UN force is withdrawn remains to be seen.

Although the UN has been able to do a great deal in the Congo in the realm of state-preserving and state-building, its contribution to nation-building—which presumably is the ultimate goal of both the Congolese and the majority of the international community—has been minimal. Nation-building involves the development of a cohesive spirit, a sense of national identity, as well as the development of the instruments of modern government. Insofar as state-building affects the latter aspect of nation-building, ONUC's Civilian Operations have made some contribution. Government is more than administration, however, and the farther removed the UN's achievements have been from pure administration, the more they have generally diminished. Perhaps through its work in the fields of telecommunications and, more importantly, education ONUC may have done something to aid the Congo in developing a sense of national identity, but this cannot be measured. Beyond these things there is little that the UN has or could have done. Nation-building is, after all, at its core a domestic process. It might be argued that the UN should have attempted to do more in the area of political development, but quite apart from the inherent difficulties of working in this field, one wonders about the extent to which a universal international organization composed of widely varying regimes could engage in such activities.

It is doubtful that as much could have been accomplished in the Congo through any other technique than ONUC's Civilian Operations. In the circumstances which prevailed it is hard to conceive of feasible bilateral programs. Certainly, in mid-July 1960 the Congolese were in no mood to rely principally on the former metropole. Whether or not they would have been willing to accept a European consortium arrangement—for example, on the part of the European Economic Community (EEC)—is questionable, and it is also doubtful that EEC would have been able to mount the effort. Had the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development been in existence, it might have been a better vehicle, but as an exclusively Western institution it would have had many of the same liabilities as EEC. Since the United States has provided the bulk of the resources for the UN's program, presumably it could have undertaken the effort alone, and the Congolese, as their early entreaties to President Eisenhower indicated, might have been willing to accept this. However, this would

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have raised ticklish problems for American relations with its NATO ally, Belgium, and surely at least some Asian and African states would have raised the cry of neo-colonialism.[50] Moreover, there would have been the problem of possible Soviet competitive intervention. On the other side, it is doubtful that the Soviet bloc could or would have committed the resources that the UN has, and the West certainly would not have allowed the Soviet Union to assume a dominant role in state-preserving and state-building in the Congo without putting up strenuous opposition. The Asian and African states obviously did not have the resources to spare, nor did the Latin American. On another level, it is doubtful that a Western program or a United States bilateral program would have made as far-reaching recommendations as the United Nations has. Thus, assuming that the changes have been in the interests of the Congolese, they have fared better under ONUC's Civilian Operations than they would have otherwise.

Whether or not the UN could again undertake a task of the magnitude of ONUC's Civilian Operations is problematical. To do so, the financial and personnel problems which have proved so troublesome in this instance would have to be solved. Although many aspects of the record with respect to these issues are discouraging, there are some grounds for encouragement.

The establishment of tripartite control over counterpart funds, involving representatives of the UN, the donor country, and the Congo; the use of the UN as a means of channeling and coordinating bilateral fellowship assistance; and the financial arrangements mooted for the Civilian Operations in 1964, whereby countries would give money to the Congo, which would in turn give it to the UN, all suggest that the problems of raising money for activities like the Civilian Operations should not be viewed simply as those of obtaining direct contributions to the UN. Perhaps in the future greater use could be made of indirect methods of raising financial support, and this difficulty consequently might be eased somewhat.

The Congo experience indicates that the UN's ability to respond to state-preserving and state-building tasks is partly a function of the reservoir of personnel available on its own staff. One way of increasing this reservoir would be to place a greater portion of the UN's technical assistance personnel on "program appointment," a form of

[50] For a revealing appraisal of the difficulties which at least one American official felt would have confronted direct United States intervention, see Adlai E. Stevenson, "The United Nations, First Step Toward a World Under Law," *Department of State Bulletin*, XLV (July 10, 1961), 69.

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permanent contract.[51] At present the number of such appointments is limited to a very small percentage of the total number of experts serving under the UN. ONUC's Civilian Operations evidenced a serious need for individuals who could perform a variety of functions in outlying areas, resembling in many ways those performed under colonial rule by district officers.[52] These tasks were generally best performed by UN headquarters personnel. Among other things, they were intimately familiar with UN procedures and traditions. The need to have individuals available who could perform such functions may well be an argument for some overstaffing at UN headquarters. The personnel problems encountered in ONUC's Civilian Operations might be eased if appropriate screening techniques were found so that more citizens of the former metropole could be utilized. Greater coordination with bilateral programs might provide an indirect technique for resolving the personnel problem. A somewhat more flexible attitude on this question than the Secretariat maintained during the early stages of ONUC would facilitate efforts in this area.

If tasks similar to those performed by ONUC's Civilian Operations were contemplated again, the question of the UN's powers vis-à-vis the host government would surely be raised. Numerous individuals connected with the Civilian Operations have said in private conversation, "If only the UN had had a trusteeship. . . ." In their analysis of the UNF, Arthur Lee Burns and Nina Heathcote have considered the related possibility of the UN's being given internal policing powers and have found much to commend it.[53] Although it is possible that a host government might accept such an arrangement with respect to the UNF, it is questionable whether in other areas the UN could or should attempt to gain considerably more extensive powers than it has had in the Congo. There would first of all be legal and political barriers. Article 78 of the Charter prohibits the application of the trusteeship system to UN Member States, and the tendency has been for states to become UN Members almost immediately after they have gained independence. This article is important not only because of its legal effect, but also because it symbolizes the intense desire of newly independent states to protect their sovereignty. The history of ONUC's Civilian Operations provides further documentation of this desire. Secondly, it is extremely doubtful that the UN could muster

[51] For a description of this system, see Sharp, *Field Administration*, 166-68.

[52] Burns and Heathcote have also noted this need in their analysis of the UNF (*Peace-Keeping by U.N. Forces*, 57).

[53] *Ibid.*, 166ff.

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sufficient resources to undertake much more extensive responsibilities than it has had in the Congo. Finally, since the UN's purpose in undertaking state-preserving and state-building functions is to prepare the host government to stand alone as quickly as possible, it can be argued that the sooner that government is forced to assume responsibility for its own affairs—though with guidance and assistance—the better.

To maintain that the UN could not and should not attempt to establish anything as extensive as a trusteeship, however, is not to argue that the UN should not have more powers than it had in the Congo. Clearly some modifications in the agreements which have been in force in the Congo would be useful and desirable. It would be helpful if UN officials in outlying areas had greater powers. This would be beneficial in itself, and might lead to the stationing of greater numbers of UN officials in such areas, which would also be useful. In addition, Civilian Operations could benefit from the UN's having greater powers in the realm of internal security. This might ease the problem of personnel recruitment and would also facilitate the implementation of training programs in these areas. Whether or not giving the UN greater powers in this respect would involve totally or partially disarming the indigenous security forces is moot.

The internal administrative arrangements for ONUC's Civilian Operations appear to have been quite successful. The pattern of the Consultative Group gave the UN's activities an unprecedented unity. ONUC's pattern could be repeated in another emergency, and perhaps ought to be considered for broader application to the UN's normal technical assistance activities.

If, then, under certain conditions the UN could undertake functions similar to those performed by ONUC's Civilian Operations, it may also be useful to consider whether or not it should do so. This question can be answered only in terms of one's values. It is clear that ONUC's Civilian Operations have served to implement American objectives and that, from the American viewpoint, the tactic of first relying on a multilateral agency as a channel for United States and other aid and then shifting to more normal bilateral patterns once the crisis has eased has proved rewarding. Soviet influence has been checked and Western influence preserved. Beyond that, Belgium's resentment at having at least some of the props knocked out from under its paternalistic plans has largely fallen on the UN rather than the United States. Given the nature of this case, it is difficult to believe that a bilateral or exclusively Western program would have served American interests as well. On

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the other hand, there are grounds for arguing that the United States ought to be cautious in calling on the UN to perform such tasks. The USSR's dissent is a warning signal. State-preserving and state-building do have serious political implications, and to overload the UN with tasks of this nature might well jeopardize the organization's usefulness as an East-West meeting place.

Whether or not the UN will ever again be called upon to perform state-preserving and state-building tasks and the ultimate success of those that it has performed in the Congo remain to be seen. However, even if ONUC's Civilian Operations stand as a unique case and time proves that some of the UN's accomplishments in the Congo were less substantial than they now appear, there can be no question that the UN has made a significant contribution to decolonization by its activities in this instance. It has facilitated and eased a radical change, which could easily have been even more disruptive and painful than it was, not only for the Congo, but also for the surrounding territories and for the international community generally. Beyond that, ONUC's Civilian Operations have at least made it possible for the Congolese to take, and have assisted them in taking, the first steps toward nation-building.

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Research Note

APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

By ROBERT A. PACKENHAM

INTEREST in the politics of the developing areas has increased steadily since World War II, and scholars have now produced a sizable collection of single-country monographs, several regional studies, and at least one attempt at a global synthesis.[1] This literature has tended to stress various conditions as the primary correlates or determinants of political development. This research note offers a taxonomy of five approaches to the study of political development. The taxonomy draws upon both traditional and contemporary sources, and studies of both "developing" and "developed" areas, to derive a framework for ordering the literature on political development produced in the past two decades. The five approaches are (1) "legal-formal," (2) "economic," (3) "administrative," (4) "social system," and (5) "political culture."

Of course, not all writings on political development have been or could be included.[2] To add another caveat, this taxonomy is presented as *a* way rather than *the* way to think about political development studies, but it is a way that has been useful.[3] Some authors are mentioned who

[1] Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960).

[2] Three books not discussed elsewhere but directly relevant are Lucian W. Pye, ed., *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton 1963); Joseph LaPalombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton 1963); and Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, eds., *The Political Modernization of Japan and Turkey* (Princeton 1964). These are the first of a projected series of seven "Studies in Political Development" sponsored by the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council. The other volumes also will be published by Princeton University Press and will deal with "Education and Political Development," "Political Parties and Political Development," "Comparative Political Culture," and "A Theory of Political Modernization."

[3] Some of the studies grouped as examples of one approach have characteristics that legitimately suggest they might be placed under another heading. For example, we would call Professor Deutsch's social mobilization approach primarily a social system one, although his hypothesis clearly contains elements of the political culture and administrative approaches as well. The social system and political culture approaches are particularly closely related. Those works which build on Max Weber and Talcott Parsons—such as Seymour Martin Lipset's *The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective* (New York 1963) and David Apter's two books on African political systems, *The Gold Coast in Transition* (Princeton 1955) and *The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism* (Prince-

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wrote about "developed" rather than "developing" countries; we hope they do not mind being placed in this framework. Finally, the taxonomy deals only with the conditions of political development. What is meant by "political development" itself varies from writer to writer and therefore has not been employed as a criterion.

I. The Legal-Formal Approach

Some writers have suggested that political development is primarily a function of a *legal-formal constitution that prescribes such features as equal protection under the law, the rule of law, regular elections by secret ballot, federalism, and/or the separation of powers.*

This notion was clearly implied, if not stated explicitly, in much of the work in formal political science in Europe and the United States during roughly the last one hundred years.[4] Illustrations of this approach are the works of Theodore Woolsey, Woodrow Wilson, John W. Burgess and, until recently, most comparative government textbooks in the United States.[5] Historical, descriptive (as distinguished from theoretical), and legal-formal studies continued to be the dominant preoccupation of American political scientists at least until 1950.[6]

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ton 1961)—are included in the political culture approach, even though the relationship of values to social system is intimate. Many theories overlap somewhat, but each tends to emphasize one approach more than the others. In spite of the problem of overlapping, this taxonomy seems reasonable and useful.

[4] Harry Eckstein, "A Perspective on Comparative Politics, Past and Present," unpublished manuscript, n.d. (c. 1961), 27-44; UNESCO, *Contemporary Political Science*, Publication No. 426 (Paris 1950); and Austin Ranney, *The Governing of Men* (New York 1956), chap. 24, especially 576-84.

[5] See Theodore D. Woolsey, *Political Science, or, The State: Theoretically and Practically Considered* (2 vols., New York 1878); Woodrow Wilson, *The State: Elements of Historical and Practical Politics: A Sketch of Institutional History and Administration* (Boston 1892); and John W. Burgess, *Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law* (2 vols., Boston and London 1891). See also Eckstein, 39-45, and Bernard Crick, *The American Science of Politics* (Berkeley 1959).

Examples of comparative government textbooks on Europe are Gwendolen M. Carter, John H. Herz, and John C. Ranney, *Major Foreign Powers* (New York 1957), and R. Taylor Cole and others, *European Political Systems* (New York 1953). Examples of Latin American texts that devote large proportions of their discussions to constitutions which exist for the most part on paper (as the authors themselves sometimes point out) are Austin F. Macdonald, *Latin American Politics and Government* (New York 1949, 1954), and Miguel Jorrin, *Governments of Latin America* (New York 1953). Recently some texts have incorporated other approaches more or less systematically. See especially Almond and Coleman, eds., and Samuel H. Beer and Adam B. Ulam, eds., *Patterns of Government: The Major Political Systems of Europe* (New York 1962).

[6] Claude E. Hawley and Lewis A. Dexter, "Recent Political Science Research in American Universities," *American Political Science Review*, XLVI (June 1952), 470-85. See also Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York 1960), 154-57.

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The legal-formal approach has been less apparent in writings about the developing areas than about the United States and Western Europe. The literature on politics in Latin America has perhaps embodied it to a greater extent than work on other developing areas, although this may be changing.[7] In general, one of the most notable characteristics of studies of the politics of the developing areas is how far the pendulum has swung away from legal-formal to economic, administrative, sociological, and psychological factors as explanatory variables.

II. The Economic Approach

A very common view is that political development is primarily a function of a *level of economic development sufficient to serve the material needs of the people and to enhance a reasonable harmony between economic aspirations and satisfactions.*

One immediately thinks of the works of Europeans, particularly Karl Marx, as classic cases of the economic approach to politics. But intellectual history in the United States also has been receptive to this idea. There is a long tradition in American social thought regarding the importance of economic factors—notably, property—for political liberty and the conduct of political affairs.[8] More broadly, there is also a tradition, recently being rediscovered, of looking at the relations of the economy, as the independent variable, to the polity, as the dependent variable.[9]

Coming on the heels of this tradition, and himself a part of it, Charles A. Beard presented the economic approach to politics more forcefully than any other prominent American scholar. He also gave it the aura of science.[10] On the research front, this meant that Beard's thesis absorbed much of the interest in the "new science of politics" that was developing as a reaction to the legal-formalism of the time.[11] On the

[7] Merle Kling, "Area Studies and Comparative Politics—The Latin American Experience," paper prepared for delivery at the 1963 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York City, September 4-7, 1963.

[8] David Fellman has traced this strain from its origins in seventeenth-century England through the end of the Jacksonian era, which he takes to be about 1850. "The Economic Interpretation in Early American Political Theory," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1934.

[9] This tradition has been interpreted as a "common theme" in "liberalism, classical economics, Marxism, conservatism and Saint Simonism—[as well as] much of modern sociology." Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait* (Garden City, N.Y., 1962), 487-88. See also Sheldon S. Wolin, *Politics and Vision* (Boston 1960), chaps. 9 and 10.

[10] See Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution* (New York 1935), chap. 1, "Historical Interpretation in the United States."

[11] See Morton White, *Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism* (New York 1949), 74, 109, 125-27; Lee Benson, *Turner and Beard: American Historical*

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teaching side, Beard's influence on instruction in American history has been pervasive.[12] For decades American elementary and secondary school pupils have been socialized to Beard's doctrine, even though the first systematic effort to test the thesis advanced by Beard in his *Economic Interpretation of the Constitution* was not published until forty years after the book's appearance in 1913.[13]

Against this historical background, it is not surprising that Americans writing about political development should be very much interested in its economic roots. It is in such a context that the famous "proposal" by Millikan and Rostow,[14] which appears to be based upon the economic approach, was seen and, frequently, criticized. The criticism often made was that the authors posited a too-close relationship between economic and political development.[15] This alleged shortcoming was frequently attributed in part to the traditional receptivity of Americans to the economic approach.

It is true that the relationship between economic and political development is not one to one. However, this fact should not be allowed to obscure the very important statistical correlation that seems rather well established between level of economic development and political democracy, when the latter is defined in terms of political competitiveness. Using slightly different but roughly comparable indices of economic development and political democracy, Lipset, Coleman, Hagen, and Cutright all found such a correlation.[16] The implication of this

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Writing Reconsidered (Glencoe, Ill., 1960); and Robert E. Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century* (Chicago 1953, 1955), 371-76.

[12] See Maurice Blinkoff, "The Influence of Charles A. Beard upon American Historiography," *University of Buffalo Studies*, XII (May 1936), 4-84.

[13] Both Benson and Robert E. Brown, *Charles A. Beard and the Constitution* (Princeton 1956), make this point. Brown's book in 1956 and Forrest McDonald, *We, the People: The Economic Origins of the Constitution* (Chicago 1958), appear to have been the first systematic tests of Beard's thesis.

[14] Max F. Millikan and W. W. Rostow, *A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy* (New York 1957).

[15] It should be noted that the authors state flatly that they reject the "crude materialist thesis that progress consists exclusively in 'extra food in the stomach' . . ." (*ibid.*, 21). There are parts of the book (especially 21-42) which indicate adherence to the social system and political culture approaches (see below) to political development. However, the proposal itself, which is guided by a "banking concept," is not very clearly tied to these approaches and does seem to reflect the economic approach to a greater extent; see especially chaps. 6 and 7.

[16] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City, N.Y., 1960), chap. 2; James S. Coleman, "The Political Systems of the Developing Areas," in Almond and Coleman, eds., 538-44; Everett E. Hagen, "A Framework for Analyzing Economic and Political Change," in Robert E. Asher and others, *Development of the Emerging Countries: An Agenda for Research* (Washington 1962), 1-8;

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finding for the policy-maker would seem to be that political democracy *usually* requires economic development. It is countries like India, which (happily) insists on remaining democratic in spite of its relatively low level of economic development, that keep the correlation less than one to one and that make necessary the qualification "usually." But India is an exception. There are also exceptions of the opposite sort. The same data that demonstrate the correlation also show that relatively high levels of economic development are in the deviant cases associated with a lack of political competitiveness and even with political autocracy.[17]

If one's index of political development shifts from political competitiveness to level of political contentment, the relation to economic development seems more complex. On the one hand, one study examines the hypothesis that there is a direct relationship between "political vulnerability," a complex notion measured in terms of three economic indices, and political discontent, measured in terms of Communist voting. A "rudimentary" test in the Indian national elections of 1951-1952 "tended to support the hypothesis," although further testing was strongly urged.[18] On the other hand, there are studies that report a negative correlation. Brinton found, in his study of revolutions, that they occurred in the United States, England, France, and Russia when the economies were on the upturn.[19] Tocqueville supports this view of the French Revolution, concluding that "The French found their situations more intolerable the better it became."[20] Davison reports a positive correlation between income and Communist voting in Sweden's 1952 elections.[21]

In a middle position are studies suggesting that there may be a cor-

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and Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis," *American Sociological Review*, XXVIII (April 1963), 253-64.

Lyle W. Shannon has found positive correlations between level of economic development and political independence, i.e., formal self-government. However, his work does not deal with political development after independence. See his "Is Level of Economic Development Related to Capacity for Self-Government?" *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, XVII (July 1958), 367-82; "Socio-economic Development and Political Status," *Social Problems*, VII (Fall 1959), 157-69; and "Socio-economic Development and Demographic Variables as Predictors of Political Change," *Sociological Quarterly*, III (January 1962), 27-63.

[17] In Coleman's data, for example, Cuba, Venezuela, and the United Arab Republic rank high in economic development but low in political competitiveness; Hagen's three exceptions are Cuba, the U.A.R., and Iraq. Other obvious examples are Nazi Germany, the USSR, and de Gaulle's France.

[18] Charles Wolf, Jr., *Foreign Aid: Theory and Practice in Southern Asia* (Princeton 1960), 408.

[19] *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York 1959), 264-79.

[20] Alexis de Tocqueville, *On the State of Society in France Before the Revolution of 1789* (London 1888), 152, quoted in Wolf, 304n.

[21] W. Phillips Davison, "A Review of Sven Rydenfelt's Communism in Sweden," P-570, The RAND Corporation, 1954, 27-29, cited in *ibid.*

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relation between economic development and political contentment, even in modernizing societies, but that the correlation is about as strong with social and psychological as with economic factors.[22] Lipset and Davies have tried to reconcile these various views. They suggest that the relationship between economic development and political contentment is best understood in dynamic terms.[23] Davies, for example, writes: "Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal. . . . The actual state of socio-economic development is less significant than the expectation that past progress, now blocked, can and must continue in the future."[24] As Davies himself points out, it would be useful to know more about what constitute "long" and "short" periods.[25]

III. The Administrative Approach

Under this heading are grouped those writers who have tended to argue that political development is primarily a function of the *administrative capacity to maintain law and order efficiently and effectively and to perform governmental output functions rationally and neutrally*. This approach stresses the output side of the Easton input-output model.[26]

Historically, the case for political development in terms of advanced administration has been put most brilliantly by Max Weber. "Weber saw bureaucratization as an institutional form inherent in all democracies."[27] It was characterized by neutrality, rationality, and achievement rather than by ascriptive criteria as the basis for selection and promotion.

Another historical source of the administrative approach to political development is the writings of the English colonial administrators about their experiences in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. From their point of view, the first priority for the political development of the then colonial, now developing, peoples was better administration. Thus they stressed this aspect of political development in their writings.[28]

[22] William Buchanan and Hadley Cantril, *How Nations See Each Other* (Urbana 1953), 30-37; Hagen, 36-38; and James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," *American Sociological Review*, XXVII (February 1962), 5-19.

[23] Davies, 5-6, and Lipset, *Political Man*, 63-64.

[24] Davies, 5-6.

[25] *Ibid.*, 19.

[26] David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," *World Politics*, IX (April 1957), 383-400.

[27] Lipset, *Political Man*, 29.

[28] Research on these works would be useful. One might start with the writings of John Stuart Mill—for example, the final chapters of *Representative Government*.

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More recently, as their relations with the developing countries have increased, Americans have observed problems similar to those of the English colonial officers of that earlier day. As a result some writers have, like the English, stressed the need for efficient government and a capacity for carrying on public services and maintaining law, order, and stability as the hallmarks of political development. The stimulus to this set of writings seems primarily to have been the authors' views of the needs of U.S. foreign policy.[29]

Another recent manifestation of the administrative approach may be found in the work of organization and communications theorists. Organization theorists think of political development as the creation of "more effective, more adaptive, more complex, and more rationalized organization."[30] A communications theorist advances the hypothesis that stability, in the context of social mobilization, depends upon increasing income rates *and* an increasing capability of the government to bear its communications "load."[31] Such theories merge the administrative with the social system approach (see below). The stimulus to this set of writings seems primarily to have been interest in the theory of socio-political change rather than the needs of U.S. foreign policy.

A major strength of the administrative approach seems to be that it emphasizes the very real need for governments to maintain law and order and to get things done on a relatively rational and efficient, yet humane, basis. To the extent that these theories indicate *how* such performance can be achieved, they are even more useful. By raising and providing preliminary answers to the question of how the "irrational" can be a means to the "rational" in administration, organization theory has an especially important contribution to make to the understanding of political development.

[29] Examples are: Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania, "A Study of United States Military Assistance Programs in Underdeveloped Areas," Annex C, Volume II, *Supplement to the Composite Report of the President's Committee to Study the Military Assistance Program* (Washington 1959), esp. 77-80; John H. Badgley, "Burma's Political Crisis," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXI (December 1958), 350-51; Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Politics of Underdevelopment," *World Politics*, IX (October 1956), 55-75; Guy Pauker, "Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade," *World Politics*, XI (April 1959), 342-45; and Howard Wriggins, "Foreign Assistance and Political Development," in Robert E. Asher and others, 181-214.

[30] Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity* (New Haven and London 1962), 38. See also Philip Selznick, *Leadership and Administration* (Evanston 1957); Herbert A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization* (New York 1947); James A. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York 1958); and the valuable discussion in Wolin, chap. 10.

[31] Karl W. Deutsch, "Toward an Inventory of Basic Trends and Patterns in Comparative and International Politics," *American Political Science Review*, LIV (March 1960), 38-39.

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A danger in the administrative approach may be that, in stressing the need for achievement, it sometimes gives inadequate attention to the problem of democratic political development.[32] In this connection a promising avenue of research is, again, organization theory. Early students of organizations, like Frederick W. Taylor and his successors in the scientific management movement, argued that efficiency is related to "having clearly defined roles, or offices, based on universalistic norms, functionally specific relationships, and rigid adherence to achievement considerations."[33] Organization theorists today are finding that informal, particularistic, functionally diffuse forms of relationships can and do contribute, or can be made to contribute, to organizational effectiveness. In this lies the promise as well of the kind of pluralism of activities and attitudes that seems necessary for democratic political development.

IV. The Social System Approach

Still another approach is the idea that political development is primarily a function of a *social system that facilitates popular participation in governmental and political processes at all levels and the bridging of regional, religious, caste, linguistic, tribal, or other cleavages.*

There are at least four ways in which this approach has been expressed. One is in terms of social correlates of democracy. These include relatively high "scores" on such sociological variables as an open class system, literacy and/or education, high participation in voluntary organizations, urbanization, and communications systems. These social correlates of democracy, like the economic correlates, seem pretty well established.[34]

A second way is to see the development of nationhood in terms of a dynamic "communications grid" or network of "social communication." The outstanding exponent and major initiator of this approach as a theoretical construct is Karl W. Deutsch.[35] Several studies have used Deutsch's framework as guides to study national and even supranational political communities.[36]

[32] For a statement of this view, see Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View," in LaPalombara, ed., 120-67.

[33] The quotation is from Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building*, 39. Taylor's book is *The Principles of Scientific Management* (New York 1911).

[34] For example, see Lipset, *Political Man*, chap. 2; and Cutright; Hagen; and Buchanan and Cantril.

[35] His most comprehensive statement is *Nationalism and Social Communication* (New York 1953). See also "The Growth of Nations," *World Politics*, v (January 1953), 168-96.

[36] James S. Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1960); Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of*

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A third group of expressions of the social system approach may be gathered together under the broad rubric of the "group" approach to politics. This approach has a tradition at least as old as Tocqueville and as recent as David Truman. To generalize about so diverse a group is always a mistake in part, but we may gain some understanding if we try to formulate the central theme of these many writers. It might be put this way: A complex infrastructure of groups provides the differential centers of decision-making, the shared power base, and the overall social vitality that are required for democracy. The case for this is put not only on moral grounds ("group participation in politics is a good thing because each group ought to have its say"), but also on existential grounds ("group participation is functional because it is necessary for the vitality of the system and because there are serious cognitive limits on men's capacity for central planning").[37] In the literature on the politics of the developing areas, two recent manifestations of this approach are Robert E. Scott's *Mexican Government in Transition*[38] and Myron Weiner's *The Politics of Scarcity: Public Pressure and Political Response in India.*[39]

A fourth expression of the social system approach is structure-function analysis, especially as put forth by Gabriel A. Almond.[40] Almond defines a political system in terms of universal political functions. These are used as a basis for identifying important political structures. Ideally this scheme provides a basis for truly comparative analysis and, to the extent that the structures and functions can be propositionally related to one another, the basis for general theory.

Now it is possible, drawing from each of these four elements of the social system approach, to construct a very rough model of the social foundations for political development. The legal-formal approach conceived of the conditions of the developed political system primarily in terms of constitutional forms; the economic approach, in terms of economic output and, sometimes, distribution; and the administrative approach, in terms of administrative capacity. This approach suggests a

Asian and African Peoples (Cambridge, Mass., 1960); Selig Harrison, *India: The Most Dangerous Decades* (Princeton 1960); and Karl Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton 1957).

[37] On the latter point, see Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics and Welfare* (New York 1953), 78-88; and two articles by Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through," *Public Administration Review*, XIX (Spring 1959), 79-88, and "Policy Analysis," *American Economic Review*, XLVII (June 1958), 298-312.

[38] Urbana 1959.

[39] Chicago 1962. See also William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (New York 1959); this study, however, draws its data from the U.S. and Western Europe.

[40] See "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in Almond and Coleman, eds., 3-64.

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society where there is a relatively large number of *groups*,[41] *organizations*, or *institutions*. People *associate* themselves voluntarily with these groups. They form new associations from time to time. People belong to several groups at one time; in each group the memberships are different; hence there are *cross-cutting memberships* and *multiple loyalties*. In addition to these horizontal links, there are *vertical links*—namely, links between groups at different levels. Groups in such a linkage relationship may be said to perform the *aggregation* function. They are a point of *access* for the *articulated demands* of the "lower"-level groups in the linkage chain. The *class structure* is neither *polarized* nor *rigid*, which further facilitates access. Through these mechanisms, in the developed political system, all *major* groups have *reasonable* access to political decisions.

V. The Political Culture Approach[42]

Here are found writings which see political development as primarily a function of the political culture—that is, *the set of attitudinal and personality characteristics that enables the members of the political system both to accept the privileges and to bear the responsibilities of a democratic political process.*

Political culture is, obviously, largely a psychological concept. The psychological mechanisms at work occur on at least two levels: (1) the level of attitudes or sets of expectations about political roles held by members of the polity, and (2) the level of personality.

The concept of political culture at the level of attitudes has been mostly a postwar development.[43] It received its name in a classic formulation in 1956.[44] Other works using it include Leites's and Wylie's studies on

[41] Groups in a conscious, rather than a categoric, sense are what is meant here.

[42] There is a rich literature on "national character" and politics, much of which might be subsumed under this approach. For some central propositions and bibliographical references, see Nathan Leites, "Psycho-Cultural Hypotheses About Political Acts," *World Politics*, I (October 1948), 102-19; Alex Inkeles and Daniel Levinson, "National Character: The Study of Modal Personality and Sociocultural Systems," in Gardner Lindzey, ed., *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Reading, Mass., 1954), II, 977-1020; and Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton 1963), 12-36, esp. 13n.

[43] One can, of course, trace its lineage back about as far as one chooses. The whole idea owes perhaps more to Max Weber than to any other single modern social scientist. In the United States, no discussion of the historical background to the notion of political culture should omit the work of Graham Wallas, Walter Lippmann, Charles E. Merriam, and Harold D. Lasswell. Talcott Parsons has been extremely influential in transmitting and revising the insights of Max Weber. Nevertheless, the concept of political culture as a major determinant of political change and development does not seem to have become prominent until the 1950's.

[44] Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, XVIII (August 1956), 391-409.

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France; Banfield's on southern Italy; Lerner's on the Middle (Near) East; Binder's on Iran; Apter's on Africa; Almond's and Verba's on the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Mexico; and Lipset's on the United States as a "new nation."[45]

These studies are notable for spotlighting a hitherto neglected dimension of political development. The psychological characteristics named as requisites or inhibitors of political development go under varied headings: for example, unwillingness to accept political responsibility (Leites and Wylie), "amoral familism" (Banfield), empathy (Lerner), and a mixed "civic culture" (Almond and Verba). While these groupings are differently named partly because they measure different phenomena, they also tap a common root—namely, psychological predispositions here called "political culture."

At the personality level of the political culture, less work has been done on the developing areas than on the United States.[46] One outstanding work is Lucian W. Pye's study of the Burmese political system.[47] The thesis of this book is that political development, which is

[45] Nathan Leites, *On the Game of Politics in France* (Stanford 1959); Laurence William Wylie, *Village in the Vaucleuse* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958); Edward C. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (Glencoe 1958); Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (Glencoe 1958); Leonard Binder, *Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1962); Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition* and *The Political Kingdom in Uganda*; Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*; Lipset, *The First New Nation*. See also Harry Eckstein, *A Theory of Stable Democracy* (Princeton 1961).

[46] In the U.S. arena, Harold D. Lasswell was a pioneer; see *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago 1930) and *Power and Personality* (New York 1948). Other important works are T. W. Adorno and others, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York 1950); M. Brewster Smith, Jerome S. Bruner, and Robert W. White, *Opinions and Personality* (New York 1956); and Robert E. Lane, *Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does* (New York and London 1962).

In the field of political biography, see Alexander and Juliette George, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study* (New York 1956); Erik Erikson, *Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History* (New York 1958); Alex Gottfried, *Boss Cermak of Chicago* (Seattle 1962); and Arnold A. Rogow, *James Forrestal: A Study of Personality, Politics, and Policy* (New York 1963).

[47] *Politics, Personality and Nation Building*. Others may be noted. Gabriel A. Almond's *The Appeals of Communism* (Princeton 1954) is relevant, although it is based upon material drawn from ex-Party members in the United States, United Kingdom, Italy, and France. It stimulated and served as a guide for an earlier volume by Lucian W. Pye, *Guerrilla Communism in Malaya: Its Social and Political Meaning* (Princeton 1956), which also leans heavily on personality to explain political development.

Two other volumes, both by non-political scientists interested principally in economic development but also in broader social change, are especially noteworthy. These are Everett E. Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins* (Homewood, Ill. 1962), and David C. McClelland, *The Achieving Society* (Princeton 1961). It is at least quite interesting that scholars with backgrounds and disciplines as different as Pye (a political scientist), Hagen (an economist), and McClelland (a psychologist) should all turn to personality to try to account for political, social, and economic change.

We know of few psychological biographies of political leaders in developing coun-

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defined in terms of nation-building, is fundamentally a problem of personal identity, trust, and psychic well-being. That is, the politically developed society is one in which participants' personalities are sufficiently secure and well-integrated to enable them to bear psychologically the privileges and responsibilities of independence and self-government. This is an extraordinary thesis, if one considers it in the light of traditional explanations of political development. For rather than, say, constitutional forms or administrative capacity or even economic development, Pye is arguing that the priority problem in political development is "identity" and psychic health. Though not all observers may go so far as Pye, his thesis is extremely provocative. The notion that the new nations of Asia and Africa face an identity crisis upon independence will strike a responsive chord among many students of those areas. Nor will the phenomenon be wholly foreign to Latin Americanists, even though most of the Latin countries have been formally independent for more than a century.[48]

There is considerable geographic distribution among these studies. Latin America seems least well represented. For example, in the literature cited, only the book by Almond and Verba draws upon research in a Latin American country (Mexico is one of the five countries surveyed). Yet, judging from the frequent references to *personalismo, caudillismo, machismo, jeitos,* and so on in many of these countries, who would deny that political culture is an important variable there, too?

It would be possible to add still other approaches. For example, a sixth might be the "geographical" approach—that is, the body of writing arguing that political development is primarily a function of land and other geographic factors. Among its foremost exponents would be Achille Loria,[49] Frederick Jackson Turner,[50] Karl A. Wittfogel[51]

tries, although this field has rich research possibilities. To get an idea of this richness, see the revealing essay by Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, "The New Courage: An Essay on Gandhi's Psychology," *World Politics*, XVI (October 1963), 98-117.

[48] "The difference between the twenties and the sixties in Brazil is that today the Brazilians have discovered themselves. They have taken a good look and they like what they see. They no longer wish to be Europeans, and their intellectuals no longer escape to Paris to find something to write about. They no longer describe themselves, or are so described by their own intellectuals, as a mongrel race, inferior because it consists of a mixed people. On the contrary, they find their creative freedom, their pride in the present, their confidence in the future precisely in this fact—that they are a mixed, a universal people. The social democracy of Brazil, and the pride Brazilians have discovered in being what they are, has released a font of creative enthusiasm." Frank Tannenbaum, in the Introduction to Gilberto Freyre, *The Mansions and the Shanties: The Making of Modern Brazil* (New York 1963), xi.

[49] See Benson, 1-92 and *passim*. According to Benson, Loria's "fundamental proposi-

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and, more broadly, the geopolitical school of international relations theorists.[52] And a seventh approach might deal with "stages of modernization": those theories which see political development as part of a total modernization process involving legal-formal, economic, social, psychological, and administrative aspects to a roughly equal extent. This process occurs by stages over time. Rather than emphasizing one or another dimension of the conditions of development (e.g., economic conditions), these theories stress various points of development, such as the "take-off" stage.[53]

Instead of elaborating these approaches further, however, we conclude with the hope that this taxonomy may help to identify and order the literature on political development and that, by so doing, it may illuminate some important dimensions of the conditions of political development—not only for scholars, but also for the policy-makers whose Herculean task it is to understand and to deal effectively with political change in the developing nations.

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tion was that the relationship of man to the amount of 'free land' available for cultivation holds the key to human history," including the nature of the political system. *Ibid.*, 4 and 6-9.

[50] "American democracy was born of no theorist's dream; it was not carried in the *Sarah Constant* to Virginia, nor in the *Mayflower* to Plymouth. It came out of the American forest, and it gained new strength each time it touched a new frontier. Not the constitution, but free land and an abundance of natural resources open to a fit people, made the democratic type of society in America for three centuries while it occupied its empire." *The Frontier in American History* (New York 1920), 293, quoted in Fellman, 294. For a reinterpretation of the Turner thesis, see David M. Potter, *People of Plenty* (Chicago 1954).

[51] See *Oriental Despotism* (New Haven 1957) for his thesis of the tyrannical "hydraulic society."

[52] For example, see Sir Halford John Mackinder, *Britain and the British Seas* (New York 1902), and "The Geographic Pivot of History," *Geographic Journal*, XXIII (April 1904), 421-37; Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783* (New York 1957); and Nicholas John Spykman, *The Geography of the Peace* (New York 1944).

[53] See especially Max F. Millikan and Donald M. Blackmer, eds., *The Emerging Nations: Their Growth and United States Policy* (Boston 1961). For earlier statements of this approach in more narrowly economic form, see Millikan and Rostow, chap. 5, and W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge, Eng., 1960).

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Review Articles

RATIONALIZING NATO STRATEGY

By MALCOLM W. HOAG*

Alastair Buchan and Philip Windsor, *Arms and Stability in Europe*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963, 236 pp. $5.00.
Ronald Steel, *The End of Alliance,* New York, The Viking Press, 1964, 148 pp. $3.75.
Robert Strausz-Hupé, James E. Dougherty, and William R. Kintner, *Building the Atlantic World*, New York, Harper and Row, 1963, 400 pp. $6.00.

I

DIALECTICS about NATO strategy have become tiresomely repetitious. One wishes they were unnecessary, ideally because a military threat had assuredly disappeared, or because a strategic near-consensus had emerged. At least the strategic debate should have become more specific. But doctrine in the end is paramount, however unfortunate the consequences of trying to settle upon it *ex cathedra*. Quantitative analyses that are not systematically related to possible doctrines can lose critical issues in a welter of data, while analyses confined to ways to implement a single doctrine are too constricted. If within NATO one or more nations insist that the mid-1950 doctrine fits the 1970's, official alliance planners can be stifled.

National planners or others must then fill the void if promising new strategies are to be considered. The unofficial critics can at least address fundamentals, untroubled by heresy, as in very different ways these books do. Ronald Steel is boldest, questioning whether the alliance need survive. *The End of Alliance* finds the Soviet threat all but vanished, with Europe by itself easily capable of hedging against its resurgence by means of adequate self-defense. *Building the Atlantic World*, on the other hand, finds the Soviets implacable—if anything, to be feared more because they have become more subtle and technologically advanced, so that nothing short of an enhanced defense effort by a united West will suffice.

These two books move far beyond military matters, although the defense of Europe poses the core issue for all. Would-be architects for

* Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors.

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new NATO additions in politico-economic cooperation can hardly hope for much until the military foundation is repaired, or its disrepair agreed not to matter. As Strausz-Hupé and his associates put it: "More than any other disagreement between the Allies, the European-American conflict over nuclear strategy endangers the survival of NATO" (p. 321). Change "European-American" to "inter-Allied" so as to cover intra-European conflicts as well, and they would be exactly right.

Buchan and Windsor agree, and their assent is doubly significant. Beyond its high quality, *Arms and Stability in Europe* commands attention by its origin. While less a committee product than *Building the Atlantic World*, it drew upon a distinguished international study group under the joint auspices of Le Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère in Paris, Die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik in Bonn, and the Institute for Strategic Studies in London. Its British authors tried to accommodate their views to those of their colleagues, but escaped lowest-common-denominator blandness by taking personal responsibility for the results. Dissents from within the study group are sprinkled throughout. Such shared intellectual discourse is greatly needed, within as well as outside NATO official bodies, both to stimulate ideas and to mitigate suspicions about national purposes in raising them.

This European study group centered its attention upon stability, defined both as a military equilibrium and as "an easier pattern of human relationships between the two halves of Europe" (p. 6). To this end they want "convincing evidence that NATO is designed and organized as a defensive alliance" (p. 143). Strausz-Hupé and his associates do not want to attack the East militarily, but they do want "the statesmen of the Atlantic world to express openly their resolve to compel the global political retreat of communism and to terminate its control over peoples who have never freely accepted it" (p. 272). A more militant tone carries over to their military recommendations, which emphasize much stronger, and more promptly responsive, nuclear capabilities in Europe.

II

These and other diverse views are pertinent because of growing pressure to rationalize NATO strategy. Because it outspends the Warsaw bloc in military preparations, NATO would seem to be pursuing a high-cost, low-risk strategy—i.e., one that hedges against possible Soviet attacks by providing many military responses less damaging to the West than massive nuclear retaliation, and hence more credible as

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deterrents. Measured by prevalent European views of military capabilities, however, the array of lesser responses does not appear impressive. Large resource inputs are not translated into large outputs. An efficient strategy would so translate them; or, alternatively, it would reduce costs and more explicitly accept possible risks. These three books provide variants of three prominent contenders for rationalization: augment tactical nuclear capabilities, if necessary at the expense of conventional (Strausz-Hupé *et al.*); strengthen conventional capabilities (Buchan and Windsor); and reduce efforts because sizable capabilities are not needed (Steel). None advocates what *Building the Atlantic World* aptly calls an "across the board" capability to counter any Soviet military initiative without NATO's having to escalate to more violent levels, either in terms of weapons employed or in area of battle.

Those content to maintain tactical capabilities in Europe, or let them decline, can be variously motivated. Optimists about the Soviet threat are growing in number. Many want to signal Western peacefulness by lessened arms efforts, hoping to relax tensions further. For them, as a minimum, any altered theater posture must not alarm the Soviets by seeming to strengthen NATO offensive capabilities. Others desire strengthened NATO tactical capabilities if these can be made good enough to qualify as solid deterrents in their own right, but question whether such high standards are feasible. Still others (including Steel) assert that nuclear technology and national politics will inevitably replace collective defense with self-defense. The pressure to cut alliance programs can find many strategic rationales. The critic who seeks to counter the pressure effectively must establish that "enough" as well as more tactical strength is useful, is feasible within reasonable budget limits, and need not take forms that would exacerbate international tensions in an arms race.

There are, first, the inexpensive alternatives. If theater forces in function are to be little more than a tripwire, why buy an expensive one? Suppose the official German view, let alone the French and British, were to revert to or remain as characterized by Buchan and Windsor: "Thus for anything more than a minor frontier incident (whether intended as a probe or not), the chief task of the West is not to 'raise the atomic threshold,' in the sense of heightening the level or intensity of conflict at which nuclear weapons should be introduced into the battle, but to raise the risks of nuclear war itself. To emphasize the dangers of escalation from a tactical nuclear conflict to general war will not reduce but increase the credibility of the deterrent" (p. 81). To implement this doctrine, little conventional

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capability would be needed, and tactical nuclear operations would be tightly coupled to general war rather than uncoupled. Theater alternatives to general war would, beyond minor proportions, be positively undesirable. Less expensive capabilities in Europe could obviously supply the required escalatory devices.

If this doctrine is too extreme, an inexpensive modification is still possible. Existing nuclear forces can be used in ways that try to persuade the Soviets not to retaliate. Throughout NATO's history, the presumed key to economy has been to abandon the "firebreak" distinction between nonnuclear and nuclear weapons, and to accept dependence upon prompt first use of nuclears by NATO. Other "firebreaks" have also been noted, however, as recognizable discontinuities in the scale of violence. The obvious one is between areas in which nuclear weapons are detonated and those where they are not; a less obvious one is between nuclear bursts at one moment in time and bursts scattered over time. These discontinuities might be exploited separately or jointly. For example, NATO might use low-yield nuclear weapons only upon battlefield targets within NATO territory. Purely defensive use so defined might replace nonuse as the limiting principle for nuclear weapons. The hope of a nuclear demonstration, with "n" simultaneous weapon bursts coordinated with a political demand, would likewise be that the Soviets would not use nuclear weapons at all in retaliation.

However poor the odds that such gambles would work, it costs little to maintain options upon their use. Thousands of weapons are already in the theater, in strength that has been increased "by more than 60 per cent in the last two years."[1] If used unilaterally, they should be ample to give NATO an overwhelming edge. Only two conclusions about tactical nuclear war can be put dogmatically: one-sided nuclear employment can convey an enormous military advantage; two-sided employment would be enormously disruptive. The great question about NATO's nuclear posture in Europe has always been about its ability to take nuclear punishment and still, somehow, gain a meaningful advantage and reasonable control over the battle. Nuclear operations that stay unilateral finesse both questions.

Would they work? Nobody knows. If tried, the price and possible risk are clear. One price would be measured by the dangerous Soviet retaliatory capabilities that were deliberately spared, either because they were located within areas that NATO chose initially to treat as

[1] Secretary of Defense McNamara, Speech to the Economic Club of New York, November 18, 1962 (DOD Office of Public Affairs No. 1486-63), 16.

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a sanctuary or because the NATO strike, in order to signal its limited purpose, was confined in size. And NATO could choose to pay in another way, deliberately losing centralized control of individual nuclear firings in order to free subordinate commanders to destroy targets of opportunity as and when they developed. Clearing individual firing against such targets through many echelons of command could consume inordinate time even if communications were working perfectly. Yet if the firings were not so cleared, what clarity would there be at either end of the "hot line" about what was being done to the Soviets? The case for maximizing the political impact of first nuclear use in a preplanned strike, rather than allowing this supreme result to be treated as if it were only an adjunct to military operations as they unfolded, has already been so well made in this journal that it need merely be referred to here.[2]

There remains the apparent risk. The Soviets, reading the signals conveyed by NATO first nuclear use and fearing the abyss beyond, may capitulate. Or they may respond in kind, or threaten to, in order to exact concessions from the most apprehensive NATO members. Or they may overrespond. Their published military doctrine, naturally, stresses only the last alternative, which would be worst for the West. Their declaratory policy must be discounted both as subject to change and as possible bluff, although it can hardly be ignored. On this score, some are reassured by the Kremlinologists' interpretations of the Soviets, are nearly certain that good Bolsheviks would withdraw, and accordingly are content to base alliance policy upon this subjective assessment of the enemy. The Kremlinologists themselves do not seem to speak with equal assurance, and governments probably get as much divided counsel from them as do researchers. NATO contingency plans should no doubt include possibilities for using nuclear weapons in such ways that the enemy might choose not to retaliate. A double tripwire is little more expensive than a single one, even if little confidence can be placed in it.

III

To be able to meet Soviet theater capabilities, instead of relying almost wholly upon influencing Soviet intent not to use them, is a very different proposition. The form that a dual-capable posture should assume has come increasingly into question. Complex technological developments only modify the stark fundamental: most fissionable materials are long-

[2] T. C. Schelling, "Nuclear Strategy in Europe," *World Politics*, XIV (April 1962), 421-32.

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lived, as the recent drastic cutbacks in American and British production attest. Their stocks constantly rise, in contrast to military stocks of men and machines, which rise and fall, but mostly are merely replenished. For illustrative purposes, history's smooth continuum can be broken into three periods: (1) when Soviet fissionable materials were so scarce that there was little to be used against NATO armies, given priority allocations to airfields, cities, and the like; (2) when Soviet relative nuclear scarcity would still leave NATO armies with a commanding battlefield advantage on this score; and (3) when any remaining Western edge in fissionable material might be overshadowed by the absolute magnitudes on both sides. In the first period, a NATO division did not have to be reconfigured and dispersed to reduce its vulnerability. The uneasy compromise struck in the second period between a nuclear and a conventional orientation in divisional and associated redesign must now be reexamined for relevance to the third.

The radical possibilities now become more pertinent. Either NATO accepts vulnerability to nuclear attack in some units in order to strengthen them conventionally, relying upon other specialized units to conduct nuclear operations, or it goes to extremes in dispersal and concealment, virtually abandoning conventional capabilities in Edward Teller-like designs: "Our fighting forces in a limited nuclear war would not be measured in battalions and divisions. They would consist of commandos, and in each group there would be as many as fifty or as few as five men."[3] Spread such thin forces widely, and total formal force requirements for NATO would doubtless decline sweepingly.

None of our authors desire this solution. Buchan and Windsor want NATO "to cease regarding the short-range nuclear weapon as an organic part of all the NATO divisions, and to recategorize it as a special form of firepower to be attached to particular divisions from a central force" (p. 166). Strausz-Hupé and his collaborators, including especially Stefan T. Possony and Richard B. Foster in the key military chapter, assert in contrast that "a [division] unit must necessarily consist of a mix of conventional and nuclear arms" (p. 86). Wherever priorities are at issue, or enhanced deterrence against deliberate attack at risk of overresponse if hostilities develop, they emphasize nuclear strength. How can tactical nuclear weapons be made available promptly enough? Make them plentiful, and deploy them forward (pp. 94, 97). More importantly, stipulate in advance the circumstances in which nuclear response against Soviet attack would be

[3] Edward Teller (with Allen Brown), *The Legacy of Hiroshima* (Garden City, N.Y., 1962), 281-82.

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"automatic," without commanders having to consult with Washington or other capitals (p. 90); and, in any case, let each sovereign nation use nuclear weapons for self-defense "in its own air space and on its own soil" (pp. 86-87). A "pause" before NATO goes nuclear is questioned as undesirable against deliberate Soviet attack because "delaying prompt counteraction could do us immeasurable harm" (p. 103).

The obvious counter has long been that immediate nuclear counterretaliation could also do Western Europe "immeasurable harm," even if the war did not escalate to global proportions. How is the war to be controlled and favorably ended? To admit in one sentence that there are "technical questions of command and control, albeit of a lower order of magnitude than those raised by larger nuclear weapons" (p. 97), is an incredibly insufficient qualification. Command and control does pose billion-dollar complexities and uncertainties for the "larger weapons" in strategic forces. To know which strategic option to exercise, and when, is difficult; to reprogram forces for any later option, taking account of reciprocal damage, is immensely more difficult. Yet the problems are simplified in some vital respects. The essence of controlled strategic response policy can be easily conveyed: for a first retaliatory wave, choose among not striking, striking while sparing cities, or striking in an unrestrained way; for any second wave, choose between stopping and going all-out. This model fails to do justice to greater complexities in reality. In it there are only two key decision points, with time before each for considered political decision, and there are too few options. Nonetheless, consider tactical nuclear warfare in its light. If there is to be no time for political reevaluation after hostilities begin, the alliance would be past the first nuclear decision point. There will be no natural second decision point, for authority devolved upon many commanders to strike tactical targets of opportunity implies a continuous fast-moving battle. Commanders whose capabilities at best will be imperfectly protected, and at worst nakedly exposed, will find the simple maxims compelling: for forces, hit before you are hit; for weapons, use before you lose. The swift momentum of a nuclear war could govern political decision, rather than the reverse, and carry both sides to high levels of devastation over a large area.

Beyond the possibility that "automaticity" in nuclear response might be confined to own-territory use so as to escape retaliation, the authors of *Building the Atlantic World* rely upon NATO preparations to establish such decisive tactical superiority that a nuclear war could be run by the soldiers, and terminated speedily by victory. They advocate larger NATO ground forces, modernized forces, more weapons,

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including intermediate-range missiles based within Europe, and effective anti-missile and civil defenses where none now exist. Doubtless all this would be accompanied by greatly improved command and control systems, protected against nuclear attack, and logically by protected logistics systems as well. Yet if it all were done, there would remain grave doubts that a two-sided tactical nuclear war could remain under control and be conducted to a favorable conclusion. These doubts are by no means confined to Americans. One questions whether it is true that "to London and, to a lesser degree, Washington the central issue is to deter war. But continental Germany and France are more concerned with the protection of their land and their peoples in the event war should come" (p. 65). On the contrary, French and even German opinion would seem to favor deterrent threats at the expense of defense more than does Washington. The understandable European aversion to any fighting at all expresses itself in opposing greater conventional effort. But in no meaningful sense does this distaste imply a taste on the part of any European government for a greater effort to achieve a tactical nuclear war-fighting and war-winning capability on the Strausz-Hupé model.

A policy for prompt tactical nuclear response appeals to many European governments as an inexpensive deterrent, not as a defense, in the hope that it will frighten the Soviets sufficiently and their own peoples not too much. The counsels of *Building the Atlantic World* would be expensive to implement, would still raise justifiable doubts about their ability in tactical nuclear war to lessen devastation in Western Europe meaningfully, and would threaten hopes for *détente*. Nor could the interpretation be wholly avoided that thoroughgoing preparations for theater nuclear fighting imply the Soviet-American sanctuary-trading in nuclear war that is Europe's worst nightmare. The authors may justly retort that if European governments will nuclear deterrence, they should will the means for its credible implementation. But they do not, and the conflicting goals that motivate them are apparent.

IV

What, then, of the conventional alternative? Must it be so unpromising that NATO should put *zero* confidence in it as a defense against any deliberate attack? Commitment to immediate nuclear response implies precisely this extreme lack of confidence. That NATO might do well in a nonnuclear conflict for any of a variety of reasons—favorable circumstances in initial engagements, satellite disaffection, low quality

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in Soviet forces—would then never be tested. The "firebreak" weaponry distinction would be lost at great, if uncertain, risk when perhaps it need not have been. For prehostilities diplomacy, the credible deterrent inherent in conventional strength, because its use is consistent with defense, would vanish. The likely result would be NATO governments unwilling to escalate in weaponry, and therefore all too willing to make concessions, fearing that battlefield nuclear exchanges would be self-devastating and that nuclear demonstrations would be reciprocated. What little political flexibility remained would be biased in favor of the Soviets. As Buchan and Windsor note: "There never has been any prospect of political accommodation unless the problems raised by strategies of deterrence which depend heavily on the early use of nuclear weapons, are settled first" (p. 10).

But to seem to bring nuclear deterrence into question by pressing for a conventional build-up, and to risk disrupting the alliance accordingly, is one thing if it leads to an altered design that fits changed circumstances; it is an altogether different thing if it leads to dependence upon a capability thought to be very inadequate. There is no good resource reason why NATO should achieve the poor result. Mid-1950 perspectives of announced Soviet armed forces of 5.75 million men, posed against NATO forces as yet lacking a German contribution, should in logic no more govern doctrine for the 1970's than should a mid-1950 nuclear balance. Soviet armed forces of about 3.3 million, plus Warsaw Pact satellites that bring the total to about 4.5 million, are now opposed by NATO active armed forces that number over 5 million. Qualitative advantages, as in tactical aircraft that "on the average can carry twice the payload twice as far as the Soviet counterparts,"[4] can go far beyond quantitative parity in some cases.

Such is the favorable side of the altered aggregate perspective, plus the numerical edge that a well-designed defense can achieve. But, as Buchan and Windsor point out, the aggregate comparisons can mislead, "for they overlook the differences between a dispersed maritime coalition and a centralized land power which enables the latter to get much greater military value out of each soldier" (p. 146). They estimate that nearly twice as many divisions (50 or 60) and tactical aircraft in the Central Area would be needed to "enable NATO to dispense with the close support of nuclear weapons based in Europe" (p. 155). They think so large a force would be disturbingly offensive to the Soviets as well as too expensive, and turn their attention to eminently practical suggestions for improving the capability "to fight and rapidly repel any

[4] McNamara speech, 12. Contrast Strausz-Hupé *et al.*, 72.

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attack whose initial scale does not justify the use of nuclear weapons and the risks of escalation" (p. 157). They want higher quality in existing units, enhanced mobility, and stronger nonnuclear firepower. These goals they share with past and present Allied commanders, and with the American administration.

Novelty enters when they contend that "mobility of the ground forces in Germany also depends on freeing them from the responsibility of trying to guard the whole line of the Iron Curtain in a crisis. With a limited force any such concept of the 'shield' must lead to the early, and probably first, use of nuclear weapons by the West, for it offers the Russians a choice of places in which to concentrate for a swift punch through a thin crust. Yet to leave any part of the line totally unguarded is to offer the Russians another kind of temptation" (p. 158). The means the authors recommend to free the mobile divisions are (1) to supplement them by militia-type local defense forces, and (2) to organize some of the divisions within a network of fortified strong points behind which counterattack could be organized. They would (3) create a stronger system of European reserves; and, despairing about radical redeployments to put NATO forces where the threat is largest, would develop (4) a more unified system of logistics to permit NATO forces to side-slip to meet threats as they develop. Obviously many variants are possible, but, without fundamental correctives, "NATO forces as a whole can reap very few of the advantages of [expensive] mobility with which their equipment is endowing them" (p. 162). Despite their different position, the authors of *Building the Atlantic World* would agree, desiring integrated efforts and reinforcement by a "citizen army" (p. 97).

Here are the components of a more effective theater posture. Yet Buchan and Windsor note that "SHAPE has shown little interest in such proposals" (p. 159) for militia-type forces. Lack of interest by NATO military authorities must in fairness be related to the prevailing defense concept, which our authors do not directly challenge, to legitimate questions about reservist quality, and to resource and political constraints. In the words of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe: "It has always been an aim of the Alliance to defend physically the territory of NATO Europe as far forward as possible, but realization of this aim has been conditioned by the forces actually available to achieve it. For example, in the early days of NATO the best we could do in Central Europe was to man a defence based upon river obstacles deep in our own territory. With the strengthening of our forces in recent years, the defences have steadily moved forward, as, indeed, they

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should . . . the need, however, is not only for increased numbers. To fight an effective mobile defence requires greater tactical mobility, more armour, more conventional fire power and better logistical support than is found at present . . . [and] some restationing is needed."[5] The job has been getting harder as defense becomes more forward, and the chosen way to do it requires expensive forces that can fit a mobile defense.

The soldier's stark alternative to mobile defense has always been an area (or position) defense, "based on retention of specific terrain."[6] But in NATO's early days the area would have had to be behind those "river obstacles deep in our own territory." To put militia-type forces and strong points behind those rivers, where they could be militarily effective, would have indicated rear rather than forward defense to Germans. To be unable to participate in the fluid battle in front of those river obstacles, because of insufficient mobility, would have been a grievous military penalty. SHAPE's lack of interest in militia-type forces was understandable. As long as the governing concept is mobile defense, military commanders will probably remain little interested. A mobile defense requires high-quality forces that can accommodate to fast-moving battle. There is little place for simple equipment and for part-time soldiers who may not be able to perform complex duties sufficiently well. The two great sources for ground force economies are blocked. How to unblock them?

V

The radical military answer is to take the further integrating steps that Buchan and Windsor do not find "politically wise or possible" (p. 159) but which other European authors have advocated, notably Colonel F. O. Miksche:[7] orient the Central Front posture to an area defense immediately west of the Iron Curtain, put the fortified strong points within this area in a system that links natural with artificially constructed barriers, and thus create an environment in which militia-type forces can perform adequately because they need only perform simplified functions with limited local mobility. In this way the quality question about part-time reservists may be answered. The quantity question can be doubly answered: First, rather than merely add such forces,

[5] General Lemnitzer, excerpts from address to Western European Assembly, *NATO Letter* (July-August 1963), 20.

[6] U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, *Field Service Regulations: Operations*, 1962, 75.

[7] F. O. Miksche, *The Failure of Atomic Strategy* (New York 1959), esp. chap. 6, "How to Make Armies More Efficient."

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partly substitute them for the more expensive mobile ones that would otherwise be committed forward, and so get more divisions for a given budget. Second, let a forward-deployed division cover more ground, because it benefits from the strength of a fortified zone, and so lessen total force requirements. Convert more forward defense, in short, from a burdensome constraint into a defense-increasing opportunity. If fluid battle to and from those "river obstacles" is politically unacceptable anyway, why retain an expensive defense for it?

This discussion must be made, even if arbitrarily, less abstract. If Colonel Miksche's two relative cost parameters are correct,[8] the following trades, for example, could be made: First, subtract two armored divisions from the present goal of about 30 divisions for ready forces on the Central Front, and use the resources instead to construct the fortified barrier. Second, from the remaining goal of 28 ready mobile divisions, subtract seven; and, with the released resources, provide 21 fortress divisions instead, at one-third the cost per division. The result would be 21 mobile ready divisions as a goal instead of 30, plus 21 fortress divisions whose mobility is limited—yielding a total of 42 divisions. If holding power per division were increased, say, one-third by the strength of the fortified barrier, these 42 divisions against direct assault would be the equivalent of 56 operating without such aid. To these must be added the reserve mobile units that would be mobilized later from Europe and the United States, of which the most dramatic example is supplied by the two American divisions for which equipment has already been pre-positioned in the theater. By this mobilization addition, if not by the fortified barrier defensive strength that they may already have counted, NATO ground forces would approximate in defensive capability the 50-60 divisions that Buchan and Windsor estimate would be needed for full conventional defense (p. 155), but which they find too provocative and expensive. But to provide such strength in this way would not be provocative, because, with 21 of the divisions effectively immobilized, fewer divisions would be able to participate in a general offensive. And such strength would be markedly less expensive than the Buchan and Windsor posture, for they speak only of additions to the 30-division goal, not of substitutions.

Can holding power per division be increased on the order of one-third, and are Colonel Miksche's cost comparisons relevant? The magnitude of the defensive improvement per division will vary widely, depending upon specific military situations, but it should usually be ap-

[8] *Ibid.*, 181.

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preciable. If not, why should past defense have been "based upon river obstacles"? Barriers covered by firepower help, whether they are natural or artificial. Colonel Miksche's relative costs are conjectural and need detailed official scrutiny, but he advances good reasons for them. Full-time professional soldiers are expensive, as are complex vehicles for off-road movement and adaptable logistics that can move with fluid combat, and these in turn generate maintenance and other additional manpower requirements. In contrast, guns and part-time soldiers to supply most of the manning for them, with simplified logistics geared to known locations and far fewer vehicles, should generate much less expensive divisions. The heavy materiel could be pre-positioned, guarded by cadres in peacetime against surprise attack, leaving most of the manning for reservists on call. One-third the cost per division may be possible without impairing firepower, although for these units inflexibility in place of battle would be accepted. The mobile divisions (here 50 per cent of the forces as a minimum, growing to a larger percentage as reserve mobile divisions are added) would supply the indispensable flexibility for any such mixed posture as a whole. The appropriate blend between mobile and fortress-type forces is an open issue, and the 50:50 ratio illustrated here is arbitrary. But a 100 per cent mobile force makes little economic sense if true forward defense is intended, for then a sizable part of any force will in any case be confined within a small forward battle zone where its expensive mobility cannot be fully exploited. If each division is made so expensive that too few will be bought, the militarily cherished flexible defense will become a flexibly poor defense.

But those Germans who want defense to be forward, effective, not too risky, and inexpensive also naturally want it to be invisible. Colonel Miksche's proposal, and to a lesser degree the moderated proposals of Buchan and Windsor, meet the first criteria at the expense of the last. A fortified zone would be all too visible, and might seem to imply the Federal Republic's acceptance of a permanently divided Germany. As Buchan and Windsor note (pp. 161-62), NATO Central Front maldistribution now puts the strongest forces where they are least needed, with American units partly opposite Czechoslovakia. To strengthen these forces by constructing barriers and some fortifications where there is no German zonal boundary might be politically less offensive, but would reverse military priorities. It would invite an enemy end-run, as in the 1940 debacle when the Germans sensibly directed main attacks north of the Maginot Line. The priority place militarily for NATO reinforcement is the North German plain, which is the worst place politically. The

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Germans' choice is hard. If their politics rule out constructing even the long lead-time parts of any fortified zone in peacetime, there will be no strong positions that could, while reinforcements come quickly forward, permit small forces to deny territorial penetration to enemies that outnumber them. There will be no comparably suitable place to put inexpensive divisions.

The alternative, as before, is a mobile defense that is more expensive, that under prevailing army doctrine puts less of available strength forward and relies more upon trading space for time, and is more complex to implement. Our earlier discussion raised the specter that two-sided tactical nuclear war might degenerate into chaos and mutual devastation, even when NATO used nuclear weapons from the outset. There is, especially for Germans, an even worse possibility. Assume a fluid conventional battle that moves quickly into the Federal Republic and clutters up different NATO national forces with one another, the enemy, and refugees. Then let NATO face the decision to use tactical nuclear weapons. However bad the battlefield situation was for such use at the outset of any hostilities, it will now be worse, as Strausz-Hupé and his colleagues properly emphasize. A decision to use nuclears will be frightful, but a decision not to use them may imply a cease-fire with part of the Federal Republic in enemy hands as a powerful bargaining pawn.

Either choice would be agonizing, which explains why a German, above all, wants to be fairly confident that a good NATO conventional capability would enable this choice to be avoided before he will subscribe to any conventional doctrine. A low-confidence capability that might do well, but likely will not, is not good enough, despite the risks evident in the alternative of using nuclear weapons from the outset of any nontrivial hostilities. Thus, low confidence leads to insistence upon nuclear doctrine, which in turn directs the creative energies of international staffs mainly to nuclear preparedness, which therefore neglects conventional preparedness, which breeds low confidence in conventional capabilities, and so on in a decade-long self-reinforcing cycle. Truly, as Buchan and Windsor say: "One of the most alarming aspects of the problem is the extent to which senior commanders of all nationalities in NATO have become psychologically dependent on the immediate authority to use a weapon which even their European masters, let alone the President of the United States, may be very reluctant to give" (p. 151).

To break the cycle, Miksche-like proposals have a military merit that overshadows more forward defense, and more defense per dollar. These proposals are oriented to a less chaotic battle, in which a con-

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ventional pause can be *enforced* at the right place, and that can consequently impose a degree of order upon any subsequent tactical nuclear phase. A preplanned area defense is a simpler defense. To break a fortified zone, an attacker must concentrate at one or a few places, and then methodically destroy the emplaced troops one-by-one and fend off counterattack. If the enemy is checked, as he should be against a well-designed defense, NATO need not face either using nuclears first or grievous territorial loss. If, however, he appears to be rupturing the zone at one or a few places, NATO will have gained both time for considered decision and better intelligence about where discriminating nuclear fires should be placed if they are to be employed on the battlefield. If they are to be so employed, the location of friendly forces will be better known, and fire can be directed closer to their protected sites. The transition from conventional to tactical nuclear combat will pose much lesser, although still horrendous, problems. To preserve NATO's tactical nuclear options while enforcing a conventional pause forward is the job for theater forces that fits political realities about nuclear decision; and the Buchan and Windsor proposals, and Miksche's more explicitly and efficiently, if less palatably, are oriented to it.[9]

Such proposals would not supply a good posture for a general offensive eastward, an outcome that Buchan and Windsor would welcome, Strausz-Hupé *et al.* deplore, and Steel find irrelevant. Like any posture seriously proposed by anyone, it probably would perform miserably against all-out Soviet thermonuclear attack, which must be answered by strategic forces. In discriminating tactical nuclear war, as distinct from reducing dependence upon and yet preserving tactical nuclear options, its performance relative to equal-cost implementations of the current concept would be uncertain. How to balance better protection of one's forces against better enemy intelligence about their location in a never-tested type of battle?

In other military situations this type of battle should perform much better. Partial forward-manning in peacetime could be put at levels, varying with enemy movement forward, sufficient to make Soviet surprise attack at least as unattractive to the enemy as mobilized mass attack. Then the one type of situation commonly viewed as least unlikely —the Soviet limited objective "pounce," whether to bargain gains against removal of a NATO member's counterpressure elsewhere on the globe, to split the alliance, or whatever—should be insured against with reasonable confidence. The other least unlikely type of situation

[9] Colonel Miksche was too negative in thinking that "the limitation of atomic war appears to be impossible" (p. 166).

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could arise from Soviet pressure against Berlin or elsewhere, from satellite action insufficiently or uncertainly controlled by the Soviets, or by accident. The common denominator would be an unpleasant need for NATO forces to respond promptly in local counteractions, although these would not be general offensives. For such contingencies, NATO needs mobile forces that can be released from fixed defensive assignments, at precisely the time that the usual complacency about defensive coverage will be replaced by crisis anxiety. We are back full-circle to Buchan's and Windsor's diagnosis (p. 156) of mobile forces currently inflexibly tied to defense, and to the need to release them, which means finding a less expensive substitute for the less exacting tasks. A fortified zone-militia combination would provide this substitute, and hence provide an appropriate base for forceful local moves by NATO with released mobile forces.

Any Miksche-type proposal provokes divided critics: Why buy so much defense, if large-scale Soviet conventional attack is unlikely? Why buy so little, if an enemy could puncture so rigid a defense? Something better than a low-confidence conventional capability is needed, first, to move doctrine away from immediate nuclear response dogma, and thus stimulate official planners to invent and incorporate conventional improvements; and, second, in any crisis to lessen sudden jitters about adequate defensive coverage while freeing mobile units for appropriate employment.

The all-mobility proponents need a different answer. The defense envisaged by Miksche as well as by Buchan and Windsor is not rigidly static. It would not be a mere line, but defense in depth. The fortress units would be able to maneuver locally within their assigned areas, and the mobile units would be able to counterattack in areas of their choosing. In physical configuration, the defense would resemble what an orthodox commander would use, no matter how dominated his forces were by mechanization, if his mission were to defend a forward area conventionally and *if* he had time to prepare a fortified zone to strengthen his defenses. The difference lies in buying the time before a crisis, and, thus assured that a fortified zone will exist, accepting some austere units whose limited mobility might otherwise risk their utility too much. A reading of the Siegfried Line experience makes Colonel Miksche's arguments more persuasive. The improvised manning of these long-neglected defenses with lower quality personnel did not, of course, create an impregnable defense against superior forces. Yet "as American troops were to discover [a deepest penetration of 22 miles in 96 days of battle, with battle casualties of 68,000 and total

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casualties close to 140,000], steel and concrete can lend backbone to a defense, even if the fortifications are outmoded and even if the defenders are old men and cripples."[10]

The appeal of total mobility is still strong enough to remind one, perhaps unfairly, of the powerful argument against nuclear shelters for bombers: "You cannot hit the enemy with cement." To which the moderate reply is, with respect to runways, "You cannot hit him without it." The 100 per cent immobile force is certainly too inflexible, but the 100 per cent mobile force is probably too expensive; the 100 per cent expenditure upon fortifications rather than forces is absurd, but the zero per cent alternative is probably inefficient. A blend makes sense. Yet in each case NATO originally pursued an extreme proportion, for military reasons that compelled rear rather than forward defense, so that any public German advocates of changed proportions were at least heretically premature.[11] Now the situation is different. The illustrative force proportions offered in this review article are in all probability not optimal. The total force size is in question as well. Although increased, it would not be enough for Colonel Miksche, whose larger force was tailored to a Soviet threat that seems exaggerated even for the late 1950's; it might seem excessive to the American Department of Defense.[12] It does set a perspective for technical feasibility. Within peacetime active manning levels that would not exceed those in current NATO force goals (because fortress divisions need be only partly manned) and within budget levels that would not exceed those needed to meet current goals (because less expensive divisions would partly substitute for mobile divisions), a conventional forward defense may be possible that would meet the full Buchan and Windsor standard.

VI

Clearly this reviewer pays tribute to Colonel Miksche as a prophet at the right time, before force structure planning had hardened in ways now difficult to change. He faced unpleasant choices while fully aware of the obstacles posed by prevailing doctrine and politics. His is the

[10] C. B. MacDonald, *The Siegfried Line Campaign*, in Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, *U.S. Army in World War II: European Theater of Operations* (Washington 1963), 35, 616-17.

[11] See references in Hans Speier, *German Rearmament and Atomic War* (White Plains, N.Y., 1957), esp. 75-82, 243.

[12] "The forces envisioned in NATO plans for the end of 1966, fully manned, trained, equipped, and properly positioned, could hold an initial Soviet attack on the Central Front using non-nuclear means alone." Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, *Statement Before the House Armed Services Committee, on the Fiscal Year 1965-1969 Defense Program and 1965 Defense Budget*, January 27, 1964, 58.

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concept that would enable planners to maximize politically relevant strength at approximately the resource scale implied by current force goals. Defense that is strong, yet nonprovocative; forward, not rear; consistent with retaining tactical nuclear capabilities during conventional battle as well as in peace, but not precariously dependent upon their prompt and widespread use—these are the attributes, and all seem right and important.

Efficiency in providing such defense is merely one among many political goals, but it can be ignored only at peril. If the European allies think serious theater capabilities beyond reach, either on Strausz-Hupé or on Buchan and Windsor lines, they will neglect their tactical arms. Worse, the malaise might spread. Nobody in the long run defends strategies that are high both in cost and possible risk. In Secretary McNamara's words: "We cautioned our colleagues that the American people will become increasingly restless with a situation in which the U.S. maintains qualitative standards—manning levels, combat stocks, and force readiness—generally higher than those of the other NATO member nations."[13] If American mobility is doubly vitiated, by lesser capabilities on its flanks as well as by sectoral defensive assignments, how can one answer the gold-flow and budget reducers? The American commitment to troop presence in Europe is as strong as ever, but it supplies no sufficient assurance of double-quality standards forever. The current strength of the flexible component, upon which all our authors save Steel would build, is itself brought under threat. The danger is not withdrawal, but sag.

Incidentally, Ronald Steel does provide a refreshingly well-written challenge to American tendencies to treat NATO as sacrosanct, but his ignorance of strategic matters causes him to reach some highly dubious conclusions. He finds technology and national interests leading us to a "Fortress America," with only "the retirement of American soldiers from Europe" to be taken as a last step (p. 61). If that unlikely event were to happen, it would be despite American design, not because of it. The understandable pressure to improve Allied forces is to validate the American contribution, not to replace it, by lessening structural imbalances that hamstring current strength. "Level up" has been the operative constructive slogan, although efficient balancing is always more easily achieved by leveling down.

How to be constructive? The softer political outlines of the Buchan and Windsor package commend it, relative to Miksche's, although its implied higher costs certainly do not. Either would make economic

[13] *Ibid.*, 23.

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sense by tapping reservists, for the truly scarce resource in NATO Europe is manpower, nowhere more so than in the Federal Republic. If the FRG were to insist upon no further diversion of land to military purposes, when it is among the highest of high-cost agricultural producers in an European Economic Community that is breeding tension within the Atlantic area by moving toward more agricultural protectionism, and were to cling to a concept of defense that is inherently manpower-intensive, military inefficiency would contribute to further divisiveness in trade negotiations. To insist that defense be truly forward and yet invisible is to compound difficulties.

The compromise that suggests itself is to lower the cost of the Buchan and Windsor proposals by converting some of their force additions into cost-reducing substitutions, but to reduce the political penalty of any associated peacetime fortified zone by limiting it to long lead-time elements. The prime examples for peacetime action would be the forces themselves, plus constructing some barriers and the small forward fortifications around which the simplified forces could both place their guard and take their refresher training. Much of the rest could be left to be implemented in periods of tension, should these develop, or more radically in periods of actual military alert. Most minelaying, for example, might be deferred until an actual emergency, as demolitions and civilian evacuation certainly would be. Military readiness would be compromised, although not as much as it is now because many of the forces would be closer to the enemy. Conspicuousness would be reduced, but not eliminated. There would be no Western counterpart of a Berlin Wall to keep Germans in, but there would be unmistakable installations designed to keep Russians out. Must their presence be politically unacceptable?

One can live with the established pattern, although its rationale can no longer be based upon the 1950's automatic superiority in tactical nuclear warfare. It might be founded upon the new nuclear superiority advocated by Strausz-Hupé *et al.*, although that would involve higher European efforts directed toward capabilities for fighting nuclear war, as they note, and promising new solutions for controlled exploitation of such capabilities, which they do not provide. Or a new rationale might be provided by Teller-like designs, with nuclear core forces scattered so thinly that the enemy could hardly find them as targets. He would be exposed to their nuclear fire whenever he concentrated, and to guerrilla warfare when he dispersed. This alternative, one suspects, would horrify the authors of *Building the Atlantic World*, because it would discard traditional army offensive capabilities almost totally. It might horrify

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European citizens by its promise that nuclear weapons, although small and clean, might fall like rain among them. This alternative would, however, reduce the vulnerability of NATO forces in nuclear war. If the current pattern is thought to be highly vulnerable, it will perform badly in tactical nuclear war. Skeptics about its performance in conventional war will then find little to commend it. Residual theater capabilities to gamble upon nuclear responses that might remain unilateral could be provided much more cheaply.

Thus one ever-present possibility is simply to cut theater forces. If the complex of problems posed by German reunification were solved tomorrow on terms acceptable to the West, the pressure to rationalize NATO forces by sweeping reductions would probably be irresistible. With the most dangerous issues settled by assumption, the probability of any conflict in Europe would be put very low by all NATO governments. Deterrent strategies would be so unlikely to be tested that the high risks abstractly implied in low-cost strategies would in practice be deemed acceptably low. Remove the wishful thinking about a favorable German settlement, and some already reach the same military conclusion about the near-absence of a meaningful threat. Perhaps they are right, and statesmen need only concert about appropriate savings. Perhaps they are premature, and the shape of any settlement should not now be prejudiced by partial unilateral disarmament. Or perhaps they are wrong, and the prudent course is to seek more meaningful defense from expenditures that are already high enough to yield low-risk strategies.

To build a new strategic consensus about a preferred defense in Europe takes time. It would be enormously convenient if meanwhile the alliance could busy itself with greater nuclear policy sharing, on which much has and can be usefully done, and simultaneously incorporate greater nuclear and nonnuclear flexibility into its possible responses. But the desirability of flexibility itself, as well as what kind of flexibility, is at the center of the strategic debate. And proposals for greater nuclear participation may impair rather than strengthen flexibility. Buchan and Windsor, for example, want to create a new NATO command for all nuclear weapons with an "interdiction function" (i.e., designed to hit tactical military targets beyond the immediate battlefield), and assign to it, among other vehicles, all the NATO fighter-bombers (p. 217). Such an arrangement might be harmless militarily, as one command was substituted for another. It would not be if, contrary to their intent, the change were interpreted as fixing these vehicles in nuclear-specialized roles, to the detriment of their dual capability. This command change might strengthen rather than weaken the tendency to treat aircraft as

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if they were nuclear-only missiles, a tendency which fails to exploit their greater versatility. Here is one possibility, when hardened doctrine can lead to many.[14]

To rationalize NATO strategy, it regrettably seems necessary to jump dangerously beyond marginalism. Yet a different pattern would select one from many possible force combinations whose different performance must somehow be tested against many possible contingencies. The debate will remain lively. Meanwhile, however, alliance-related programs will proceed, and they require coherent guidance if waste is to be held to tolerable proportions. To this end the debate must move beyond dialectics to "how to do it" alternatives that, at least in aggregate terms, indicate probable performance and cost, and NATO must choose among them.

A necessary but insufficient condition that any alternative must meet —at least, any of those that call for constant or heightened effort—will probably be much more defense per dollar and per man. Our European authors appear to supply the most promising basis for such an alternative. To concentrate instead upon capabilities for waging tactical nuclear war at the expense of conventional capabilities, as argued in *Building the Atlantic World*, would concede the Soviets a permanent conventional option which they might never use, but which would leave NATO diplomacy hampered by the onus of having to use nuclear weapons first and promptly in almost any military contingency. To relieve this onus greatly on terms acceptable to forward-exposed member nations, however, NATO must be able to contain conventional attack without yielding sizable areas even temporarily, and without disrupting its fallback tactical nuclear capabilities in the process. The aspirations are rightly high. To meet them, perhaps nothing less drastic will do than a posture oriented to an area rather than a mobile defense, a partial fortified zone, and force increases made possible by cost-saving substitutions for the units that would be employed within the zone. Then the evolutionary movement of defenses forward would be capped by a revolution to confirm it.

This revolution may be politically unacceptable, because it might seem to symbolize acceptance by the West of a divided Germany, or to be too costly even if more efficient. If unacceptable, let political authori-

[14] In choosing to concentrate upon alternatives posed for NATO tactical forces, this review fails to do justice to critiques of the multilateral force. All these authors are critical of the MLF, but for various reasons advance no collective force alternative in comparably specific terms. My views are given in "Nuclear Strategic Options and European Force Participation," R. N. Rosecrance, ed., *The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons* (New York 1964).

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ties proclaim it so, and state their alternatives. Hopefully, these would be more promising on all counts. If not, nations may prefer to make defense less visible if more expensive or less forward, and can indicate which they prefer. Or they can simply opt for less defense. Which? Intra-European and trans-Atlantic differences about preferred patterns are to be expected, and these may, but need not, be deeply divisive. Among lesser shared interests is concern about an appropriate rationale for theater forces, with resources related efficiently to it. On this score, specifically, the United States can probably adapt to any reasoned alternative that maintains collective defense. Ronald Steel's prophecy of *The End of Alliance* will, if right, turn out to be so for the wrong reasons; more probably it is simply wrong.

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INTER-AMERICAN POLITICS

Limited Thoughts on the Unthinkable

By DANIEL GOLDRICH

John P. Powelson, *Latin America: Today's Economic and Social Revolution*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964, 303 pp. $9.00.
Tad Szulc, *The Winds of Revolution: Latin America Today—and Tomorrow*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963, 308 pp. $5.95 (cloth); $2.25 (paper).
Milton Eisenhower, *The Wine Is Bitter: The United States and Latin America*, New York, Doubleday, 1963, 343 pp. $4.95.
Vianna Moog, *Bandeirantes and Pioneers*, translated from the Portuguese by L. L. Barrett, New York, George Braziller, Inc., 1964, 316 pp. $6.95.

I

THESE are four books on inter-American relations, the focus necessarily requiring the authors to make an assessment of intra-national politics as well. With one partial exception (Powelson), none of them is based on anything approaching a theoretical orientation, and the frame of reference is not that of systematic empirical inquiry. Their value then for the student of comparative politics or international relations is extremely limited. All (except Vianna Moog) share a diffuse commitment to the prevailing U.S. value system which constrains their ability to define Latin American political realities. It is to this point that most of the present essay is directed.

Powelson's book derives from his teaching experience at the Bolivian University of San Andrés. It contrasts and analyzes the dominant intellectual opinions of the United States and Latin America on political economy. Szulc describes the rising revolutionary pressures, their social and economic origins, the political dynamics of the region through midcentury, the appalling ignorance and shortsightedness of the Eisenhower administration's Latin American policy, the Cuban Revolution, and the U.S. and Latin American responses to it. He appraises the Alliance for Progress, and makes a projection of future dynamics. Szulc provides much useful information on recent U.S. policy and on current political developments to the south, but seems frustrated by his inability to formulate policy adequate to the emergency. Eisenhower provides a personal account of his diplomatic missions for his brother, and describes the social, economic, and political factors accounting for Latin American discontent. His insights into Latin America seem much

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more profound than those of any other of that administration's major figures. He foresaw the Panamanian crisis of November 1959 and watched the government process his recommendations so slowly as never to catch up with events. He sees the major changes needed in the structure and culture of these societies, and senses that these will be generated largely from within, encountering the intense opposition of the current elites. He opposed on both moral and political grounds the U.S. government's notorious bemedaling of the Venezuelan dictator, Pérez Jiménez. He is aware of many serious errors in U.S. Latin American policy over the years, including our responsibility for the demise of the revolutionary Grau San Martín government of Cuba in 1933-1934 and its replacement by Batista. And he is unafraid to extend the scope of government action in order to accommodate some of the problems that seem insurmountable by private means. But before the spectacle of social revolution, he arrives at what is essentially a policy dead-end. Vianna Moog appraises a variety of factors—geographical, racial, and so forth—that have been used to account for the extreme differences in the direction of Brazilian and U.S. national development. He concentrates on the effect of early history, the character of the Brazilian *bandeirantes* (predatory) and the North American pioneers (industrious), which he concludes set the distinctive character of the two nations. He presents and analyzes current national problems, finding the means to national maturity in the example of their respective great heroes. (He has the distinction of being one of the few contemporary commentators on the inter-American scene who has a perspective of humor!)

II

Powelson's book is the most creative effort, providing for the first time, to my knowledge, a relatively comprehensive confrontation of prevailing Latin American and United States intellectual positions on the political economy.[1] He argues that Latin Americans have never understood very well the mixed-economy welfare state of the United States, and North Americans have reciprocated with ignorance in regard to Latin America's unproductive "capitalized feudalism," to use Milton Eisenhower's phrase, or adventurer-dominated capitalism, to use Powelson's. So different have been the two regions' economic experiences, for example, that U.S. intellectuals have tended to reject Marxism as a rele-

[1] Fredrick B. Pike has performed a similar highly creative service in *Chile and the United States: 1880-1962* (Notre Dame 1963), which focuses more on the psychology of the various social classes than does Powelson's work.

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vant approach to political economy, while "Marxist conditions fit many Latin American countries perfectly" (p. 22), with the result that it provides a widely accepted base for the consideration of public policy. Powelson then presents and, with considerable insight, analyzes a succession of opposing perspectives on such matters as agrarian reform, the extent and international trade role of U.S. "monopolies," commodity problems, inflation, economic integration, and planning.

The very intensity and pervasiveness of the problems and the emotional involvement of the protagonists may mean that this attempt to generate a dialogue at a relatively dispassionate level comes too late. The U.S. government never has understood, at least to the point of concerted action, the necessity of establishing communication with the Latin American intellectual left, which has increasingly set the climate within which external policies are made. By the time the Kennedy administration came to office with some comprehension of this need, the inter-American environment was crisis-ridden, rendering the initiation of a dialogue almost impossible. State Department policy remained such that the scheduled television debate on the Alliance for Progress between Richard Goodwin and Carlos Fuentes, a Mexican novelist highly critical of U.S. Latin American policy, was canceled when the latter failed to obtain permission to enter this country. In some of the critical areas where overt crisis was temporarily under control—for example, the case of Panama from roughly 1960 through 1963—the opportunity for long-range contemplation, preparation for change, and mutual accommodation was squandered, as the January 1964 riots demonstrate. In other countries, the U.S. government identified itself so completely with a particular group of reformers, such as the Peruvian Apristas, as to limit severely its access to all other leftists. (The irony is that the Apristas, warmly regarded by many liberal U.S. intellectuals, came late to praise by the U.S. press and government. By the 1960's, these radicals of the past three decades had become so much more conservative that their opportunity for leadership seemed lost to younger, newly spawned radical movements more sensitive to contemporary demands for change.) Within Latin America, anti-Americanism has become so deeply rooted that there are many countries where moderate politicians cannot afford to appear to be taking an accommodating position. Even where politicians can still afford a position of concordance with the United States, the universities and intellectual communities tend to be committed to militant independence if not hostility. This of course returns us to the condition that stimulated Powelson's book.

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One of the most significant differences in orientation, according to Powelson, is the Latin American tendency to seek collective solutions to economic problems, whereas North Americans are predisposed to individual solutions. Powelson sees this difference primarily in relation to government and business, with North Americans fearful as individuals of power concentration in government and Latin Americans fearful of domination of whole nations by private power concentrations. He suggests as an important factor in the origin of the difference that England was a modern nation embarking on industrialization at the time of colonization, while Spain and Portugal were still feudal. However, it seems to me questionable whether the culture of the modern national society and that of the preindustrial or feudal society differ on this basis. Certainly, given their history, Latin American intellectuals may seek solutions to national problems emphasizing the role of government, while United States counterparts are relatively more oriented toward nongovernmental, but not necessarily individual, action. But the extent to which individual action, by actors in private or public roles, is based on concern for the collectivity is a different order of question. Silvert, for example, distinguishes the national from subnational types of states, partly on the basis of whether the citizens have a commitment to the national interest that precedes in order of priority the interests of family, class, etc. He assesses such an economically developed society as Argentina (and, by inference, most Latin American countries) as a civic-political failure precisely because of the unwillingness to make a commitment on the national level.[2]

One of the characteristics of many Latin Americans, intellectuals included, has been their high valuation of aristocratic privileges and styles of life, despite verbal expressions to the contrary. There are many spokesmen for extreme leftist causes in Latin America who are unwilling to place the interest of the collectivity ahead of personal ones. Such may well be the case of many old-line Communists, for example, who have developed vested interests in the *status quo* and scramble to find justification for acquiescence in the prevailing system in the fact that "conditions are not yet ripe for revolution." In any event, it is clear that relations between indigenous radicals and the Moscow-oriented Communists frequently are almost as tense and hostile as those between the latter and the Chinese.

This criticism of Powelson's ideas is not, however, a rejection of them. On the contrary, the matter of commitment to the collectivity

[2] See K. H. Silvert, "Introduction" and "The Costs of Anti-Nationalism: Argentina," in *Expectant Peoples: Nationalism and Development*, ed. by Silvert (New York 1963).

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on the attitudinal and behavioral levels seems quite crucial to an understanding of intra-Latin American and inter-American political differences, and therefore an important focus for systematic comparative research.[3] It is to be expected that the distribution of orientations of this sort will show considerable variation within and among nations, and the discernment of "pockets" of particular types may be the beginning of both theoretical and practical political breakthroughs. In my own study, for example, I have found within a sample of upper middle-class Panamanian secondary students a fairly well-defined syndrome of commitment to the collectivity—even at the cost of family wealth, status, or power—rejection of traditionalism, and general political radicalism. Translated into practical political terms, this means that within a highly privileged stratum of young people, those who favor exactly the social and economic changes called for by the Alliance for Progress are also those most nationalistic and radical, though strongly anti-Communist, in their orientations toward political means to these ends. This suggests the need for a rather massive reevaluation of the Alliance itself, which presently demands of the Latin Americans (at least formally) a comprehensive social transformation by means of persuasion, while maintaining an economic climate favorable to foreign and domestic private investment, in close cooperation with and essentially under the direction of the United States.

The bulk of Powelson's book consists in a dispassionate, highly reasonable analysis of modal U.S. and Latin American perspectives on the outstanding issues of political economy. Rather than choose to review these in their own right, I am concentrating on their evaluation within the context of national and regional politics, in order to indicate the probable limits and costs of "rationality." This can be illustrated by consideration of the role of private investment. Cognizant of the various bases of hostility to foreign private (particularly U.S.) investment, Powelson treats Mexican developments as offering a model relationship between national regulation and foreign-local cooperation (pp. 93-95). The "Mexicanization" policy adopted within recent years requires 51 per cent ownership by Mexican nationals of all investment in a wide range of important industries. Despite foreign predictions that external investment would decrease, an upward trend occurred after a short decline. Powelson then cites the advantages and responsibilities in this

[3] The comparative intra-national studies of Juan Linz (Spain) and intra- and international studies of Silvert and Frank Bonilla (Argentina, Chile, Brazil) demonstrate the value of operationalizing such major variables and submitting them to empirical assessment.

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relationship for foreign investors. This "third stage" in the history of foreign investment in Latin America imposes a critical responsibility as well on Latin Americans: political stability. "New projects will not be undertaken if economic forecasts are likely to be upset by revolution" (p. 95).

The fact is that a decline in U.S. private investment in Latin America (together with a tremendous flight of domestic capital) has occurred with the political uncertainties of the 1960's. The creation at this point of a climate favorable to such investors would mean in effect a moratorium on much of the social change projected in the Alliance, a program generated in response to demands for social change, which, in turn, accounted for the heightening political instability. It seems highly unrealistic to expect that a moratorium on such a basis could be achieved, except at the expense of ensuring a form of government committed to suppressing the advocates of social and economic change. This set of contingencies is not treated by Powelson. And the Mexican case is the deviant one within Latin America, in that it is probably the most stable of the set of political systems; it underwent its social revolution long ago, and foreign investors have had several decades during which to adjust to it.

Even in Mexico, however, the high priority placed on the acquisition of foreign private investment by the Mexican government has, among other factors, led it to place very stringent restrictions on domestic politics, a situation that most U.S. governmental and academic observers have either ignored, failed to perceive, or endorsed. Milton Eisenhower, for example, cites the Mexican polity as a highly encouraging example for Latin America. In regard to economic development, there is no question that Mexico's accomplishments have been extraordinary, but for Eisenhower to ignore the repeated violation of democratic processes[4] by the Mexican government when he rejects Castro largely on these very grounds is an unacceptable inconsistency. The implicit demand here is not to reject the Mexicans as especially undemocratic, but to subject the regimes of all political systems to the same empirical assessments, and to analyze the problem of maximizing democratic rules of the game on the basis of all cases. This would probably require much more sophisticated and complex thinking about and evaluation of the present Cuban political system.

[4] On this point, see P. B. Taylor, "The Mexican Elections of 1958: Affirmation of Authoritarianism?" *Western Political Quarterly*, XIII (September 1960), 722-44; and the monthly accounts of the Mexican campaign and other political events in the *Hispanic American Report*.

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III

The ultimate point of Szulc's thesis is that the West must immediately provide a democratic ideology and model that can be used by Latin Americans as they embark on their social revolutions. Not surprisingly, he fails to go beyond this to outline the democratic revolutionary model, or even to indicate some promising partial guidelines or directions, for there is no precedent for a rapid, profound, comprehensive societal transformation occurring through a democratic process, nor are such observers as Szulc able to find clear-cut cases of fundamental change through consensus or persuasion in contemporary Latin America.

Almond and Verba have concluded why such an expectation is unrealistic in their recent comparative study in depth of the civic culture. It is a culture of moderation, where political awareness and involvement are widespread but not highly salient or intense. Such orientations exist, they argue, only where politics has had a gradual, even development, and where the stakes are not so high as to force people "to enter into politics as if in a battle to protect their interests from dangerous adversaries."[5] Thus the issue might be more usefully put, proceeding from much the same values as Szulc's and Eisenhower's, in terms of maximizing participation and freedom during the aftermath of social revolution. It is within *this* set of limits that external influence might be brought to bear on political systems undergoing social revolution. The latter predictably will mean that coercion is going to be used against the current establishment, and Szulc does not indicate how he would evaluate such a phenomenon, or how he thinks the U.S. government might best behave to promote liberalism within the revolutionary context.

Milton Eisenhower's probable reaction, on the other hand, is indicated in his citation of the response to the Chilean students' famous letter to his brother, during the latter's 1960 trip to South America, in which the President said that "the United States is not opposed to Cuban reforms, but expects them to be made legally and democratically" (p. 245). There is little in his book that suggests an intellectual or emotional appreciation of the nature, the dynamism of social revolution.

Eisenhower repeatedly commits himself to democracy in Latin America, but has little comprehension of the dilemmas involved, other than that democracy is "under attack." If he were to posit democracy as a goal toward which to strive, but recognize that it cannot operate effectively without prior social and economic change, he would be in the

[5] Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton 1963), 500.

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impossible position of attacking Castro for sacrificing democracy to the pressure for industrialization, yet endorsing the same path for others. If, on the other hand, he were to opt for democracy *now*, he would encounter the paradox that unencumbered electoral processes today in Latin America would likely result in popularly sanctioned governments committed to social and economic change even at the cost of violation of democratic constitutionalism (a large proportion of my samples of middle- and working-class Panamanian and even Costa Rican secondary students endorse just such a proposition), or governments whose popularity and election were derived mainly from their vehement proposals to dissociate from the United States. The Goulart government *was* the constitutionally sanctioned government, and the return to a "strong" presidential system *was* endorsed overwhelmingly in a national referendum. The Frondizi government was elected on the basis of an extremely nationalistic and radical platform, Frondizi's consequent rejection of which led to the wave of cynicism about elections and the appurtenances of democracy in Argentina. After years of turmoil, the minority election of the socio-economically moderate Illia was also based on a platform of economic nationalism. Though his promised annulment of the North American oil contracts which Frondizi had signed (in exact violation of his campaign promise) now is involved in judicial proceedings, rendering the outcome of the issue unpredictable, it is worthy of mention that nationalism in Argentina is a *sine qua non* of presidential "availability." Similar dynamics may be perceived currently in such other major countries as Chile and Peru. Thus Eisenhower's insistence on democracy begs all the critical problems facing U.S. policy-makers.

IV

Despite Szulc's awareness of the long history of anti-Americanism and the tremendous impetus given it by U.S. governmental support of dictatorship and reaction during the 1950's, and despite his own description of the region-wide trend toward national independence from the United States, particularly in international politics, he poses as a critical need for the immediate future more effective U.S. propagation and leadership of the Latin American social revolution. Despite Milton Eisenhower's similar awareness and (more moderate) recital of the same trends, he refers to his brother's 1960 trip as demonstrating that the intra-hemisphere differences are "those of a family" (p. 11), and states that Latin Americans are involved with us in the East-West struggle, at the root of which is "Communist rejection of God and adherence

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to militarism, imperialism, and dialectical materialism," in contrast to "the Western Judaeo-Christian philosophy" (p. 51). These are assumptions for him, not empirical questions. (Nor does he deal with the inconsistency between this position on "Communist militarism" and the U.S. government's responsibility for reinforcing Latin American militarism, though he acknowledges that official policy has overemphasized military aspects of the Latin American problem.)

Once again, all energies are spent on the apparently losing battle to influence Latin Americans to accept U.S. precedents, direction, style, and leadership in their attack on their problems of social transformation, instead of expanding the focus to consider more probably fruitful alternative relationships with Latin America. One such alternative, for example, involves a very long-term perspective on our part and immediate acquiescence in the loosening of political bonds. The reasoning underlying this alternative is that the need for autonomy today in Latin America is very great, that psychologically such autonomy is an integral part of the process of national maturation (as Eisenhower notes, "The wine is bitter, but it is our wine"), that in the light of history the United States cannot change this need, and that the consequence of acquiescence in or support for such a development may be stronger, more mutually satisfying relationships in the long run. The only bit of evidence in support of this alternative is that it appears to "run with" the course of history, rather than to oppose it, and therefore offers the United States the possibility of modifying long-run trends rather than undertaking the infinitely more difficult, and perhaps impossible, task of reversing them against the apparent demands of a major sector of Latin American opinion.[6] Such a preliminary alternative, since it has received little sustained attention and development, immediately provokes a series of superficially rhetorical reactions. If the United States withdrew from the attempt to influence internal Latin American politics directly (including putting an end to military aid), or relaxed its demands for Latin American support, or ceased economic assistance until such time as political transformations had been wrought so that the assistance would contribute to more productive, egalitarian, and just societies, would not the field be left to the extremists, the Communists? If the above were to occur, would not the Latin American governments inevitably turn toward the Russians for assistance and protection?

[6] A useful report on legislative and public opinion in Brazil on international and domestic politics is Lloyd A. Free's *Some International Implications of the Political Psychology of Brazilians* (Princeton 1961).

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It is, however, not at all established that the Russians would or could welcome such a vastly expanded foreign aid program. Nor is it established that incumbent Latin elites would permit substantial dependence on the USSR. But it is a hypothesis worthy of consideration that much of the Latin American impetus toward the Communist bloc or neutralism is a function of perceived domination by the United States. If the latter behaved so as to change that perception, and particularly if it could demonstrate its capacity to associate positively with social revolutionary systems in transition from preindustrialism, that reaction might in turn be transformed over time. In any event, present U.S. policy is to "hold" Latin America against the advancing tide of communism, though the probability is very high that no policy can prevent every last one of these countries from breaking away to neutralism or the Communist bloc. This of course was demonstrated by the Cuban Revolution, and may be repeated in different form if the Chilean election goes to the candidate of the Socialist-Communist alliance, if British Guiana gains independence under Jagan, or, most likely of all, if radical nationalism explodes in such a country as Panama. The argument here is not that the above alternatives are comprehensive and the most realistic, but that present policy direction is sterile and highly unrealistic. In such a situation, rationality may well lie in experimentation.

V

The two writers most completely concerned with political dynamics, Szulc and Eisenhower, are so concerned with the Communist threat that they fail to assess the possibility of reactionary developments, although there seems as much or more impetus in this direction. At least four potential sources of influence toward the establishment of reactionary oligarchies may be identified. The military includes a significant faction of officers who fear Jacobin consequences from the unleashing of reform movements to the point where the *status quo* is rigidly defended. Though there have always been those who fear the uncertainty inherent in change, fresh impetus toward control or repression of reformers has undoubtedly resulted from these officers' awareness of the consequences of the Cuban Revolution, a reform movement that brought about the destruction of the military establishment, including the execution of numerous officers.

Similarly, elements of the middle class have always aspired to the attainment of traditional privileges and styles of life. These have apparently now been joined by other, formerly "progressive" members of

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the middle class whose reformism has been muted by fear that a wave of change, once it has gathered momentum, may destroy those who supplied the initial impetus—again, as was the case in Cuba. If the choice is narrowed to radicalism or reaction, as both Szulc and Eisenhower think is increasingly the case, such middle-class elements can be expected to opt for the latter.

While the policy of the U.S. government has been far from consistent on these matters for years, its commitment against communism is so great and so salient that internal Latin American elements favoring a reactionary course have acted as if they could count on U.S. support or at least helpful acquiescence. Recent indications are that U.S. official ambivalence has been changing in the direction of support for political elements on the right, rather than taking a chance on support for reformers who may lose their control over the situation.

A final element may be Soviet-oriented Communist parties. To the extent that the emerging struggle becomes one between radical revolutionaries and reactionaries, these parties may behave in such a manner as to promote the ascendancy of the latter. One indication of this is their opposition to indigenous radicals bent on raising revolution by means of guerrilla warfare—a development which the Party press has been inveighing against in country after country.[7] As Szulc perceptively notes (though in his book he repeatedly treats the Communist threat as monolithic and as the most extreme element in Latin American politics), the costs of alliances with left-leaning neutrals and the acquisition of satellites are increasingly difficult for the Russians to cope with. Recent indications are that the Russians are seeking a Cuban-American *détente* that would relieve their military costs on the island and their economic assistance costs through greater reliance on normal international trade channels. If this is so—and it is plausible enough at least to assess in systematic fashion—then it seems unlikely that the Russians are prepared to finance the economic development and other politico-economic costs of a pro-Communist Brazil. Furthermore—again, as Szulc notes—such a development would threaten the emerging association between Russia and the United States, a policy which may be far more important to the former than the acquisition of a string of Latin American dependencies. It is a fascinating question for the future what the Russian stance will be toward a probable emerging alliance between indigenous radicals and Maoist Communists in Latin America. It is not altogether unrealistic to project a growing tendency on the

[7] See the evidence provided by Ernst Halperin, "Castroism—Challenge to the Latin American Communists," *Problems of Communism*, XII (September-October 1963), 9-18.

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part of the two affluent industrialized powers to act, if not together, at least not in opposition against the combined forces of the radical "have-nots."

Szulc's preoccupation with changes toward the left is evident in his treatment of the role of the military. New military generations are described as "full of a semi-reformist zeal," and as promoters of a nationalism of the Nasserite type. He adopts the generalization, developed by Edwin Lieuwen in *Arms and Politics in Latin America*,[8] that the increasing recruitment of officers from the ranks of "the socially conscious middle classes" is transforming the military into "powerful progressive forces" (p. 267).

Undoubtedly one can distinguish military factions in some countries that can be characterized in certain respects as progressive—in Brazil and El Salvador, for example. But the bulk of military politics has been on the side of the *status quo*, and the progressive factions have been politically weak in comparison with the dominant conservative ones during the recent ascendance of socially revolutionary politics. The military has much more often opted to maintain its privileges than to identify with reformers. When one considers the security, income, and perquisites of the officers *and* the rank and file vis-à-vis civilian counterparts, this support of essentially traditional political systems is easy to comprehend. While this is particularly obvious in such socio-economically underdeveloped countries as Honduras, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Guatemala, it has attenuated less in the socially more complex countries than Szulc's (and Lieuwen's) thesis would indicate. The alternative hypothesis that one may suggest is that the recruit or officer of poor or modest origins considers himself lucky to achieve the rewards of military life, and tends to support the system that provides them, regardless of the manner in which that system treats his less fortunate fellows.

VI

The image of Latin America provided by these books is pretty thoroughly pessimistic—the tone of most writing on the region within recent years. The most damning is perhaps that of Vianna Moog; though a Brazilian writing on Brazil, he describes a culture in fundamental ways apparently typical of the whole area. Corruption is deplored, as are personalism, unrealistic and inexpert bureaucracies, elitest educational systems, and disrespect for applied science and theoretical knowledge acquired through empirical investigation and hard work. Says

[8] New York 1961.

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Moog, "What they [the Brazilians] really admire is not culture in action, but culture and knowledge in the pure state" (p. 136). The period since the abolition of slavery is characterized not only by a continuation of the search for privilege on the part of the former masters, but also of "freedmen . . . lacking better examples . . . trying to conceal their origins by cultivating the same reservations as their former masters against labor, craftsmanship, trade, specialization, mechanization, industry, and science with constructive . . . ends" (p. 211). Whereas law enforcement in the United States is seen as straightforward in operation, in Brazil economic "readjustments" and "the periodic reward of fiscal amnesties" go precisely to the wealthy wrongdoers—for example, to "those who manage to earn in coffee, rubber, sugar, or cotton, the sums needed to pay the interest, and the interest on the interest, of debts resulting from pleasure trips to Europe . . . and of a standard of living that contrasts with the misery of the poor . . ." (p. 178).

This culture is that of a society emerging from the preindustrial type. Gideon Sjoberg has provided a systematic description and analysis of such societies, emphasizing technology as the key independent variable but not to the exclusion of such others as social power and cultural values, and indicating the interdependence of the political, economic, social class, religious, educational, and family systems.[9] His empirical generalizations about the preindustrial society indicate the nonuniqueness of much of what academic Latin Americanists have insisted were peculiarly Latin American culture traits. Today Latin American countries are in varying degrees of transition from preindustrial social structures, and Sjoberg's systematic statement directs the focus of serious analysts away from superficial cultural criticisms to an intellectual appreciation of the system of factors that accounts for the extraordinary tenacity of preindustrial cultural forms. (The study contains a highly useful analysis of the nonpoliticization of the lower class in the preindustrial city, which helps to explain why the urban pot has typically failed to boil over in contemporary Latin America, despite virtually uniform predictions that it would do so by journalists, politicians, and academicians, the present set of writers included.)

But Sjoberg has also gone beyond this point, and beyond the stopping point of the four writers considered here, by projecting a model of the process by which societies in transition from preindustrialism can attain rapid industrializaton.[10] His model may not be the only

[9] *The Preindustrial City: Past and Present* (New York 1960).

[10] "Political Structure, Ideology, and Economic Development," a paper prepared for the Carnegie Seminar on Political and Administrative Development, Department of Government, Indiana University, 1962.

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logical possibility, but it is a theoretically informed one in a problem area of the highest significance. Few others working in the area have produced competitive models; most notably are they lacking from the extended school that is committed (as is Sjoberg privately) to political democracy.

Sjoberg proposes that "If modernizing societies are to undergo *rapid* industrialization, then we must expect this to occur within the context of a high degree of totalitarianism—especially in a one-party state having a leadership of a messianic or charismatic sort." The authority of charismatic leadership shifts in derivation in the modernizing situation from appeal to absolutes and/or tradition to the consent of the governed. The division of labor being relatively simple and experts consequently few, the leader and his ruling group face few restraints. So antagonistic is the incumbent elite, so overwhelming are the society's problems, and so scarce the resources (amply described by all four writers) that one of the few means to overcome "impossible" obstacles is an ideology of the "impossible," a diffuse nationalist glorification of the people, a future of infinite possibility, and a rejection of the traditional past. Through rationalization by this ideology and the psychic gratification provided by this new politics, the leader can enlist the commitment of the masses to development and to the material sacrifices this requires. The focus on the collectivity helps to overcome the strains deriving from the disjunctive social changes associated with modernization (and that might well destroy the political fabric of such a society lacking this type of revolutionary structure). The asceticism of the leader, his image of the future, and his organizational apparatus combine to convert the worker from the preindustrial normative order concerning labor. Thus, the political system is the major agent of cultural change promoting and sustaining development.

Where Vianna Moog argues for a Brazilian "emotional orientation" and moral leadership as the means to national cultural maturity, he offers only the path of national identification with the example of the eighteenth-century mulatto sculptor, Aleijadinho, who was born a slave (and for the United States, the example of Lincoln). The other writers offer little more in the way of models for economic development and cultural change. Is Sjoberg's model all that exists? Until others as theoretically compelling are produced, attention might best be paid to this one and the problems it raises concerning the manner in which the industrially advanced societies can best accommodate the radically changing nature of the "other" world.

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TOWARD FURTHER MODERNIZATION OF THE STUDY OF NEW NATIONS

By MANFRED HALPERN

Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, eds., *Nation-Building*, New York, Atherton Press, 1963, 167 pp. $4.50.
Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa*, New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1963, 310 pp. $6.95.
Lucy Mair, *New Nations*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1963, 235 pp. $4.50.

WHERE are we now in the study of new nations? Three books that are the product of nineteen experienced minds should help to establish our present position. *Nation-Building* grew out of a panel discussion at the 1962 meeting of the American Political Science Association organized by Karl W. Deutsch. *Old Societies and New States* reflects the work of the Committee for the Comparative Study of New Nations at the University of Chicago. *New Nations* represents the thinking of that British school of social anthropologists who, beginning with Radcliffe-Brown, have been especially interested in problems of process, authority, change, and conflict in society.

All three books should encourage the scholars who nourished the hope in the early 1950's that the systematic comparative study of new nations could overcome the amorphous parochialism of area studies and contribute new insights and hypotheses to the general study of politics and society. Only occasionally do these essays still echo sounds of battle with those who once dominated non-Western studies—the collectors of separate items of possible or undoubted cultural value and the writers of sequential but not necessarily consequential chronicles whose influence delayed the recognition and analysis of change in Africa and the Far East, and perhaps longest of all in the Middle East. Even those authors who for reasons of professional modesty confine themselves to the region they know best, or who accept new academic jurisdictions that place China or Ethiopia out of bounds for not constituting "new" states, welcome concepts first developed by a different discipline or for a different country.

Indeed, the concern with "new nations" is unlikely to constrict exploration. It is difficult to embrace most of the world, yet remain careful not to touch all of it. The new tasks and problems of underdeveloped nations are visible in some form everywhere in the world. The design of *Nation-Building* is obviously based on this fact. In that APSA

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

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volume, Richard L. Merritt well illustrates the usefulness of remembering that the United States itself was once a new nation. In the Chicago volume, though focused on new states, Lloyd Fallers in a most perceptive comparative study of social stratification utilizes Western history to great advantage. Robert Levine declares his intention to explore political socialization and cultural change "in the context of the new and changing nations of Asia and Africa," but half of the references in his useful paper are to studies founded on Western materials. I propose, several paragraphs later, not only to welcome these border transgressions but to insist on their necessity. But, as a start, I should acknowledge that there is something to be said for the hospitable exclusiveness involved in the confining of one's study to new nations.

First of all, the subject of new nations is not as big as it looks. We do not yet know very much about most of the world. Certainly, for the majority of countries of the Middle East and North Africa we possess not a single work of any merit that discusses the political system empirically or theoretically as a system in process of transformation.[1] A rather more positive estimate may be made about the second least developed area of scholarship—Latin American studies.[2] Nonetheless, in the present state of the field, it is quite feasible for a scholar in his mid-thirties who has made a major contribution to the study of Africa to shift his research to Latin America, yet also continue to master and contribute to the general literature on modernization.

It is the very scarcity of our present knowledge about underdeveloped nations that makes this new kind of liberal education not only possible but essential. Information about institutions, processes, behavior, or values in any one country is perceived as being validly enlarged by data from other regions when we focus on structures playing functionally equivalent roles in a similar context. It is the reliance on theory that makes this enterprise possible, turning broadly scattered and still inadequate materials into cumulative scholarship. Nor is this wide-ranging but empirically discriminating and theory-bound net unrelated to the life to be caught. As McKim Marriott shows in the Chicago volume, the culture of the new nations has itself a highly selective memory of the past. While it remains a vital and unresolved question in what manner the past, when transfigured by the present, may still be alive in different societies, neither we nor the new nations must become familiar

[1] Manfred Halpern, "Middle Eastern Studies: A Review of the State of the Field with a Few Examples," *World Politics*, XV (October 1962), 108-22.

[2] Merle Kling, "Area Studies and Comparative Politics—The Latin American Experience," paper prepared for the Annual Convention of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 4-7, 1963.

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with their entire past before we or they can cope with the issues of modernization. We can be expert and professional in the study of the modernization of new nations without having to become universal encyclopedists. The study of new nations is not only a manageable undertaking but will probably remain so, as the likely increase in data helps to refine our theories and in turn allows us to decide with greater discrimination what facts are really worth looking for.

There are other good reasons for concentrating on the study of new nations. The underdeveloped areas are, as Jacques Berque recently put it, underdeveloped in part because they are the underanalyzed nations of the world. We need to overcome a major gap not only in human knowledge but in human action. Problems are in some important ways actually easier to perceive and analyze in new nations than in the old. The prerequisites and requisites of development, stability, or nationhood, and the transformation of ideologies, personalities, laws, and institutions are dramatized with greater clarity than in the seemingly established societies. Indeed, the analyst's attention (and even the politician's) is more readily drawn to the larger issues of politics than in the societies now possessed of consensus and hence of vast areas of gray, yielding multivariate correlations. The questions to which we had been giving increasingly familiar answers—such as the relationship of authoritarianism to democracy, or the implications of what have been assumed to be typical Hindu values, or the tasks of nation-building—have had to be reopened, thanks to the systematic comparative study of new nations. At the same time, new major questions have been discovered. Why is it, for example, that African and Islamic Middle Eastern nations bent upon modernization tend to break radically with their past while South and Southeast Asian nations tend, so far, to modernize by adding, subtracting, and fusing rather than by uprooting and transforming? How long will the latter be able to modernize successfully in this style of moderation? Or another such question: what can socialism mean under conditions of great scarcity?

There are further advantages in focusing on new nations. It may help to diminish our own parochialism by forcing us to take notice that, contrary to our expectations, neighbors often have less in common with each other than strangers. Nasser has learned more from Tito than from any of his Arab neighbors. The analyst seeking to understand the future of successful single-party dominance and modernization in Tunisia would probably do well to study Mexico's experience. Syria's structured instability has many causes comparable to those shaping the French system.

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Such studies also make it plain that the West is falling behind in its intellectual contribution to the needs of the new nations. We may take pride in having been the first to develop the theorist and field researcher of change in alien societies. However, the last Westerner to recognize explicitly and deliberately that theories about man and society in transformation have ideological implications and to be heard by all the world was a German in England a century ago. That so old and inadequate a framework should still have so much appeal today in the new nations suggests that it is high time to ask the great questions all over again. One could begin by accepting Marx's proposition that to be radical is to deal with roots, and the root of the matter is man in transformation, and then concentrate on the correlations that are important—inquiring systematically of what use authority may be when man and his relationship to others and to the material universe are being fundamentally transformed.

Clearly the travails of the peoples of the new nations expose what American social scientists in various disciplines have been tending to forget: the fundamental connection between politics and society. Indeed, as Edward Shils argues so well in a preface to the Chicago volume and as both *New Nations* and *Nation-Building* seek to illustrate, when the formation of a new polity and society is at stake, a macroscopic perspective is required—study which relates specific issues to the processes of polity and society as a whole.

To put this point more sharply than these essays do (although a few, though certainly not all, of the authors may agree), the stresses, discontinuities, and urgencies in the development of the new nations underline the primacy of politics in the process of social transformation. It seems plain that politics has wider content and significance than the labels that analysts more accustomed to order than change have bestowed on political inputs and outputs. The tendency of sociologists and anthropologists to think of political systems as embedded in social systems, valid and important as this orientation is, has also led to the habit (though it did not need to do so) of viewing the political system as merely derived from society—a subsystem contributing primarily to the maintenance of the social system as a whole. Political scientists themselves have contributed to this diminution of political analysis by uncritically accepting this prevailing structural-functional habit of organizing the subject and by constricting themselves principally to a concern with coercion, bargaining, or administration. The economists —among all social scientists probably the most influential in the making of policy toward new nations during the past decade—have too often

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

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relegated politics to the role of an obstacle to be resolved mainly by offering economic incentives for interest aggregation and greater organizational competence.[3] This proposition has been of powerful help in encouraging the extension of foreign aid, but also in spreading bafflement as to why foreign aid does not yield better political results.

Championing the primacy of politics is not, however, based on loyalty to a discipline. We did not need to pay undue attention to the political system in the premodern age when all revolts, however violent, were intended to consolidate the existing political order by bringing into power leadership that would exercise customary authority with greater justice or greater partisan strength. In an age of modernization, however, revolutions, even if bloodless, are acts which transform the political order so that the latter may also transform society. Government then becomes the art of avoiding, delaying, or guiding such a revolution. The cohesion, character, and movement of society are at stake in the politics of modernization. Of all systems affected by the disintegration of a closed traditional or colonial society, none has more potential capacity than the political for rapidly and decisively mustering coercive power. More. None can muster material and institutional resources as quickly. None can more quickly organize and give effective institutional expression to the largest and usually also the most powerful social class which is entirely a product of modernization—namely, the salaried middle class. None has the capacity more quickly or effectively to organize the participation of the masses in new types of roles that would fashion a nation and rebuild the consciousness, organization, and material interdependence of society. None can as readily develop and spread an ideology to substitute for the faith that was and the political culture that has not yet grown into being. (By ideology I mean no dogma—though all ideologies, including pragmatism, can become dogmatic—but an explicit framework of the means

[3] This is the principal political theme of a document which had more impact than most in the course of its transmutation from policy recommendations to the U.S. executive, draft for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and finally text for thousands of students and citizens—*The Emerging Nations: Their Growth and United States Policy*, ed. by Max F. Millikan and Donald L. M. Blackmer (Boston 1961). Yet if, "[i]n short, the task is no less than to alter, usually quite radically, the outlook, skills and resources of the majority of the population" (p. 52), then interests must first be transformed before there is hope of aggregating them on any basis other than the accustomed distribution of benefits. There is also inadequate recognition in this book that economic development will be destabilizing (by altering values, demands, and power relations), needs to be destabilizing (in order to exchange old habits and institutions for the new that alone can make investments productive and secure), and that the crucial historical payoff of economic development lies not merely in satisfying effective economic demands, but in providing means for overcoming the social, political, and economic imbalances created by the revolution of modernization.

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and ends of society, serving as the frame of analysis, the inspiration of action, and the touchstone of accomplishments.) The political system need not play at all times as weighty a role as it does during crises of transformation. Still, politics tends to retain its primacy because the political system possesses greater and more immediate power than any other system for maintaining or altering society's capacity to generate and absorb persistent transformation—the essence of modernization.[4]

It is solely from this perspective that I would criticize Lucy Mair's remarkably clear, informative, and insightful book. (In this sense, "review articles," in contrast to reviews, are intrinsically unfair to authors. The critic, not the author, chooses the issues of discussion, and in this instance he must also ignore some of the nineteen authors concerned.) Mair describes and analyzes vividly and systematically the problems of Africans adjusting to new modes of livelihood, family patterns, and religious ties, as well as urban life and new political states. Her conclusions do not speak of revolution: "It is the contention of this book that the social pressures which operate in a rapidly changing society are those which are to be found in any society, and are the same as those that . . . maintained the small-scale societies in their relatively unchanging condition in the past: the pursuit of individual advantage within a framework of social expectations to which individuals respond by conformity or resistance as they choose . . ." (pp. 15 and 9). This may well be the way most people continue to understand and adjust themselves to the risks and opportunities of life, and such a response is itself a fact of great political consequence. Political leaders, however, cannot avoid confronting (or else being devoured by) a revolution of modernization which creates fundamentally new, system-transforming issues, demands, and capacities. Whether leadership be centralized or based on pluralistic interest-bargaining, policy-making becomes policy-planning if it intends to develop a capacity for dealing with this historical transformation of society.

[4] This is why I am baffled by a statement at the very beginning of Everett E. Hagen's far-ranging and courageous enterprise toward synthesis, *On the Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Began* (Homewood, Ill., 1962). He writes: "The study of culture and of primitive societies by anthropologists, of the social structure of societies by sociologists, and of personality formation by psychologists have been largely separate disciplines. They have reached a point at which they should be brought together." But then he adds a footnote: "I do not mention political science. The newer school of political science integrates the three social sciences in the study of some aspects of social behavior, but it should not be listed as a fourth discipline" (p. 3 and note 1). I recognize that not only political scientists but Presidents have given aid and comfort to the holders of this view. In Hagen's book, the *political* innovator gets little attention. Yet why should social scientists be less aware of the power of politics or political innovation than, say, Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen or President Gamal abd al-Nasser?

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Mair misses the revolutionary nature of modernization because she (unlike African leaders) intends to neglect politics: "Social changes are very often the concomitants or consequences of technological changes and in the field to be covered by this book, they are very largely so" (p. 17). "In contrasting small-scale and industrialized societies I have made the nature of the techniques at their disposal the essential characteristic which distinguishes them," she states, and goes on to explain the "characteristic changes that are taking place in the major social fields . . . in terms of the extension of the scale of social relationships" (pp. 20 and 9). Hence, speaking of government, she writes, "One can see the needs of commerce and 'large-scale' production as the prime motive for the extension of European rule over tropical countries, as it is for the tightening of government control in those which remain independent." She mentions only three other functions of government by way of example—to secure respect for law, to enhance public health, and to engage in soil conservation (pp. 21-22). It is not that she fails to add a great deal later that is fresh and sensible on chiefs, nationalists, and democracy in the new African states. She simply does not propose to take politics too seriously: "Whatever aspect of social structure is considered, it will be found that the most striking changes can be seen as the effects of the introduction or wider extension of a money economy and the development of large-scale industry" (p. 32).

This attitude toward politics is by now also more popular among Western policy-makers than among Marxists. As David A. Wilson's concise and compelling essay in *Nation-Building* demonstrates, Communists do not in all stages concentrate on technology and production relations but recognize the priority of politically oriented and socially penetrating mobilization. Political and military power, propaganda, and economic reconstruction conceived separately from such a mobilization or even in isolation from one another are unlikely to contribute effectively to nation-building. This much many non-Western leaders have learned without borrowing totalitarian (though often resorting to authoritarian) means. One has the impression (is it erroneous?) that more non-Western than Western analysts or leaders have recognized the scope of the challenge and the connections that must be newly fashioned in the revolution of modernization, even though these new leaders may still lack sufficient resources and skills to succeed.

It is not enough, however, to recognize the scope and importance of politics—that the state is building the new nations. Politics is also transforming society—that is to say, all systems by which man organizes his life—and politics is itself also being transformed by the changing

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society. This is a more complex relationship and an even more profound cause affecting the power or impotence of politics than the reorganization of the public loyalties and public relationships of the nation.

A number of authors touch usefully on the latter theme. Clifford Geertz in his Chicago volume, for example, shows how the reduction of primordial sentiments of kinship, religion, language, and custom to civil order is initially rendered more rather than less difficult by modernization. Robert E. Scott in *Nation-Building* emphasizes the remaining burden of insufficient connections between the nation-state and society. "Of all the countries of Latin America, Mexico probably has made the greatest relative progress. [Yet] focusing more directly on political values, I have found that, despite a clearly defined tendency toward increasing homogeneity of outlook and constructive fusion of traditional with modern political norms, after an enforced legitimacy of over half a century, the integration process is by no means complete in the vast majority of Mexicans, and for a great many is just beginning. . . . The greatest part of the population, in fact, has not yet achieved a complete transition from norms producing action patterns appropriate for less developed polities to those required for a modern political system" (pp. 79-81).

The search for short cuts for relating politics to society therefore flourishes. An imaginative analysis of the utility of such short cuts is contained in David Apter's essay on "Political Religion in the New Nations" in the Chicago volume. Political religion, such as he observes in Guinea, Ghana, Mali, China, and Indonesia, specifies permissible definitions of individual continuity, meaning, and identity, in order to strengthen the state's capacity for mobilization at the cost of societal pluralism, flexibility, and piecemeal bargaining. In contrast to the latter "reconciliation systems," "mobilization systems . . . pose the problem of modernization in terms of an organizational rather than an industrial revolution; and in order to achieve modernization by organizational means, political religion . . . makes monopolistic claims of authority and prescience." As the actual relevance or effectiveness of the claims of political religion decline, ritual and dogma tend to increase (pp. 96-97). Apter makes many illuminating comments on the style and costs of such a system, and on its capabilities for change. He concludes by acknowledging that the difficulty in his analysis has been "how to weave together the relationship between those fundamental needs both religion and politics can satisfy in ordinary human beings while relating [these needs] to the dynamic properties of

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different structural types. Properly, then, this discussion ought to be regarded as the beginning of a study rather than as the end of it" (p. 101).

II

I have been citing a number of reasons and quoting a number of demonstrations why there is much to be said for concentrating studies on comparisons among new nations. A lifetime of work for many scholars still remains to be done on the level of vision and abstraction on which we now find ourselves. Not all scholars will find time or inclination to go beyond this level: there is no point underestimating the cost of learning the many languages of South or Southeast Asia needed for comparative work; the difficulties of acquiring Arabic, which is a language group rather than a language; or the investment needed for studying politics conducted among the masses of a single nation in a variety of vernacular languages. Still, where do we need to go from our present beginning in order to understand more thoroughly the alternative roads to modernization and their costs, especially if we mean to see more clearly the relationship among men, politics, and society in transformation?

I suggest that two steps are required for the sake of better theory. The first is to recognize that we live, all of us, in new nations. The second is to find ways of focusing on *system*-transformation, not only on changes within particular institutions and processes or among certain clusters of them.[5]

I would argue that the revolution of modernization involves the transformation of all systems by which man organizes his society—the political, social, economic, intellectual, religious, and psychological systems. The revolution of modernization, however, is the first revolution of mankind to set a new price upon stability in any system of society—namely, it requires an intrinsic capacity to generate and absorb continuing transformation.[6] This constitutes both the unique oppor-

[5] I have developed some of these perspectives at greater length in "Notes on the Revolution of Modernization in National and International Society," to be published in the NOMOS Yearbook on *Revolution*, as part of a series sponsored by the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy.

[6] In the essay cited in the preceding note, I have tried to define "transformation" more abstractly and to discriminate among types of transformation. Here it may, one hopes, be sufficient to illustrate the meaning of transformation by example. Modernization demands of all systems of society the capacity which the scientific community already possesses: the ability to persist continuously in the enterprise of responding to the challenge of new questions, new facts, and inadequate solutions by developing, maintaining, modifying, and disintegrating systems of theory. That such scientific revolutions, even under the best of circumstances, tend to be discontinuous, conflict-

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tunity and the unique requirement of the revolution of modernization. Traditional societies, by contrast, were not faced continuously by system-transforming demands. When, usually only after centuries, they were confronted by a particular challenge of this kind, they were capable of responding only by disintegrating or by creating a new closed system.[7]

Modernization is uniquely marked, over time, by the following developments: (1) All premodern systems of a society disintegrate as systems, and so does the premodern pattern in which these systems interacted with each other and so maintained a society's particular life-process. (This radical change is usually obscured by the fact that some—never all—of the elements or linkages of premodern systems continue to function, though with altered relevance and effectiveness.)

(2) The revolution of modernization eliminates as fully adequate responses to the successful survival of societies all three methods which constituted the premodern alternatives for confronting stability and change: (a) changes *in* certain structures and functions within some systems of a society without altering the core pattern of the systems (e.g., accepting new tools without altering a kinship-based political system); (b) changes *of* some of the systems of a society and the patterns relating them to each other, but not involving a change of all systems or all patterns of relationship (e.g., the establishment of traditional bureaucratic empires based on certain free-floating resources available to a centralized authority, combined with the continuing autonomy at least of kinship groups; the growth of "great cultures" combined with the persistence of "little cultures," etc.); or (c) resistance to change through isolation. By contrast, the revolution of modernization for the first time raises the opportunity and need (which represent at the same time the minimum and maximum chance for wedding stability and change) to create systems that derive their stability from their intrinsic capacity to generate and absorb continuing transformation.

This concept of the revolution, obviously, applies not merely to underdeveloped areas, but to the entire world. American ideas, values, institutions, and processes are not yet sufficiently developed to meet the challenges that face us—for maintaining peace, eliminating poverty,

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ridden, and marked by considerable intervals of concentration on refining and enlarging existing systems, helps to make scientific transformations particularly characteristic examples of the revolution of modernization. See Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago 1962).

[7] For a well-argued plea for the reexamination of traditional societies for their relationship to contemporary political alternatives, see Ann Ruth Willner, "The Underdeveloped Study of Political Development," *World Politics*, XVI (April 1964), 480-82.

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ending ignorance and bigotry, for dealing with the sheer growth in the number of people, institutions, and facts, for mastering our technology, and for preserving and spreading beauty. In this sense, the fortunes of the underdeveloped areas are a more dramatic and more intense reflection of our own lives.

What we need to know in order to understand any political system in relation to the revolution of modernization is the interaction among three elements: the *imbalances* existing within and among the systems of a society (e.g., the disparity between population and resources, between educated men and the jobs available for them, between modern problems and theories relevant for understanding them) and the *will* and *capacity* of a society to transform these imbalances so that it may generate and absorb continuing transformation. The question, in short, is whether and at what cost any particular action or event facilitates the process of transformation in the system as a whole, or in the relationship of any one system to other systems in society.

I would, therefore, also propose that the distinction commonly made between transitional and modernizing systems needs to be recast. I would apply the term "transitional" to any political system in which the structural changes and demands set loose by the uncontrolled forces of transformation exceed the will or capacity of political authority to cope with them. Transition, therefore, is a term used without any predetermining judgment of the direction in fact being taken by such a society. The term "modernizing" applies to any political system which, in contrast to the transitional, has achieved the will and capacity to deal with social change. To be a modernizing state, therefore, is no firm, final achievement, but rather a persistent capacity for coping with a permanent revolution. I would use the broader term "modern," therefore, to refer not to time but generically—that is, to refer to both transitional and modernizing systems—for the revolution of modernization is marked by the emergence of these two types of systems for the first time in history, whether five hundred years ago or during the past decade.

My interest here is not in advancing yet another typology, but in sketching out a different approach toward the study of transformation—an approach focusing on the comparison of systems and of factors affecting systemic change in similar systems, or from one system to another.[8] Nothing proposed here is intended as a substitution, for example, for Apter's concept of mobilization and reconciliation sys-

[8] Since different concerns do require different typologies, I have outlined portions of a typology of transitional and modernizing political systems in the NOMOS essay referred to in note 5.

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Volume 18, Number 3 **Summer 1964**

ARTICLES

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Urban Politics: The New Convergence of Power, by Robert H. Salisbury 33
The Alabama Senatorial Election of 1962: Return of Inter-Party Competition, by Walter Dean Burnham 31
Traditional Role Performance and the Development of Modern Political Parties: The Indian Case, by Myron Weiner 21
On the Logical Analysis of Power-Attribution Procedures, by Benjamin Walter 35
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tems. Seen from our perspective, these concepts are transformed. We observe two different types of mobilization systems: (1) a transitional system which is *extremist* because it is moving toward the institutionalizing of terror and dogma in order to impose certainty in the midst of change; and (2) a modernizing system which is *radical* because it is moving toward the mustering of sufficient strength to uproot survivals of the past that prevent new growth and to establish roots for modern ideas and institutions. We also observe reconciliation systems, then, not simply as moderate and moderating systems equidistant from all extremes, but as transitional or modernizing, depending on the relationship among imbalances, will, and capacity involved in such a system. It matters a great deal whether a reconciliation system is only moderate while facing immoderate problems.

For becoming aware of, and analyzing, modernization as a unique kind of systemic transformation, perhaps the most popular of all concepts of modernization is as yet of little help—namely, modernization viewed as a cluster of particular indices.[9] Much important work can be done in this manner, and the majority of essays under consideration depend on such indices, whether quantitative or (more often) qualitative. Currently accepted indices, however, cannot tell us what capacity the new system possesses for enduring as a system, or for generating and absorbing continuing transformation. They do not lead us toward understanding how, in developing the capacity for wedding stability and change in modern systems, different values, behavior, processes, or institutions may successfully substitute for each other or mix together. Present indices do not allow us to distinguish among types of modern systems in terms of their varying involvement in the process of systemic transformation. Thus, the indices we need will require that we see our own society also as sharing in the first world-wide revolution in human history and that we accept no present form of the modern as final.

If I have dealt with modernization as a unique process of system transformation, and slighted its substance, it has been—I should make this plain—for ideological reasons. At this point in the struggle for modernization and our understanding of it, what most of the world

[9] One of the broadest, yet most succinctly stated, sets of indices for modernization may be found in Robert E. Ward's "Political Modernization and Political Culture in Japan," *World Politics*, XV (July 1963), 570-71. Among the most penetrating criticisms of current indices of modernization are the essay by Joseph La Palombara in the book edited by him, *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton 1963), 35-39; and Fred W. Riggs, "The Theory of Developing Polities," *World Politics*, XVI (October 1963), 147-71.

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Vol. VI **CONTENTS** **No. 1 (July 1964)**

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still lacks is the capacity and creativity for engaging in this process of transformation and exploring its various means and alternatives. In emphasizing process and capacity, both in analysis and in action, I do not mean to ignore the need for evaluating the present content and evolving ends of modernization. But if truth, freedom, equality, fraternity, peace, and beauty are dear to us, we shall be able to secure them only by doing and saying things about them that are in fact relevant to the transformations of our time. I think that such a response will become easier than it has been as we and others experience greater capacity to generate and absorb transformation. To go now beyond the analysis of the historical process and its challenges, alternatives, means, and costs would necessarily force us to rely on old clichés and dogmas, for we have not yet finished our homework and the age is without prophets or even creative utopians.

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